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Mere Fidelity: Evangelical Blind Spots with Collin Hansen

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Collin Hansen is Editorial Director at The Gospel Coalition and author of the new book Blind Spotswherein he attempts to help evangelicals overcome some of the major faultlines in the movement by becoming more self-aware about the limitations of our own emphases and perspectives. To hear his take on that, well, you have to listen.

The article that Collin mentioned in the podcast, which I wrote, is here.

One other business note:  we have ordered new equipment and it should be arriving sometime next week. Thanks again to everyone who so graciously assisted us. We hope that it goes a long ways toward improving our sound.



Mere Fidelity: Should Women Preach?

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John Piper answered “no.” Our own Andrew Wilson responded “yup.” Tom Schreiner weighed in with his “nope.” And then Andrew said “Still yes, mate.”

We discuss. Enjoy.

If you enjoyed the show (AND ONLY IF), leave us a review at iTunes.  If you didn’t enjoy the show, let us know and we’ll work to make it better.  Or we’ll ignore you.  And if you want to subscribe by RSS, you can do that here.

Finally, as always, follow DerekAlastair, and Andrew for more tweet-sized brilliance.  And thanks to Timothy Motte for his sound editing work.


Mere Fidelity: Pentecost and the Prophetic Gift of the Spirit

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Having just celebrated Pentecost, we consider the role that the frequently overlooked ‘prophetic’ gift of the Spirit plays in the life of the church.

Articles to consider include Peter Leithart’s essay on the seven spirits, and the “Alastair Roberts corpus.


Special Feature: Why I am Opposed to Gay Marriage

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b&wHands

Preface

“I will always love you.”

Many of us don’t remember the first time we felt such a sentiment; some of us may have never felt it at all. If we first encountered it in our youth, as most do, we were probably advised not to consider it very closely. The first word the sixteen-year-old in love hears is that the emotions will not last, that love is a choice, that the heart is untrustworthy, that he really should give the whole business some time. It is the responsibility of adults to help the young direct their erotic impulses, but it is easier and safer to destroy them altogether. Love is intoxicating. And it should be, for it moves us to willingly take on obligations and commitments that help make us adults. Only the one thing the young lovers want in the midst of their rapture—for it to go on, always—is the one thing our society tells him will never happen.

The torrents of passion the sexual revolution released are now receding, leaving behind the ruins and rubble of broken lives and homes. We once thought we might have all the feelings of love without any of the boundaries; but by trying to set eros free, we instead shattered it. Once eros became a god, he laughingly absconded. It is in his nature to do so. Eros awakens us to mystery, and now that we have broken all the taboos, there is nothing left to enchant.

Except perhaps glittery vampires. The Greeks worshipped the deathless gods; Stephenie Meyer made teenagers love the benevolent undead. The intense longing and passions of eros depends upon the presence of an always and of boundaries, a combination that Twilight amplified and exploited.

Because there is nothing sacred left to profane, at least in matters of sex, amplifying love’s rules and costs is the only way to keep meaning alive. Unfettered sex might sound “fun,” but sexual pyrotechnics without sharp boundaries eventually lose their luster. We don’t have romantic comedies any more because there is no romance to lampoon. It is the absence of erotic desire that is now our grave social crisis, not its presence.

In our response to the great crisis of marriage, social conservatives have frequently objected to how emotional construals of love and romance have overwhelmed the institutional, covenantal, or procreative aspects of marriage. We have chastened against grounding the commitment of marriage in our feelings, have objected to ‘merely emotional’ unions, and have argued our society is besotted by ‘companionate models of marriage.’

Such critiques are aimed at showing how our changing intuitions around love and romance have stripped the power from the traditional view of marriage. They are meant to counterbalance and reframe the emotions of love, not to undermine them.

But it is with eros that I want to begin, with all the sentiments and the yearnings and the hopes and dreams that make it easy to roll our eyes at googly-eyed teenagers.

For it is in marriage—and marriage alone—that eros finds its consummation and discovers resources for its ongoing renewal. Eros can destabilize us and make us go topsy, but it also helps us see why marriage matters. There is only an adventure if we accept its dangers. And marriage is a good great enough to justify its demands.

1. The Permanent Union of Two Particulars

I will always love you.” Let us begin again with what I hope we can all agree upon: Whitney Houston could sing. I don’t even care that she’s singing with synthesizers about Kevin Costner: with that voice, I would buy whatever she was selling.

We only dimly understand what we mean while making such rash vows, but it’s easy to see that the feeling that leads us to them leaves us a bit lightheaded. When Harry meets Sally, will they or won’t they ends with him realizing (at last!) that he has met the person he wants to spend the rest of his life with and wants to get on with it. It had to be her. For Hitch, being in love makes him feel like he can fly—straight into the dance line at his wedding. Julia Roberts is just a girl asking a boy to love her, and when he does she’ll linger in England “indefinitely.”

The joy of being in love is only complete when it is reciprocated: the heartsick, unrequited lover might feel a stabbing pain at the sight of the one to whom all his longing is directed. But when his “yes” is answered in kind, the boundless joy is too potent for a single moment to contain. It bleeds into the future, wraps itself in time, and engenders a willing and grateful selfimposition of obligations and burdens. A man knows no higher freedom than when he shuts every door to his romantic future besides this one. The joy of saying we belong to another is the glory of the lover. We make promises in such moments because we can’t help ourselves.

Besides, freedom is the least concern of someone in love. When eros grips us, we happily give our selves up. We relinquish our wills to the other, cheerfully establishing them as an authority over us. The joy of love consists in submitting to the goodness and beauty of the other. “As you wish”—what man does not want to meet a woman who moves him to say so? Love makes us beggars and servants; we plead and give, for when in love our lives are not our own. Erotic attraction depends upon the mutual humbling of ourselves before the other. Eros can only ask, and delights in asking: it cannot demand and long remain, for lovers will only have their beloved if the gift is given in freedom.

But I wish to consider the always more carefully. Love takes the form of a lock, as countless couples still understand better than the cynical New York Times writers. Love does not “alter when it alteration finds,” but is an “ever-fixèd mark, that looks on tempests and is never shaken.”

B&W-Locks

The moment of reciprocation fills us with the hope that such a love will endure forever—and with the fear that eros cannot endure the union. Whitney Houston’s song, after all, keeps eros alive only through the lover’s absence, rather than his presence. But there is an inevitable absence that any erotic sentiment must eventually come to terms with. Eros is shaped by the shadow of death. Joy, stretching us into the future, discovers our mortality and fosters the perhaps irrational hope that we might become stronger than it. Love “alters not with his brief hours and weeks, but bears it out even to the edge of doom”—and, if such a thing were possible, even beyond such an edge. Twilight used vampires because those in love hope to become like gods.

That erotic attraction reminds us of our finitude and mortality, of our impermanence and instability, should not surprise us: the movement between lovers attends to their bodies, to the locus of human fragility and vulnerability. Unless we deliberately resist, the delighted gaze moves naturally into a caress, as lovers extend their mutual welcome into an embrace. While the elevated atmosphere of eros prompts us to speak of a ‘mingling’ or ‘union’ of souls, such hyperbolic rhetoric only dimly describes a richer, more colorful bodily life than we know now.

Indeed, disciplining the attentiveness toward each other’s bodies is essential for safeguarding lovers from devouring each other and allowing eros to endure. The consummation that eros seeks is not a fusion: the absorption of both parties into a single, undifferentiated unit would make eros both suicidal and nihilistic. If the joy that another loves us can endure, the other person must as well. Learning to deny ourselves safeguards the otherness of the person before us and keeps intact the essential and inherent division that love depends upon. But such discipline takes its nature and shape precisely because a bodily consummation wherein both people remain separate, whole, unique individuals is both possible and desirable. Only a stunted love would be satisfied with an image or picture of the beloved.

The interested aliveness to the other’s bodily presence confronts us with our own needy vulnerability. The encounter with one who is lovely makes us feel the lack when they are absent. Tom Cruise destroyed the sentiment, it should be said, by banally approaching it head-on. Yes, Christian youth leaders everywhere reminded us that that only Jesus can complete us. But we should not ignore the half-truth present in Tom Cruise’s pleadings: when the whole person is awake to the beloved, life seems imperfect and unfulfilled without them.

That absence, however, cannot be filled by just anyone. To those suffering from a broken heart, no suggestion is more offensive than that they might find “someone else,” or “the right one.” And understandably so. In an important sense, there can be no one else. The lover does not seek an abstraction nor a person conceived as a member of a general class (‘woman’ or ‘man’). They seek a particular, a specific individual, whose life and history are irreplaceable and unrepeatable. The joys of falling in love again might make us dull to the loss of another—but they can never quite repeat or replace it.

Let’s walk through why that is a bit more closely. Instruments and tools are marked in part by what we might call their ‘fungibility’ or ‘interchangeability.’ They can be replaced by similar objects with no significant loss. When building a fence, two equal hammers are as good as each other. There’s no point to choosing one over the other. Persons, however, are not interchangeable in this way. We cannot swap one friend for another without some kind of loss. Persons are particulars: they have irreducibly unique histories and perspectives and in relationships where those histories and perspectives are the pre-eminent purpose—like love and friendship—they cannot be interchanged without being dehumanized.

The erotic impulse turns upon this irreducible particularity of persons: a man in love does not have any interest in transferring his affections to another person. He may not even be able to imagine such a possibility.

The departure of eros from our world is perhaps most clear from our rampant willingness to replace the objects of our love at our whim. Consider our use of pornography, which preys on eros in order to destroy it. The men and women presented within pornography are instruments for the sake of a viewer’s pleasure and become, as a result, almost entirely interchangeable for others who fall into similar “types.” Those on screen are not encountered as subjects with their own unique histories: they are objects, whose performances are not communications of love or interest to us as viewers, but rather theatrical displays meant to titillate an unknown audience. There is no eros in watching pornography, as the viewer and the actors do not interact with each other as persons.

The “I” and the “You” are the substance of eros: change either one and the aspiration itself changes. The idea that one party might be replaced (now or ever) appears to the person in love as a genuine sacrilege, a corrosion that undermines the very nature of the union. For eros aims at a permanent union of just those people and no others. “I will always love you.”

2. The Vow

Then the man said,

‘This at last is bone of my bones
and flesh of my flesh;
she shall be called Woman,
because she was taken out of Man.’

Therefore a man shall leave his father and his mother and hold fast to his wife, and they shall become one flesh. And the man and his wife were both naked and were not ashamed.”

 

We hear in Adam’s poetry a note of relief at having discovered a companion. It is easy to forget the terror that isolation can evoke, and the joy that can come from no longer being alone. Chesterton was at his most astute when he acknowledged that however right the mathematicians were about twice two being four, they botched one plus one. The proper answer is nearer 1000, for having another by our side offers us exponential comforts.

Adam’s poetry also contains a vow—a promise. The idea that Eve is “bone of [Adam’s] bones” is often read as having an ‘ontological’ dimension. That is, Adam recognizes Eve is made out of the same stuff he is, fully human, and as such an equal player on the scene.

But that does not preclude other meanings: “bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh” also means something like “strength of my strength, and weakness of my weakness.” Or as a more modern rendition might put it, “In sickness and in health, ’till death do us part.”[1] The elevated form of poetry is part of the point: vows are a human act wherein we bind ourselves to one another. We place our character in peril by doing so, opening up the possibility of fragmentation and dissolution if we break our word. They are a matter of great seriousness, if anything is.

b&w-hands-2

A marriage vow is a closure—the kind of closure that is easily looked at as foolish because of its demands. Those who make vows open themselves to the possibility of pain and suffering, betrayal and loss. Here, perhaps more than anywhere else, we are familiar with the hurt of broken hearts. Tragedy is not inevitable, but its all-too-real possibility heightens our awareness of the unknown, potentially unstable path ahead of us. No aspect of human existence is as impenetrable as the future, and a vow pledges our selves to another “come what may.” The vow is not a leap into a void: we make the promise with the knowledge of our own character and with glimpses of our spouse’s. But the marital commitment brings us face-to-face with the fragility of our lives, with the threat of betrayal and our vulnerability. The vow reminds us that our futures are in the hands of providence.

Vows give form to the unknown and begin a new moral reality; they stretch our character out into the future, establishing new boundaries and opportunities for our character and our lives. When we make vows, we make ourselves. Vows give us new glories to attain and new levels of baseness to fall into. And so as we lose confidence in the promises that constitute the marriage, we lose confidence in ourselves—and vice versa.

It might seem that marriage, with its ceremonies and its rules, is an unnecessary restriction on eros. We would be better, the notion goes, with a future unfettered by the outdated notion of binding ourselves to one another for life. Yet some limits expand us. Even the joy of mundane activities like chess or piano depends upon their rules.

Marriage demands the strength of will to keep our word. But in offering our word, we can also discover unknown strengths to keep it. We undertake obligations, even of the most extreme variety, because fulfilling them demands every ounce of our creative and spiritual energy, energy we may not have tapped into otherwise. The man who wishes to join the ranks of Monet or Mozart will in many cases find himself adopting a monkish approach to life. His asceticism will be real, as he abstains from goods like sleep or sociality that he otherwise might enjoy for the sake of attaining the glories he seeks. But such costs are often the price of greatness; the goods truly worth having are those that we can live and die for.

The simplicity of the marriage vow is one of its greatest strengths. It is a vow made for all seasons of life, and enables those who make them to grow in wisdom as they face situations they could not have possibly anticipated at the outset. Making the vow dependent upon each party fulfilling specific behaviors—as polyamorous or prenuptial agreements do—undermines its intrinsic power and requires lovers to become prophets. “To have and to hold, from this day forward” is general enough that no two happy marriages will ever look exactly alike and broad enough to provide the couple creative resources to meet any situation imaginable.

Such vows make formal and public what every true lover knows in the heat of passion: that if we could harness and direct the impulse to remain together, forever, we might discover even deeper joys than those we can imagine in the moment. That this kind of union is very good, and that however good it might seem now, such goods will be even greater if we can endure to the end. Such vows, as Chesterton understood, take lovers at their word. But in doing so, they ennoble us and raise us to the heights of human expression, drawing us nearer the gods than the beasts. It is not surprising that our greatest art is either religious or erotic in nature.

But while we make our vows, and our vows make us, we do not create their form ex nihilo. If a man and a woman consent to a marriage, they form a new bond. But they do not create a new kind of thing. Marriage exists as an institution, yes, and is passed on as a tradition within a society. The vow makes public the lovers’ union and locates them in a pre-existing network of communal ties, which exist in part to create pressures that ensure they keep their word. But the institutional dimensions of marriage are not the deepest form. Marriage presents an opportunity that a man and a woman who marry discover, but do not create. We may be godlike, but we are not gods, and the moral goods marriage makes available to us existed long before any particular couple and will endure long after. A man and a woman are like that curious explorer at the beginning of Chesterton’s Orthodoxy who comes upon a land he thinks to be New England and then discovers it was Old England all along. In making their vows, they enter for the first time upon a new moral terrain—and then proceeds to discover that it is already well known by others, because they did not make it themselves.

Yet it is the self-imposed limits of the marriage vow that the drama and excitement of eros hinges upon. If a man could make the world in accordance with his own will or desire—as pornography mimics—he might experience an initial thrill of delight, but the sensation lacks the power to endure. Viewing the world as an extension of our wills leaves no room for the surprise that comes from discovering unexpected goods in the obligations we take upon ourselves, and the spontaneity that comes from the presence of another’s will. Overspecifying the conditions of our commitments to each other diminishes the risk of our own pain; but by arrogating to ourselves the power to determine what kind of union we shall have, we infantilize ourselves. The glory of humanity is found in creatively living within and responding to an existing world of goods, one of which is the opportunity “to love and to cherish, ‘til death us do part.”

It is a curious fact about eros that it pursues privacy between the lovers even while longing for public recognition. The man who wishes to keep his lover only beneath the secrecy of night may justly have his affections questioned. The lovers’ mutual “mine” establishes a boundary that others may not be admitted to. But boundaries are only real if they are known to the world. Walls demarcate gardens, but they only do this meaningfully if there is an ‘outside’ to set them apart from. The public and private are co-dependent: the shape of the latter is determined by the former and vice versa.

So the vow is the official public-making act of an erotic desire that wishes to privately delight in the union. The intense power of eros is too good for other eyes. The face-to-face intimacy of eros makes it beholden to the ‘observer effect’: the presence of a camera or third party invariably changes its nature by giving it an aura of performance. The communication of welcome, of delight, allows the other to absorb one’s attention and draw us out of ourselves. And so eros seeks privacy, for the intensity of the communion negates and denies the rest of the world. The face-to-face union of the couple appears in public through the vow of marriage, its native home and safeguard. If eros is sacred, it should be hidden. For to profane it—to shine a light upon it—destroys it altogether.

In the words of Genesis, both the vow and the union make the two “one flesh.” The two individuals become a visible unit, a social organism, with its own internally directed ends. They are a community—and while they are privately two, they are in public, one.

The traditional manner of making marriage vows known—though not the only possible one—is the wedding. To make such a promise is a civilized act, which is to say it founds a civilization, which is to say it is a human act. However much else we might learn from them, the birds and the bees do not gussy themselves up and go down to the chapel.

As acts of civilization, though, weddings are rational. They are made up of symbols and meaning and words and reasons and art and all the other kinds of things that go into the human world. But they are also rational moments of excess and abundance. As they begin one of the most transcendent opportunities for a human life, weddings evoke the finest and the best we can muster. It is a glorious thing to commit oneself to another for a whole life. Our current unhinged aesthetic arms-race started over engagements and weddings because we forgot the meaning of the symbols. But the impetus behind putting on our Sunday best for the union is the right one.

B&W Rings

Despite this heavenly vision of the vow, many of us are more familiar with marriages that come nearer the atmosphere of hell. My account is idealistic, because I am defending ideals. Few who are in love hope for anything less, because people in love are filled with a rational confidence that their story will end happily. Why would they not be? Such confidence is the wellspring of human greatness, and in many cases the beginnings of social renewal. Diminishing the ennobling possibilities of marriage for young people because their hopes are “unrealistic” or “unlikely” might keep them from broken hearts, but it will certainly keep them from even greater joys. If we expect little from our young people, that is what they will be. Some goods are only won through risking great unhappiness.

And some goods are so grand and beautiful that the risk is worth it. I have long thought the rationality of the marriage vow depended upon the unshakable conviction that the final five years of marriage will be better than the first five, despite the appearances around us to the contrary. Adopting such an outlook may be an article of faith—but it is a better, truer, more beautiful article of faith than the bland cynicism of our day. We bind ourselves to one another because we hope we both might become better and the whole union become greater than either of us could be alone. “Eyes have not seen, ears have not heard”—those goods that can be known within a marriage. All the great and deep emotions that motivate our deepest and most profound arts are in this union contained. We know the sorrows that an unhappy marriage leads to, and yet we refuse to be deterred completely.[2] We are either a colossally stupid people, or our hearts know more about the world than we might care to admit.

We do not know in setting out what marriage will demand of us. But this is part of its beauty and its point: in wedding ourselves to providence, we must be open to carrying a cross. A man who vows to live with a woman may not yet be ready to die for her. And he may not need to be—yet. He may not know that the vow will demand his life; all he needs is his ineradicable commitment to his own word, an unwillingness to break his bond. The growing good and glory of the marriage depend upon the willingness to forgive grave moral wrongs, or more likely, a thousand petty ones. Whether eros is stronger than death will be discovered only through testing. As lovers take up their crosses and forgive, they may find a path toward joys that their initial moment of delight in the mutual “yes” could only dimly anticipate.

3. What Love Demands of Us

Suppose two people are madly in love and wish to remain that way. Suppose they are not prudes with aversions to sexual pleasure, but that they are gripped by a vague, inarticulate intuition that the joys of mutual love they discover in their early days might lead on to even deeper, greater goods. What kind of practices would they undertake to discover them? What kind of mental disciplines might they strive for, and what kind of emotions or attitudes would they seek to cultivate?

Suppose they are a typical modern couple and have not only witnessed divorces first-hand, but are well-acquainted with lifeless marriages for whom the possibility of eros sounds more like a cruel mirage than a word of hope. They might eagerly wish to avoid such a fate; but it would not be fear that would animate them so much as an earnest hope that their love might become a thing of beauty, perhaps even a thing of legends, like Beren and Luthien or Coach and Mrs. T.

Such a couple might develop an incredible and exacting rigor in their relationship. To the outsider, they might seem obsessively, rigidly puritanical; they might adopt norms that seem hopelessly unattainable and downright masochistic. Their fastidiousness might seem as strange as the asceticism of the Desert Fathers or as irrational as the mysticism of the medievals. But their self-imposed burdens and practices would sound to the married couple like the very substance of love.

Let us give such a set of practices a name: fides, or in our own language, “faithfulness.”[3] While such practices might involve any number of negations or denials—“I will not…”—at its heart beats an unrelenting and uncompromising commitment to love and cherish the other. Those who cultivate fides understand and delight in the irreducible uniqueness of the other, and the other’s irreplaceability with respect to the union.

Bringing two lives together in the union of marriage necessarily involves a whole host of activities: couples cook, work, garden, do housework, and so on. But for those motivated by eros, sex takes on a heightened importance because of their attentive interest and delight in the bodily presence and openness of the other. In a sexual encounter, two persons meet as embodied subjects who have their own histories and obligations that shape their respective futures. Some people deliberately hide those histories and obligations, reducing the encounter to a purely transactional one. The particularity of the person is subordinated to the satisfaction of sexual pleasure. For those motivated by eros, however, the subordination of the union with that particular person to any extrinsic quality (like pleasure or procreation) corrodes it. It is not “sex” that the person in love wants as a general class of action, such that just anyone would do to “scratch the itch.” Instead, eros seeks a union with another “I” whom we encounter as irreplaceable, since our point is not something beyond them but the person themselves.

As sex has something to do with marriage, then, our hypothetical couple would need to consider what kind of practices they would undertake in order to keep eros alive and strong within the sexual union. How might they approach sex so that “I will always love you” has a meaningful chance of becoming true?

For one, this couple might fastidiously expunge any willingness to engage in any kind of sexual activities that would replace the other person with respect to their union. They might refuse to watch pornography, for instance, because it inculcates in the viewer a willingness to replace their spouses with respect to sex. Pornography habituates a person’s thoughts and attitudes toward sex to pursue some end—bodily pleasure—outside or beyond that delight which is had in the person of one’s spouse. Pornography “works” in part based on the viewer identifying himself with the scene in some way—an identification that treats one’s spouse as replaceable with respect to sexual activities and pleasure. And such exclusivity would clearly not be limited to porn. This couple would also be vigilant to deny thoughts or sentiments that were directed toward engaging in sexual acts outside their own marriage.

And there is another step they would take, a more controversial step but an equally important one: this couple would withhold approval from those who engage in sexual activities outside of marital contexts. To approve of a behavior is to treat it as morally permissible, not just for the people engaging in it but for anyone similarly situated—including ourselves. What we bestow approval on not only reveals our character, but determines it. To approve of someone playing golf is to render the judgment, “If I were similarly situated I would play golf.” Approval indicates we have a conditional willingness to participate in the same activity; by approving we admit that we would do the thing if our situation were the same as theirs.

To approve of two people “having sex” outside a marital covenant renders the verdict that if one were similarly placed, one would engage in the same kind of activity. Which is to say: approving of sex outside of marriage inculcates a willingness in the approver to have sex outside of marriage, and by doing so, treats sex within one’s own marriage as simply an instance of a general class of activities (seeking “physical pleasure,” perhaps). But the moral content of sexual activity is determined by marriage; within the marriage, sex is a specific, unique activity of the irreplaceable and irreducibly unique individuals. It is not an instance of a general class of activity with a general aim, like “seeking pleasure” or even “procreation.” Its moral and communicative prospects are uniquely determined by the presence of just those two people and no others. Merely having the willingness to ‘have sex’ as a general class of activity corrodes one’s commitment to the irreplaceability of the other—it corrodes one’s fides, that is. To approve of sex outside of marriage destroys the unique moral prospects of sex within one’s own marriage.

What good might such moral rigor be? To those in love, the question is silly: once we taste the joys of eros, the disciplines needed to preserve them take on a new and more gracious atmosphere. Fides may not seem like it is worth the hassle, especially initially. But that is only because we have not seen it practiced. To steal from Chesterton yet again, it is not so much that marriage has been tried and found wanting so much as that it has never been tried at all. The highest goods are inaccessible to those who have not the virtues to taste them, the way the finer arts or foods are impenetrable to those of us who do not speak the languages required. But the pure in heart will see God, and the pure of body will discover delights that will be inarticulable to the rest of us. They will have an atmosphere and aroma that, when encountered, will be beautiful even if we cannot give it a name.

4. Love’s Transcendent Hope

Eros longs for a beloved. But what happens when the union is attained? Is there a satisfaction of eros that will not extinguish it, but renew it and keep it alive? Can there be a searching that, when it comes to an end, begins again? If the beloved is not simply present to us, but makes themselves available to be known by us, to be explored and delighted in, will there be an end to our searching? Or will eros, “having” the object that we longed for, wither away and die?

Perhaps this also is an article of faith, but I have long considered the idea that love could be satisfied and renewed within the same moment to be a necessary part of an elegant, beautiful universe. Like the edges of the cosmos, love’s organic law is growth and its true power tends toward expansion. Those who give much will have more—to give, rather than to keep—and those who do not give, even what they have will eventually wither away.

Love must be open-ended, then, at least for those who are creatures of time. And so love of another is. When encompassed and motivated by eros, the knowledge of a person becomes a renewable resource. It is not as though once a person is known they are somehow possessed or determined, that such knowledge is a closure. Our understanding grows with them; the other perpetually evades our grasp, surprises us, and is encountered again as “unknown.” Intimate knowledge is a never-ending business. We are not wholly new in each moment—but as long as there are movements left in the symphonies of our lives, our character and our persons are not fixed. And so eros, while delighting in the knowledge of the other, remains open to the future and to the freedom of the other.

b&w-landscape

All this is present in the intimate union eros is most closely associated with. In the throes of desire, lovers—as we so inelegantly say these days—“make love.” Their delighted exploring may be spontaneous and carefree, or done reverently, soberly, and in the fear of God. The secrecy that such lovers pursue for such intimacy demands our respect, and I see nothing to be gained by profaning such moments with crass or medicalized descriptions. Poetic speech about the union of husband and wife is not motivated by fear, but the truth, for only such speech reflects the ennobling opportunity such marital love presents to the world.

Still, the dignity and glory of this human action is not something separate from its animalistic quality. For those who are married, who meet in such a union as subjects, the physicality of the act is embedded within a history and context that transposes it into a new key and gives it a texture and meaning that it nowhere else has. Sex within marriage is not the same kind of thing that other animals have; its meaning and content is inextricably determined by the vow, and vice versa, even if the lovers are wholly unconscious of those dimensions in the middle of their pursuit of it.

The bodily union that consummates the lovers’ open-ended knowledge of each other is one that perfectly expresses its character. Their union is as open-ended as their love; it gives a particular form to an unknown future, establishing a new opportunity and depth for their lives that they can know in no other way. Their communion may have moments of ecstasy, but it makes possible a lifetime of joys—or sorrows.

Always. The I and the You who meet might even hope for the perpetuation of their bodily union beyond the death they know will inevitably tear them asunder. But only one path can provide the hope of such satisfaction. And here we come to the center of the argument: The bodily union of fides can lead to children, can bring about new members of the community who are not equal sharers of every aspect of it, but who are embodied icons of the exclusive and unmediated devotion of the husband and wife to each other and no other.[4] The “I” and the “You” who express their undying love to each other alone can experience a kind of satisfaction in a child who can outlive them both, who is uniquely begotten as the heir and embodiment of their union, who carries in his own character and identity the exclusive, permanent commitment of his parents love. The “I” and the “You” come together into one who is neither—but for whom both are required.

The husband and wife’s resolute commitment to the irreplaceability of each other with respect to their union—their fides—with all its joyous, self-imposed, exacting rigor establishes a moral environment wherein the child has the security of knowing that their identity and personhood has its foundation within the exclusive devotion between just two people. The child’s life and origin begins in the secret, hidden mystery of love between the man and the woman whose shape is made public in their vows of marriage.

To be clear, my point is a moral one and not about biology per se. But what’s true at the moral level is also true biologically: if either member of the union were replaced, the DNA of the child would obviously come from a different pool. To the extent that matters for the determination of a child’s life—and it clearly matters some—that would be enough to indicate that there is something about being begotten from just those two parents and no others that matters to the child’s future.

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To be an icon, and to know that one is an icon of their parents’ love, is a peculiar kind of good. It is a status, a morally-laden status, which provides an important sense of security to a child, even if the conditions of their biological life are vulnerable. To know whence we come is one of life’s great questions. And fides secures the knowledge not simply of one’s biological parentage, but of the moral conditions of one’s own birth. For those moral conditions are inextricable from the knowledge of one’s own parents as persons and agents. We know each other in part by discovering their character, and to know that one’s parents fastidiously cultivated an ecosystem that was oriented toward the exclusive and permanent erotic attachment between them and no other is to learn something deep and important about them—and about one’s own origins. It is something more than simply knowing that I am the son of my parents: being an icon means the possibility of knowing that such sonship means being an extension of the devotion a father and mother have for each other, and that my origin was contained in their mutual ecstatic joy and sacrificial love. To recognize this is to see not simply that the union of their bodies created mine; it is to see that their love for one another brought me into existence.

If the union eros seeks is good for humans to pursue, then being born into an environment determined by it is also a good—and its absence would be a moral injury. But paradoxically, such an absence may not be discernible as such to those who lack it, just as those who are born into a society that lacks clean water, or penicillin, or equal voting rights for women may not recognize their absence as injuries. Or consider a person who is slandered and so denied opportunities he otherwise might have chosen, but who never learns of it. Such a person has suffered a real loss, even though it is invisible to him. The moral injuries children suffer may only dimly appear in the present to our empiricists, if at all, for their effects may only be seen when aggregated over an entire society over multiple generations, while “chastity” and its norms recedes further into our cultural memory.

If my argument is right, gay marriage is not a revolution; it is simply the final stage of the erosion of eros. The divorce revolution destroyed eros by attacking its foundation, namely the commitment to the permanent union with just this person and no other. Remarriage is predicated on the possibility that we can swap out our marital partners with respect to our vows without loss—it denies the permanence eros aspires to, and so cannot make sense of how children uniquely satisfy that aspiration. And by considering one’s spouse to be replaceable with respect to one’s marital vows, remarriage generates a moral outlook that inevitably leads to gay marriage. It is not just any man and woman who can appropriately or fully satisfy eros and generate the kind of community wherein children are icons of the love of their parents: only this woman and this man can fully do so. The divorce revolution simultaneously undermined the irreplaceable particularity of a man and woman, and the permanence of their vow, making gay marriage immensely more plausible than it ever would be otherwise.

But the cruel paradox is that societies immersed in atmospheres of injustice are least well equipped to see them as such. Our standards of ‘normal’ for what constitutes marital flourishing are themselves the problem, as they rarely get beyond the mammon-worshipping categories of wealth and economic status. Having considered each particular, individual men and woman as fungible with respect to their marriages for the past fifty years (due to our rampant acceptance of remarriage), we have no ability to see why men and women as general classes might not be fungible as well. But going on further in the direction we are headed would be a wrong nonetheless, one which a society ordered toward promoting and promulgating the good for its citizens would take with the utmost seriousness given marriage’s central role to the child’s life and moral outlook.

One final word about the moral opportunity that eros leads us to. Childbirth is a process that, once begun, happens without intervention. While we have learned to support the process and to intervene when there is danger, such decisions respond to an existing natural process that happens outside the direct, voluntary control by the mother. As such, an intimate, bodily union of a man and woman that can begin the procreative process has a twofold open-ended quality that makes it unique among any human actions. It can start a biological process that carries on long after the momentary action, and that process can culminate in the appearance of new human life into the community begun by the exclusive, permanent commitment of the husband and wife. Of all the acts that communicate love, devotion, or commitment to each other, only procreative acts require our intervention to ensure they do not generate human life.

This open-endedness toward the future is what lovers bind themselves to in the height of their expressions of erotic love: “I will always love you” casts us upon the fortunes of providence in a way that the biological processes of procreation mirror. A couple that longs for the fulfillment of their eros opens themselves to tragedy. Procreation is (still) risky, and makes us vulnerable to serious sorrow and loss. It puts the life of the mother at risk and begins human life in the most fragile of ways. And some couples may find—or even know in advance—such fulfillment is not available to them. Providence does not smile on us all—but the possibility of such suffering or frustration is contingent upon and discloses the uniqueness of the good. Infertility is tragic because joy is possible, and because new life can appear. The openness to sorrow, loss, betrayal and heartbreak that the great goods of the marriage vow demand of us are contained in bodily form in the possibility of procreation.

5. Fine Tuning In Response to Objections, Including Thoughts on Adoption

That is the core of the argument. There are objections to it, to be sure. And I wish to provide a few brief responses to those here. My aim is twofold: first, I want to show that the above view provides reasonable answers to them. To do that properly may involve clarifying some of what I have said. But we should not let that scare us: sometimes the truth emerges dialectically, through the giving and taking of reasons and counter-reasons. Second, I want to try to articulate what I think are the underlying presuppositions of the objections, to provide a glimpse of the kind of comprehensive outlook that I think makes gay marriage more plausible.

The first and most obvious objection is that not everyone who marries is capable of engaging in “procreative acts.” That is to say, some couples are not simply infertile: they may be incapable of engaging in any sexual activity at all, or be missing organs that are essential for the procreative process. How does the above view allow them to marry, while denying those who are of the same-sex?

This is a serious objection; answers to it might seem like special pleading or overly technical. But as with the moral rigor the couple engages in to preserve the vitality of their union, so here as well such distinctions are the substance of love and ethics. The careful pursuit of precision in response to a question like this may not indicate a deep aversion to people with same-sex desires, but an urgent sense that such distinctions really matter for living our lives together well.

So, then: Whether a man is willing to engage in sex with someone who is not his spouse, and whether he actually does, makes a real difference in how we evaluate him. We might be tempted to give him a pass, to overlook it as a mere indiscretion (but would we if the woman said this?). But to his wife, his willingness might seem much more grave and important, and appropriately so. It might feel like a personal slight, a violation of their marriage vow, a tacit suggestion that she is replaceable with respect to their union and its central activity. If such a willingness is justified because such an act ‘wouldn’t mean anything’ or is ‘just for pleasure,’ the wife would rightly be justified in calling into question precisely what the same physical acts meant even within their own marriage, and whether she at any point was reduced to a disposable means for his pursuit of physical pleasure. His approval of the depersonalized pursuit of sex reveals something about his character, after all, which cannot be extricated from his own union. In short, willingness matters for moral evaluation as much as the act itself.

Whether a man and a woman can marry depends not upon their ability to have children or even engage in procreative acts per se, but rather whether it makes sense for them to be willing to do so—even if they choose not to. It makes sense that a man and a woman who are incapable of engaging in procreative acts could be willing to do so under certain conditions, namely the conditions wherein their bodily functions were restored. Regardless of how unlikely those conditions are, most of us would recognize that the medical interventions that would enable them to engage in such actions would be choice-worthy for them to pursue, and would restore certain capabilities and functions that human beings naturally have. Their willingness to have children has a clear and intelligible logic to it, one that even comes through in the emotions that might take root in their union: such a couple might feel a deep sense of frustration and sorrow over their inability to engage in such acts despite their erotic longing. And such frustration would be entirely reasonable.

Could we say the same about a couple of the same-sex? It seems unlikely; for the moral opportunity inherent in procreative acts to be intelligible to them, one member of the couple would necessarily have to be replaced (with one potential exception that I will discuss below). Their non-procreativity is of a different kind than the incapacitated opposite-sex couple; any “willingness” to have a child on their part must violate the conditions of fides. The inability of some male and female couples to have children is a tragedy, and easily seen as such; for the same-sex couple, it is a structural feature. It would be strange for a same-sex couple to “regret” their non-procreativity; there is nothing to regret, because no moral opportunity has been lost. Even if one member underwent the radically invasive, non-curative surgeries required for sex-reassignment, they would still require a third-party to provide either the sperm or egg required for conception. As such, any ‘willingness’ to have children within the union is, quite literally, unintelligible.

Now, this establishes at a certain level that same-sex unions and different-sex unions are morally distinct, and that same-sex unions lack certain features that allow and enable them to experience the satisfaction of the kind of love that motivates them to enter the union. Same-sex unions might share in any number of goods, even if they are not marriages. But the aspirational love that aims at extending the union itself past the death of its members is impossible in same-sex unions in a way that it is not impossible in different-sex unions. It is in principle impossible in same-sex unions, whereas in infertile or incapable different-sex unions it is only conditionally impossible.

What of those different-sex couples who do not want to have children? One implication of my argument is that such individuals permanently frustrate the very aspiration that originally brought them together. They work against the very grain of their union’s existence. This is an implication I am happy to adopt; the existence of those who seem happy and content while willfully denying themselves the possibility of children does not on its own establish that my argument is wrong.

Some readers might also object to the above because same-sex couples do have children via adoption. Given that’s the case, why should we not grant that such couples are married? It’s important to underscore that a child’s life might be improved by being adopted into any number of relationships, and that is no small thing. For a child in foster care, the stability and opportunities that come through being adopted into a new home are considerable. Their social status and economic prospects may quite literally be transformed overnight.

But adoption into any family still either constitutes or depends upon a moral injury to the child, as it entails they no longer are present with the mother and father whose love they are an icon of. It is sometimes said that adoption is “redemptive”, and that may be. However, it is no substitute for biological parentage; adoption establishes some new goods, but it does not replace those that are lost.

Childhood as childhood has something to do with marriage: the moral norms by which a child comes to know himself and the world are, in part, determined by the marital status of those who raise him. If there is a morally-laden status of being the “icon of the parents’ devotion to each other and none other” that biological parentage can provide a child, then we should strive, as much as possible, to preserve the child’s presence within that communion and view adoption as a last-resort. As the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child puts it, every child should grow up “wherever possible…in the care and under the responsibility of his parents.” Adoptions happen only because tragedy exists.

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But sometimes adoption does happen and should happen. What then? Different-sex couples who adopt welcome children into a community where the moral opportunity of marriage is intelligible, even if that moral opportunity is only imperfectly realized. But as same-sex couples have no similar opportunity, adoption doubly deprives a child of a first-hand encounter with the goods of marriage; having been deprived of their biological parents, adoption into a same-sex couple also withholds first-hand, pervasive encounters with the unique moral opportunity at the heart of marriage, even if the child’s socio-economic status improves (which, again, is a considerable good in its own right). It is not simply the presence of children within a community that establishes that community as a marriage; it is marriage and its goods that establish the moral contours and opportunities of childhood.

The cases of children entering a same-sex union through IVF or surrogacy most clearly demonstrate marriage’s distinctive moral opportunity. If a different-sex couple uses IVF, the child who enters the union might have the biological lineage of just those two parents and no other. I am opposed to IVF as a general practice; but for same-sex couples, these means of childbirth require replacing one of the members of the couple. Such methods make one member of the union fungible for purposes of having a child; this difference alone should be enough to show that the unions in question have different moral structures and opportunities inherent in them.

I said above that there was only one way in which same-sex couples could generate a child who was the “icon” of the non-fungibility of their parents. And it is this one: If researchers are able to engineer sperm and egg cells out of genetic material from same-sex couples, it would provide them an approximation of the moral opportunities inherent in opposite-sex couples. Such children would share, it seems, the DNA of both parents and so in that sense would be a “biological child.”

What should we make of this? For one, it is helpful to see the kind of universe that same-sex unions need in order to mimic the moral opportunities inherent in opposite-sex unions. This possibility would not have been conceivable without the developments in scientific knowledge and practice over the past 50 years. The gay marriage argument is persuasive to many people partly because of those developments—without IVF or surrogacy or improved contraceptive practices, the moral differences with respect to childbirth would have been much clearer. Adopting the arguments for the moral equivalence of gay marriage may commit us to accepting this technologically determined ecosystem. But it is not a very elegant system, and it should give us pause. Different-sex unions have a simplicity that the technological artifice beneath same-sex marital unions lacks: if sex makes babies, we don’t need scientists to.

No one should question that any biological children who come about in such a way are fully and properly human. But they come into the world as subjects of moral injury and harm, through no fault of their own, that children of opposite-sex couples (generally) do not. It is important to understand why.

The child who arrives through procreation is not, strictly speaking, chosen. While a different-sex couple may strive for health, identify the optimal time to conceive, and so on, indirectly supporting the procreative process is the best they can do. Parents directly choose to engage in an action that begins a process that they then can only choose to stop or support, but which will otherwise carry on without their intervention: parents do not, strictly speaking, choose to have a child. That possibility exceeds their direct grasp. The conception of a child is, instead, directly and immediately linked to the face-to-face encounter between a husband and wife, an encounter of love that is unmediated by any third party and that happens in secret, wherein each member of the union fully reveals themselves to the other in a loving embrace. The parents may welcome and accept the child, as indeed they should. But as much as they might hope for and want one, the conditions by which children come into the world mean ‘having a child’ cannot be a choice by them.

Mediated practices like IVF turn children into objects of choice. The trajectory of agency is very different in IVF than in natural childbirth. In procreation, the one moment of decision makes parents subsequently passive and hostage and vulnerable to fortune. IVF and other processes seek to remove this passivity as much as possible, to improve the chances and eliminate risks. Doctors play an instrumental role in the process, distancing the birth of the child from the initial and fundamental encounter of love between the two parents alone. This makes it much more likely that the child will be instrumentalized by the parents, as undertaking more direct control over the process will require reasons for choosing a particular embryo over another, instead of passively awaiting whomever appears. (The logic of ‘designer babies’ is already incipient in IVF; if we have to select embryos to implant, why wouldn’t we try to evaluate them and choose ones that match our wish list of potential qualities?)

But such a process also instrumentalizes the parents’ union for the sake of having a child, as it does the woman’s body. The inability to directly choose to have a child through natural procreation means that the only reasonable point of the sexual union is the union itself, especially since physical pleasure can clearly be had in different ways. However, those limits chasten both husband and wife from instrumentalizing each other or their union for some third-end beyond it (including children), a limitation that the direct aspirations of IVF seeks to overcome. And IVF brings the disproportionate burdens of childbirth into the very origins of the process as well. The consent and self-giving required by the sexual union is symmetrical; procreation clearly is not. But IVF intensifies that asymmetry by requiring women to undergo elaborate procedures to harvest their eggs even before they bear the child for nine months. Such a process risks instrumentalizing women and their bodies for the sake of procreation, rather than viewing them as equal even if asymmetrically burdened participants in the process.

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It is important to see how counter-intuitive the above is: the logic of the pro-choice movement has inculcated into all of us the idea that children are best served when they are chosen directly. The view treats children as isolated individuals who have no prior connection to the parents until they are chosen by them. But the child is welcomed and received into marital unions, not chosen. The life who appears to us in procreation is an authoritative good who justly demands the submission of our plans, lives, and aspirations to their well-being until they can become independent of us. In that sense, the eros that kneels before the authority of the beloved is heightened and de-sexualized in the face of the child, who enters as an irreplaceable, equal member of the community, even if that community is asymmetrically ordered. The child is the son or daughter of his parents regardless of what his parents ‘decide’. He bears the status as an icon of their devoted love prior to and before their “choice.” It is not their choice of him that makes him a child; their exclusive and non-instrumentalizing love for each other organically brought a child into the world.

The logic of gay marriage, then, and the logic of abortion come together at this crucial point. To support gay marriage, and to support the notion that the children who are brought into same-sex unions are “no different” than those brought into opposite-sex unions, is to adopt an understanding of the child at the heart of the pro-choice outlook on the world. All children deserve respect, care, and love. But that means that they also deserve to be welcomed into the world as those who come from outside our wills, whose lives are formed in the secret and hidden recesses of the most intimate and powerful act of human love known to humanity, whose sanctity and well-being exists outside of the direct choices of the rest of us.

Even if that argument isn’t persuasive, it will always be the case that same-sex couples are dependent upon either the tragedy to which adoption responds or third parties for the introduction of children into them. There is some wisdom to the adage that opposite-sex unions are “pre-political”; it is possible for a community to emerge from a male and female pair in total isolation, without the assistance even of a midwife. Such a simplicity is part of marriage’s power and why, as an institution, it is so structurally important. Its decline and erosion invariably leads to the expansiveness of other institutions (especially the government), which must fill the gaps left behind and attempt to correct the harms done within such failed marital relationships.

6. Some Further Reflections about the Debate

One position in this debate is wrong, which means that one group’s critical and rational reflecting has led them astray. One side is ‘deceived’ on some level; either they have made certain deliberative mistakes, or they have closed themselves off to certain thoughts or arguments, or they not had enough experiences, or they have drawn the wrong lessons from the experiences they have. One side is giving approval to what the other thinks is a grave moral wrong. There are a host of ways in which our critical reflection about the world can go wrong; there are far fewer ways that it can go right.

On this question, the suggestion that one side is morally wrong rarely leads to a self-reflective conversation about the merits of the arguments. It is easier, more politically potent, and safer for individuals on both sides to dispense with arguments altogether. After all, to enter into the process of giving and exchanging reasons is to momentarily open ourselves to the possibility that we might be wrong. And for gay or lesbian individuals, in particular, the burden is even heavier. The inevitable implication of this debate is not simply that their reasoning might be misguided—that is possible for heterosexual supporters of their view, as it is of opponents of their view. Instead, the implication of this debate is that the ‘experiences’ of gay and lesbian individuals of love, joy, happiness, acceptance, welcome, and so on do not hold the meaning or moral content that they think. There is an unavoidably disproportionate burden here; the conclusions I come to will unquestionably affect some people’s lives more seriously than they do my own.

But this disproportionate burden is also an inescapable feature of moral reasoning. Consider the arguments against eating meat, for instance. To those who think that vegetarianism is mandatory not simply for health reasons, but because killing animals is unethical and inhumane, eating meat seems like a grave moral offense. Even more to the point, the pleasures and delights that meat-eaters have in consuming meat are, on this hypothesis, not sufficient to justify the practice—and may even be part of the problem. The intensity of the enjoyment of eating meat deepens the meat-eaters attachment to his own outlook, so that relinquishing the practice would require an ascetic abstention from delights he otherwise would enjoy. The conversion would cost him something, and those stakes make it understandably difficult to change his mind.

The analogy is an imperfect one. Food is not sex; sex entangles us with other human persons in a more immediate way, and sexual desires may be more pervasive in our consciousness and resistant to change than our desires for food. It is relatively easy to learn to like tomatoes or curry; finding someone to love, on the other hand, is one of life’s great challenges. But my point is a narrow one here, and should be (I hope!) uncontroversial: not all that appears to be good for us truly is, and not all pleasures reinforce moral outlooks that are justifiable upon reflection. Our experiences of happiness or joy or sadness are not infallible or translucent to us.

Additionally, I argued earlier that the moral rigor embedded in the aspiration to keep eros alive is a universal one. It places an equal demand on all those who are in love, namely to expunge any sentiment, thought, impulse, desire, or any other psychological feature that engenders a willingness to replace one’s beloved with respect to the marital union. While my ‘form of life’ may be nearer that which I think is morally permissible than, say, an active and practicing same-sex couple, the moral scrutiny my view engenders of my own practices are not exactly an easy burden either. (So much moreso, I note, my pleas for mercy in my own life, unable to bear up this weight perfectly as I am.)

7. A Concluding Word, At Last

There is much more that deserves saying. Despite having gone on too long already, the above is nearer to an outline of an argument than it is a complete case. I have said less than I should have about the institutional dimensions of marriage, for one. Vows generate obligations, and in marriage where in most cases children are a possibility, those obligations are of the most serious kind. The government should allow couples to live their lives as they may, but it does not, should not, recognize those unions as marriages that lack the marriage-making features I have tried to articulate above. On what basis the state might do this while preserving the equal dignity of its citizens deserves an essay at least as long as this one—if not three times the size. But I have also not demonstrated how my above argument shows why polygamy and incest are wrong. And I have not mapped it on to any of the existing social science research, psychological research, or any other field that has some role in this debate, or explained why I think such fields are subordinate to the kind of critical reflection I tried to undertake here. Many others have taken up aspects of those arguments already; I have no plans to fill them out in the near future.

However, I will note that nothing in my argument depends upon any kind of special revelation. I am a Christian—a Protestant, specifically, an evangelical even, and a conservative evangelical at that. While I deployed a text I hold to be sacred and inspired, it can function in this context simply as an account of the world that has an authority similar to Plato: the authority of wisdom, from which we might learn something about ourselves. Even so, readers need no existing religious commitment to find the above essay intelligible and, I hope, persuasive.

Still, I am a Christian—and I am enough of one to know that the above comports well with traditional Christian doctrine on the subject. In that way, I am happy to admit that my arguments here have bearing on my religious commitments. But bearing in which direction? I might just as well say that the above arguments are why I believe the witness of the Gospel, rather than that the Gospel is why I believe the above arguments. I might as well say that because it is true. I began thinking about this argument for the first time by reading Plato; if we speak from the standpoint of faith, I see only more reasons to think that same-sex sexual relationships cannot deliver on what they promise.

Marriage is an institution that elevates us and ennobles us, that helps us aspire to a kind of greatness that we still—despite our attempts to obscure it—can glimpse today. We can always love another person. We can commit ourselves with the single-mindedness of devotion and discover that there are depths to ourselves and one another that we might never have known otherwise. Our marriages can get better—but only if we learn their meaning and begin to submit to their moral demands.

Treating same-sex and different-sex erotic relationships as equivalent removes from eros the glorious possibility that we might discover a love stronger than death, that a man and a woman might be so devoted to one another alone that they would form a community whose children would be icons of their exclusive, permanent commitment. That glorious aspiration and the hope of its fulfillment make us vulnerable to nearly infinite depths of sorrow and loss. But they also make the world a more exciting, dramatic, and beautiful place to live.

 

Notes and Credits

All but two of the photos are taken by Allison Oh. The final two are used with permission from Unsplash, and were also selected by Ms. Oh. 

This essay is available as a PDF for those who, like me, do not enjoy reading on computers or screens of any kind. If you wish to reprint it, all I ask is that you send me an email at matthewleeanderson.84@gmail.com as a courtesy.  

I am grateful for the editorial help of James Arnold, and for the very helpful comments I received on previous drafts from a number of readers, including Andrew Walker. I make clear my most recent intellectual influence below. The other figures that have shaped this in some way are too many to name here. However, the content of the above, and especially its errors, are my responsibility alone.

Finally, I have long thought that the comments at Mere Orthodoxy have hosted some of the most rigorous and irenic discussions about important issues. I hope, sincerely, that readers do not in this instance prove me wrong about this, even if arguing I am wrong about everything else. 

 

[1] See the argument Walter Brueggemann makes in “Of the Same Flesh and Bone” is contained in Catholic Biblical Quarterly, volume 30, 1970, pages 532-542.

[2] Yes, marriage rates are declining. However, even if they are waiting for it, young people still seem to think that marriage is an important part of their future.

[3] I am heavily indebted to the work of John Finnis throughout this essay, but especially for his language of ‘non-fungibility’, the notion that children are “icons” of the non-fungibility of persons, and for the argument that approving of particular acts implicates us in them. Any and all errors are, of course, my own. See especially Finnis, John. “Marriage:  A Basic and Exigent Good.” The Monist 91, no. 3 (2008): 388–406 and also “The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical Observations.” The American Journal of Jurisprudence 42, no. 1 (January 1, 1997): 97-134.

[4] The language of ‘icon’ here is directly taken from Finnis.


Our Culture of Reading and the End of Dialogue: An Essay

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Christians are a people of the book, a people whose lives are formed and shaped by their encounters and interactions with a God whose works have been manifested in the words that bear witness to them. The early Christians understood this, which is partly why they paired the transmission of the Scriptures with their evangelistic zeal. The number of manuscripts we have of the Bible from that era far exceeds any other books, in part because Christians cared so deeply about getting the Word out that they eagerly got the words that bear witness to Jesus out as well.

We live in the paradoxical world, though, where the volume of books is matched only by that of the handwringing about whether anyone is reading them. The explosion in books may actually have little to do with the internet. Richard Nash points out that between the 1980s and 2010 the number of books published annually jumped from 80,000 to 328,259 (a surprisingly precise figure). And while worries about reading are not a recent phenomenon—Rudolph Flesch’s influential Why Johnny Can’t Read was published back in 1955—things haven’t much improved since then. The average reading level for students in high school is just barely above the fifth grade. Students may be reading as much, but they’re obviously not reading as well as they used to. The same study found that between 1907 and 2012 the complexity level of books assigned in high school plummeted.1 Even if we read more as a culture we do not read as well.

But a people whose curriculums are shot through with Shakespeare will have more tools to deeply understand the world than those who are assigned The Hunger Games, however enjoyable they might be or well they might be written. The plays can be tough reading and the pleasures and joys deferred until a re-reading (or, in some cases, a re-re-reading). And the work required to understand them is considerably greater than that which contemporary fiction demands of us, if only because of the gap between Shakespeare’s time and ours. We should struggle through books like Shakespeare because the sort of understanding about the world that we need often doesn’t come on a first read of it, but on a third or fourth. Confronting a text whose meaning is initially obscure to us and being impelled to press onward, to work and think and wrestle, gives us the sort of discipline and training that genuine wisdom demands.

As we move into a world where people can no longer read deeply or well, Christians will be in a territory we have charted once before but have long forgotten. We may be a people of the book, but we are not a people who thinks that book’s meaning is easily or quickly grasped. The perspicuity of Scripture, or the idea that Scripture’s meaning would be clear to anyone, never entailed that it could be grasped on a first reading. And we even have a Bible verse to prove the case. 2 Peter 3:16 notes that “[Paul’s] letters contain some things that are hard to understand, which ignorant and unstable people distort.” In a world that struggles to understand Shakespeare, we have Biblical reasons to think we will do no better with the Apostle.

Yet it is not simply reading that is imperiled. A culture where reading is in decline will be a culture where inquiry and learning struggle as well, and the possibility of genuine and meaningful dialogue with those who we disagree will erode too. There is a fundamental connection between how we take in the world around us and sort through it internally and how we participate in conversations with those around us. As our culture reads more poorly, it will speak more poorly and respond more impatiently and less charitably.

——

Perhaps no part of Scripture is as insistent on the value of words to the Christian life as the Gospel According to John. The book opens with the magisterial identification of Jesus and the logos, the “Word,” a term that is as difficult to understand as any in Scripture. Yet throughout the Gospel, John highlights the value of the words that Jesus says and implicitly underscores the unique importance of the words he is writing that communicate them. In John 6, a controversial passage in recent church history, Jesus points out that the Spirit is the one who gives life, and that “the words that I have spoken to [the disciples] are spirit and life” (John 6:63b). Jesus qualified his famous line that “the truth will set you free” with the condition that it will happen “If you abide in [his] word” (John 8:31). In John 15, the symmetry of Christ abiding in us and us abiding in him is disrupted by the asymmetry of us abiding in Christ and Christ’s words abiding in us as the premise for power in prayer. Those words, interestingly, conspicuously stand in the very spot in the story where every other Gospel records Jesus instituting the Lord’s Supper. And in closing the Gospel, John himself point toward the truthfulness of his written testimony and its limitedness: “the world itself could not contain the books that would be written” about the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus (John 21:24-25).

There are two metaphors for what happens in reading a text like Scripture: on the one hand, we take it into ourselves and make it a part of us. The words abide in us, make their home in us, rearranging our thoughts and reframing how we see things. On the other hand, we enter into a world that the words create. There is a certain self-forgetfulness that happens in reading, particularly when we read fiction or read books that we struggle to understand. This is true of reading Scripture, too: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” is not a sentence that has anything to do with us, at least not immediately. Only by entering the universe John points to with his words can we properly come to understand them.

On both metaphors, though, how we read a text significantly affects how it changes us. There is no substitute for slow, unhurried lingering over the words of a book—abiding, we might say—to come to grips with its subtleties, its nuances, and its depth. When we marinate ourselves in a text, we begin to think thoughts after the author—for good or ill. James Gray, an evangelical theologian whose career spanned the 19th and 20th centuries, once commended reading the same book of the Bible over and over again to master it (or rather, to have it master us) instead of simply reading through the whole thing.5 When Fred Sanders reminded us of the passage, one writer–my brother– humorously decided to test out the thesis by doing the same with Ralph Waldo Emerson, and spent his time thinking Emersonly about the world. Emerson isn’t the writer I’d commend starting with, but he makes the point well: words will change us, but only if we give them the time and space to do their work within us.

Abiding in a text, though, and allowing words to abide in us demands an attentiveness and care that we seem to increasingly struggle with. When we return again and again to a text, we may eventually get bored with it—but in doing so, we place ourselves in a situation where we can notice what we have not noticed before. By exhausting what we have to say about a text, we reach the point where we can open ourselves to something it might have to say to us.

—–

In his poem Milton, William Blake writes that John Milton comes down from heaven:

To cast off the idiot Questioner, who is always questioning
But never capable of answering, who sits with a sly grin
Silent plotting when to question, like a thief in a cave;
Who publishes doubt and calls it knowledge.

Those are strong but still timely words. Christians have often done a poor job of being hospitable toward those whose faith is not very sturdy. The Biblical exhortation to “have mercy toward those who doubt” is there precisely because we Christians are tempted to do otherwise. But many young people struggling with their faith have been inclined not merely to have their doubts, but let the world know about them too. The reasons are understandable: doubt can be isolating, and it is comforting to hear a sympathetic voice. But they can also draw a crowd, particularly when they are mixed in with a form of doing something “new” and “different.”

Yet lingering in our reading actually forestalls doubt by reframing our desires away from the momentary experience of uncertainty toward the permanent good of understanding. Reading as I’ve described above is simply one form that inquiry takes: it is not something separate from questioning, but itself is a part of it. Anyone can ask a question: children are more adept at the practice than many adults, often to their parents’ chagrin. But to experience the fundamental form of questioning goes much deeper and demands much more from us. Questioning is aimed not at information to nullify or quench our desires, but at an understanding that will deepen them. Questioning is a form of life that involves a searching, a seeking out, a hunt for an unknown good. And when the understanding comes upon us, it creates a sense of wonder and awe that only deepens our desires and renews our searching. Doubt is a kind of negation, an unwillingness to accept what is before us. But questioning is a way of entering into it, searching it out, and working to understand it.

Reading a text doesn’t preclude an experience of uncertainty, then. If anything, close reading helps us learn how to survive uncertainty and deepens our faith and hope that the meaning will eventually become clear to us. Consider the two disciples walking on the road to Emmaus in Luke 24. They can not understand their story of the events of Jesus’ death—their “text,” if you will—and so Jesus comes along and explains it to them by expanding the horizon they had put it in and reframing the events in light of the Old Testament. He shows how the story points toward himself, that is, while signaling that their mistake is bound up in their unbelief.

The parallel passage in Acts makes a similar point. An Ethiopian eunuch is reading Isaiah, and Philip is sent to help him. The eunuch confesses his own understanding, on grounds that he cannot unless someone guides him. His is not the experience of Pilate, who asks a question and does not stick around for the answer. He is searching, examining and probing the text for a way through. And as he comes up against his own inability to find one, Philip is sent to point out the way.

In both stories, the meaning does not emerge only from their rereadings. They are directed to it: it comes from outside of them. They do not read alone, but with those who know the paths of the texts and know how to help them navigate them. But their searching prepares them for that moment of understanding. In their reading of the world and the text, they learn both what they can see and what they can’t and need to be able to.

All deep reading, then, must ultimately become an act of faith seeking understanding. It is not enough to maintain a cool, detached skepticism from a work if we want to properly see how it works. We must allow ourselves to get inside the text, and it to get inside us—a process that demands trust. Such an act may be for the mature, and will not always be rewarded. We may find ourselves with an author whose commitments and disagreements are so different from our own that they cannot be rescued or saved. But that can only be discovered after the process has already begun, after the commitment to work to understand is underway. There is no true reading that does not ultimately undermine a posture of doubt, for there is no true reading that stops with only questioning and never seeking an answer.

——

I suggested above that a world that does not read deeply will struggle to speak reasonably with each other. That claim deserves more attention, as it is not intuitively obvious. If my hypothesis that deep reading demands trust gets anywhere near the truth, it would provide one reason why a world of shallow readers would also be a world of combative and reactive interlocutors. When our posture is one of skepticism or defensiveness toward what we read, our tone in response will be as well. Winsomely and cheerfully defending the truths of Christianity means charitably reading those who oppose us.

The paradox of this is that the very promise the internet made for intellectually minded Christians is the one that it necessarily cannot fulfill, at least not for very long. As someone who began his public career by organizing the first conference for Christian bloggers back in 2004, I know well the triumphalism of the “new media” and the possibilities for improved and expanded dialogue with those we disagreed with inherent in it. Those possibilities may have come to pass in some small corners (like this one!), but more often than not the speed and anonymity of the internet brought out the least charitable and most polarizing aspects of our world. And that was among a body of people whose first movements in this world didn’t have screens in front of them. Those who are children now will struggle even more than we, unless they are fed a steady diet of books,

Part of the problem is simply the volume of information that we now are bombarded with on a daily basis. Between our emails, social networks, and advertising, our attention is often pulled in a hundred directions simultaneously. Such inundation makes the sort of patient, slow, single-minded concentration that careful and close reading demands more difficult. Even when our minds are receiving helpful or true information, the demands of brevity and accessibility form our ways of thinking to make deep access unlikely.

Minds formed in the shallows, though, will struggle to grasp deep arguments that see beyond clichés or talking points. And that creates a sense of distrust and cynicism, as people feel like the point of talking is simply to repeat what’s already been said rather than to truly exchange reasons for our positions. Think of the way the gay marriage debate has gone: a variety of very effective clichés of both the progressive and conservative variety have obscured the traditional Biblical account. To properly understand the breadth and depth of the Bible’s teaching about human sexuality takes reading and wrestling with the entire text. Ripping a few bits out to “make a point” isn’t reading, (“Romans 1!” “Shellfish!”) any more than repeating clichés is thinking. Yet if we are not taught to read well, to sit with a difficult argument or plod through a complex and sometimes unsatisfying novel, we will lack the sort of patience that serious and substantial reason-giving for our positions demands.

If we are not practiced at momentarily accepting or adopting another’s commitments—as any reader must do—we shall find ourselves struggling to imagine why others think as they do. Even if they think wrongly, getting “inside their head” and seeing things from their point of view is a time-consuming process that demands careful, charitable, and attentive listening. The skill of understanding someone and where they are coming from can be learned anywhere. But given the microcosm of the world that books can represent, it can be particularly honed through reading and dialoguing about them. The more carefully and charitably we read, the more we open ourselves to the possibility of the habit catching on everywhere else in our lives.

The possibility of exchanging reasons, then, of genuinely and truly persuading each other will be imperiled if our culture of literacy continues to erode. It takes a well-formed mind to internalize a book, to sort through it and grasp not simply the ideas it proposes but the questions it is answering, and the presuppositions beneath those questions that make them problems for the view. It’s that sort of understanding that comes through reading and rereading, through making a home inside a text with those who know it better than we. And it is precisely that sort of reading that is increasingly in short supply.

———

How we read is only a facet of how we live: it is an important facet, but the virtues and vices we build in our intellectual life are simply virtues and vices. When technology writer Paul Miller left the internet for a year, he found the same vices he had attributed to being online cropping up in his life anyway. Whether the internet simply revealed who he was or whether it magnified and exacerbated it, Miller does not say. But we make a million decisions online, take a thousand of tiny steps per day, each of which reflexively shapes our character and our lives. We are formed through living, for good and for ill.

Which is why there are few more countercultural tendencies we can cultivate as Christians than to read less but read better, to saturate our lives with the space to allow thoughts to bubble up in us, to pause and wait and notice and attend to all that God has made. Our late modern world is a frantic place, driven by what Augustine called the “libido dominandi,” the lust for power. Whether more money, more fame, or a better status for doing good, we are a people who have gone mad for more and are hurrying to arrive there before it is all taken away.

There can be no deep reading as long as we are people who hurry, whose eyes glaze over the text to say that we have read the book at our next social gathering. And for Christians, there can be no permanent hurry, either. To hurry is to deny the reality of God’s providence and to seize control over our lives. The urgent task of evangelizing the world is one done within the ordered pattern of rest and the peaceful repose of trust that God is the one who saves. The false hurry that so many of us (this author included) are dominated by is not a recognition of the importance of this life, but a denial of eternity. For as George MacDonald once put it, “Of all things, time is the cheapest.”

“Complexity” is not entirely an arbitrary metric. While I think the study’s decision to quantify it makes sense given their purposes, a quick perusal of the lists of books assigned in high schools in 1907 and those assigned today clearly illuminates how far standards have fallen.

Additional note by the author:  I wrote this two years ago for a major apologetics magazine, who declined it. I had forgotten about it until very recently; it still needs a good deal of editing, but I leave it here for now. For my most robust statement on the nature and value of inquiry, I refer readers to The End of Our Exploring.


The System Behind Abortion: Planned Parenthood’s Dehumanizing Rhetoric

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Some matters in this world are complicated:  some deserve careful deliberation, time, and the opportunity to work through our emotions before coming to a reasonable judgment of things. I have long been an advocate of this principle and wary critic of the impassioned internet-activism that motivates many people online.  Such movements have a distorting effect, they don’t allow for more subtle responses, they often backlash when the facts are wrong, and so on. I know every reason to avoid speaking in the midst of social media uproars, and have made nearly all of them myself at one point or another.

But some things are simple. Some moments grip us with such a clarity and power that we have no choice but to respond. When I saw the video of the McKinney police officer pushing the face of a 15 year old black girl into the ground, any question about the justice or injustice of the situation fell to the ground. The appropriate response to the racist Charleston shooting was to repeat imprecatory and lament Psalms, and to allow our country the full vent of its just infuriation to well up into the removal of the Confederate flag from South Carolina’s grounds. It is the better part of wisdom to discern the moments that have complications that might temper our outrage and those in which the evil appears unmasked and naked, well-intentioned and ‘reasonable.’

Yesterday was one such day. As I sat in a Starbucks watching the video of a Planned Parenthood executive casually discuss the transfer and sale of “fetal tissue” extracted in abortions, Russell Moore’s question haunted me: “If this does not shock the conscience, what will?”  The video should disturb us to our very core, and animate us to lament and work to bring an end to the practice that I have in my most sober, dispassionate moments described as the most pressing human rights abuse of our day and the American genocide.

There is no “but” here, no extenuating factors that make the conversation any more palatable to me. Yes, I have read the transcript in full.  Yes, the Planned Parenthood executive denies repeatedly any attempt to profit off the sale of body parts. Yes, this has been going on a long time, and may be legal (or may not be). As the transcript notes, the “buyer” suggests that “we’re not selling tissue, we’re selling the possibility of what research can offer.”  To which the Planned Parenthood executive responds, “I think we would all agree with you. That’s just not the perception, sadly, for everybody.”

Only my outrage stems just from such qualifications. I had a vague awareness that the grave moral evil is a “systemic” problem within American culture, but had never seen quite how clearly until yesterday how extensive that system of exchange extends. Many evangelicals learned the language of “systemic injustice” in response to the tragedy of Ferguson, because it explains a real phenomenon:  a repeated pattern of incidents that share similar features in a wide number of contexts.

But here we have a much more defined and concrete system of exchanges in which the main “product” are human bodies—bodies whose ‘consent’ is given not by themselves, but by their mothers. Planned Parenthood may not make a single dime off of participating in such a system. But they are still in a “market” where the other people and institutions who do benefit from receiving the ‘fetal tissue’ doubtlessly reciprocally support Planned Parenthood in other ways, if only through donation and political support.  The practice of treating infant bodies as products in a transaction should itself shock us, regardless of who profits from it.

Now, I find the abortion itself to be morally wrong. But the video is so galling because it makes so obvious the kind of contorted redescriptions of human life that makes the practice possible. Abortion requires not only the dismemberment of the human body in fact, but in our speech as well:

“So then you’re just kind of cognizant of where you put your graspers, you try to intentionally go above and below the thorax, so that, you know, we’ve been very good at getting heart, lung, liver, because we know that, so I’m not gonna crush that part, I’m going to basically crush below, I’m gonna crush above, and I’m gonna see if I can get it all intact. And with the calvarium, in general, some people will actually try to change the presentation so that it’s not vertex, because when it’s vertex presentation, you never have enough dilation at the beginning of the case, unless you have real, huge amount of dilation to deliver an intact calvarium. So if you do it starting from the breech presentation, there’s dilation that happens as the case goes on, and often, the last, you can evacuate an intact calvarium at the end.”

We cannot allow ourselves to see the baby as a whole, integrated, living organism.  But an ‘intact calvarium’ is in more common parlance a head, and if someone crushes a part of my body they crush me. 

The ‘scientific’ or ‘clinical’ language obscures as much as it reveals: it cannot abide the possibility that what we are discussing are living beings who are direct descendants of us. Even if such beings are not yet persons, they are at the time as we once were, and denying them their humanity means we deny our own and commit grave evils as a result. Before the “extraction procedure” ever comes to be—a neutralizing neologism if ever there was then—there are the fragmentary descriptions that inure us to the reality.

I have quoted it before, but Oliver O’Donovan has made this point best:

“I do not wish to complain that this ‘human subject’ is really all the time a person, because I think…that both such a claim and its denial are in principle undemonstrable.  It is enough to point out that the ambiguity of the status of the embryo research subject is precisely what is intended.  It is what the task of self-transcendence needs, that it should be ourselves and yet not ourselves.  If we should wish to charge our own generation with crimes against humanity because of the practice of this experimental research, I would suggest that the crime should not be the old-fashioned crime of killing babies, but the new and subtle crime of making babies to be ambiguously human, of presenting to us members of our own species who are doubtfully proper objects of compassion and love. The practice of producing embryos by IVF with the intention of exploiting their special status for use in research is the clearest possible demonstration of the principle that when we start making human beings we necessarily stop loving them; that that which is made rather than begotten becomes something that we have at our disposal, not someone with whom we can engage in brotherly fellowship.”

O’Donovan’s point is a brutally, horribly relevant one.  It is one thing to read it from the comfort of one’s own home and nod along, tsk tsking about the principalities and powers of our age. But it is quite another to see that spirit so animatedly displayed in the service of a practice that is so gravely, morally wrong.

Dr. Deborah Nucatola is not a comic book villain. I doubt she is malicious, just as I doubt that the people profiting off the transfer of ‘fetal tissue’ are malicious. She has the kind of consequentialist justification—“At the end of the day, I’m just trying to make the most people happy”—that many of us have swallowed in other realms of life, even if we do not realize it. She deserves the compassion and love that the victims of Charleston’s shooting eventually demonstrated toward their shooter.  She is deeply deceived about the good she is doing, and so needs our prayer.

But we should also work to end the systemic pressures which keep the moral evil of abortion a meaningful possibility in the American culture, the same way over the past year many people have become more aware of how the evils of racism continue to structure our society. I myself have not written on those matters for one reason: I am not qualified to, not having done the reading, listening, or living that I think is required to not merely speak about such matters of grave importance, but to speak responsibly and well.  History and my children may judge me harshly for my general silence, and they would be right to do so.

But the ‘marginalized’, the ‘vulnerable’, the ‘voiceless’:  where else but the womb are such descriptors more readily or easily applied?  The womb is a microcosm for the world:  the conditions on which we welcome the unborn will determine the atmosphere by which we welcome anyone else into our lives.  Do they look like us?  Do they allow us the status we wish for ourselves?  Do they drain our resources and inhibit our desires for our own life?  Do they make us uncomfortable?  Do they demand the sacrifice of our own bodies for their welfare and well-being?  For many women who are in danger of seeking an abortion, pregnancy feels like the end of their dreams, their hopes, and their futures. For all women, it requires a level of sacrifice and care which I, as a male, will never know and can never imagine. But so much moreso the wrong that obscures their gift to the world by reducing the humans bear to “fetal tissue.” And so much moreso our need not to spurn such women, but to welcome, support, and extend our care and concern to them. They are victims of the spirit of our age, if anyone is, and no amount of working for the ‘greater good’ can meaningfully overcome the unsettled bifurcation such a trauma must induce.

It is for that reason, then, that in this case our outrage should be directed toward the research regime that depends upon dehumanizing members of our own species in order to treat them as research products, the funding sources for Planned Parenthood, and the regulatory regime that make these evils possible. Yes, to stop such a program we would have to say no to the “possibility of what research can offer,” or at least research that uses the tissue from those who cannot consent to the process. But limits are the mother of invention, and while denying scientists access to fetal tissue may slow down their work, our country’s complicity in torture should have made us by now well aware of the kinds of moral wrongs that arise under the banner of urgency and necessity. Those are our laws that have enabled this practice: they represent us as a people. And as Ben Domenech has put it, “We must answer the obvious questions. What type of nation does this?  Are we that type of nation? And: Do we want to be?”


The End of Sexual Ethics: Love and the Limits of Reason

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Dianna Anderson (no relation) recently penned a very spirited critique of my recent essay on why I am opposed to gay marriage. I had been notified about the essay a while ago: in fact, a reader asked me about the comments and I suggested that I would not be responding because I didn’t think it allowed for any meaningful conversation.* Why now? Therein lies a tale, which I will take up below.

While she alludes to other concerns she has with my essay, Dianna takes issue with my suggestion that in the debate over gay marriage, someone is deceived. As she puts it:

[Matthew Anderson] is allowed to say what he wants because he is positioned as having a monopoly on the moral rightness of his married love. I, as a single, bisexual woman, have not the moral authority to speak on the issue because I am deceived, I have interpreted my own life incorrectly, and I am necessarily wrong – not because I am an inhuman beast, but because “objective” moral reasoning necessarily carries dehumanization of the subject as a consequence.

You can read the part that Dianna is referencing for yourself, in section six.**  The criticism is surprising to me, as I actually meant that section as something of a unifying moment in the piece. Having made the bulk of my argument against gay marriage, my intent was to highlight a puzzle about the debate that everyone has to address. I think those who approve of gay marriage are wrong to do so—but I think it’s possible I’m self-deceived as well. That possibility is one that unites us all.

And Dianna’s rejoinder proves my point. For her, my alleged failure to engage in what Dianna calls “empathy” is an indication of my captivity to the Objective Male form of reasoning, which has allowed me to judge others and “dehumanize” them. It’s fair to conclude, I think, that Dianna would suggest that I’m ‘deceived’ in my moral conclusions, that I have in fact interpreted my “life” and world incorrectly, especially if I have listened to those who do identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Dianna’s moral conclusion about me may not ‘dehumanize’ me. But I have no way of seeing how I am anything but deluded in my conviction that the moral conclusions are compatible with a serious interest in and care for the lives of gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. Perhaps Dianna would suggest I am a bigot, as she has concluded of others. (How such a conclusion is any less ‘dehumanizing’ than the conclusion that gay sex is morally wrong, I have no idea.)

But Dianna goes one step further, suggesting that I have taken “objective reason into a space that is inherently unreasonable,” namely the nature of love. But if critically reflecting on other people’s desires is inherently dehumanizing, then sexual ethics becomes impossible as ethics.*** Is it ‘dehumanizing’ to reflect about, say, the sexual desires that two consenting brothers have for each other? Why? Or any number of other formerly deviant sexual desires? Is it dehumanizing to deliberate about the moral permissibility of using sex dolls?  On what basis can we even ask the question of what counts as a deviant sexual desire, since reflecting about another’s sexuality strips them of their humanity?

Ethical reflection requires not simply what we give ourselves permission to do, but what we will approve in the lives of others. To think otherwise is to treat ourselves as islands, isolated from each other with impenetrable walls surrounding us. But no one lives that way, even if we occasionally think that way.  Identifying what we should approve requires reasoning together, that is, talking together in a manner where we exchange reasons for our positions.

And it is just such reasoning together that Dianna candidly acknowledges her view forecloses. The “empathy” Dianna seeks is functionally approval: it is impossible on her view that a person might listen patiently, closely, and sympathetically to the stories and lives of those with same-sex sexual desires and still conclude that such desires are morally disordered. But by foreclosing the question of the permissibility of such desires, she treats her own moral outlook as immune from any “moral blind spots”: her sexual ethics cannot be self critical, because that requires the possibility of being wrong. And having staked her ‘humanity’ on this singular moral position, such that anyone who disagrees has dehumanized her, she certainly cannot bear any criticisms from outside herself. Diana’s position is a sophisticated moral solipsism, turned in on itself and no longer able to countenance dissenting opinions or reasons from the outside. It is a vicious form of moral pride, precisely because it must deny the possibility of self-deception. If this is what the confident progressive Christian account requires, conservative Christians should take hope.

There is also a considerable anthropological gap between Dianna and me that is worth highlighting. There is nothing magical about an ‘orientation’ that means the regular and stable set of sexual desires that it identifies should be exempt from moral scrutiny, as Dianna seems to think. The language of ‘orientation’ helpfully describes a phenomenon: but if the sexual content of one instance of desire is morally wrong, the mere fact that such desires are reoccurring in a person’s life does not provide any meaningful moral absolution for them, even if they so pervade a person’s self-understanding that they become a part of their identity (whatever that is).

Dianna might suggest that evaluating any sexual desire between consenting adults is “dehumanizing”, as long as such desires do not harm anyone.**** But if that is her view, it suffers from a number of problems. For one, it’s just not clear why we should accept “consent” and “harm” as sacred moral categories that we can somehow use to evaluate other people’s sexual desires while the categories I deployed are necessarily “dehumanizing.” Consent and harm offer reasons why certain sexual acts are right or wrong, after all, and for Dianna love escapes “reason.”

But consent and harm also can’t meaningfully deliver conclusions on a number of situations: they are, at the very least, way too thin to be meaningfully Christian. What of the sexual desires of two adult brothers who are seeking a fruitful, flourishing, incestuous relationship because they are experiencing great spiritual fruit in their relationship? Or the sexual desires of someone who chooses to make love to a sex doll? Or an adult pedophile who, being committed to never harming a child, creates and watches pixel-porn, digitally created child pornography that harms no one and requires no consent?  The mere fact that a person regularly experiences sexual desires for a given sex (or both sexes) tells us nothing about the moral appropriateness of those desires, and no gussying that phenomenon up with the language of ‘orientation’ or simply considering those desires through the lens of consent and harm can escape that fact.

Contra Dianna, in fact, my proposal that those who disagree with the traditional view are in some manner ‘deceived’ humanizes them by treating them as real moral agents, capable of reflection about their lives and their world and of coming to different moral conclusions than those they have reached. It dignifies their moral freedom, that is, and views them as agents with a moral character that can be formed and mal-formed regardless of whether anyone else in the world is ‘harmed’ by their desires. If anyone’s position dehumanizes those with gay or lesbian sexual desires, it is Dianna’s, for it puts an end to inquiring about the normative shape of the moral order and whether one has, in fact, arrived at the wrong conclusions about it.

Why write this now? I had said that I was not going to respond to Dianna’s piece on grounds that I didn’t think reasonable discussion was possible. Dianna affirmed my intuition on Twitter, suggesting that to try to say anything would dehumanize her further.

My motivation is that I needed to clear up a tweet that I sent out which contained the conclusion of my train of reasoning, but not the reasoning itself. I was struck by progressive Christian Rachel Held Evans’s effusive admiration for the essay. The conversation which ensued with Evans was curious, given that she went on to indicate that she appreciated Dianna’s point but seemed to prefer arguments against my view that Dianna didn’t make in the post. I confess myself at a loss now about what Evans makes of Dianna’s essay, given that she was willing to give it a ‘standing ovation’ before telling me she didn’t agree with it 100% but never signaling anything she disagrees with about the essay itself. My hope is that she misread it and did not realize that it commits her to an account of sexual ethics that is not only far more permissive than Scripture, but unremittingly hostile toward traditional Christians.

Evans’s perspective is important on these questions, of course, precisely because her audience is considerable and she is an authoritative figure in the progressive Christian world.  I suspect Evans neither likes nor agrees with the idea of completely closing down debate on this question. But Dianna and I agree about one main thing: logic can be cruel, and in this debate Dianna sees and has articulated the consequences of the progressive position on sexual ethics with a clarity and consistency we should all appreciate. Rachel has suggested in the past that Russell Moore and those like him have “suicides on our conscience” for our views; but given that, it’s hard to avoid Dianna’s position that conservatives should not be reasoned with, but shamed and shouted down. People live with inconsistencies all the time, but we shouldn’t fall into the trap of making inconsistency a virtue. Progressive Christians like Evans, who are trying to leave room for conservatives within the church, may not like Dianna’s conclusions: but that is different than providing arguments for why they do not follow from positions they have already committed themselves to.

*My actual comment: “Given that Dianna says these things are outside the boundaries of reason altogether, I’m not very confident we will have a very meaningful or productive disagreement about things.”

** As our last names are the same, I’m going to use her first name, in hopes she won’t take it as a sign of disrespect.

*** This was the claim which got me into such trouble on Twitter.

****Whether this is her view, I do not know. I put it here as a possibility.

Update: Dianna Anderson has responded here.  I am not going to write a full response, as given her position it is clear to me that any further conversation about this will be taken as simply reinforcing her point. Which I think proves mine.


Anthony Kennedy was *Almost* Right: Post-Obergefell Thoughts on Where We Go Now

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Anthony Kennedy was almost right. While his inventive reading of the Constitution in Obergefell vs. Hodges has been widely and panned by both liberals and conservatives, his transcendentalizing of marriage is precisely the kind of understanding to which defenders of traditional marriage can and should offer a hearty and enthusiastic ‘yes.’ When it comes to constitutional reasoning, Obergefell is a disaster. But when it comes to our nation’s culture of marriage, Obergefell provides traditional Christians the best opportunity we have had in fifty years to make a more persuasive case for why marriage still matters.

—————

“Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.”  As Wesley Hill and others pointed out immediately after the ruling came down, such rhetoric makes it seem like those who opt not to marry are somehow missing out on a form of life that is essential to satisfy their needs and deepest desires. Such language doesn’t quite create a ‘dignitary wound’ toward those who are unmarried, since they are not in the precise sense denied marriage. But it certainly extends our current atmosphere where marriage is the only form of deep personal fulfillment we can imagine.

But Kennedy, I think, can be saved. If family is something slightly different than friendship, than marriage is essential to the needs of those who never marry. Sibling and parental relationships form our lives before we even begin to consider the possibility of voluntarily remaining celibate or entering marriage. The quality of the marital love between the parents establishes an environment that, for good or ill, marks our own lives.

Moreover, celibacy does not stand apart from the goods of marriage; it is not a hermetically sealed form of life that has no contact with the institution in adulthood. Marriage and celibacy exist in a symbiotic relationship, the meaning of celibacy only properly being understood in its relationship to the goods of marriage and the nature and limits of marriage only being known in communities where vocationally celibate individuals live and are supported. Those who are vocationally celibate still participate in the goods of marriage in the communities in which they live, because the goods of marriage are not limited to the family alone. Marital love both moves outward to the world (and not only through childbirth) by drawing the world into its orbit. It establishes a ‘household,’ in which individuals of many different statuses are invited.

If married individuals are to take an interest in the nature of celibacy and support those called to it, then, so must the celibate do likewise toward the married.  Otherwise how will they know what they are remaining celibate from, which good they have opted not to enter into directly?  Marital love is renewed and deepened as it is placed in near proximity to those who have chosen not to directly partake in it. And while a close proximity to marital relationships might make celibate individuals yearn for what they do not have, it also necessarily reminds families and married couples that the nature of their ties, while fundamentally biological, must have a voluntary element in order to avoid devolving into a diseased attachment to blood and soil.

An elevated, romantically infused view of marriage, then, demands an equally elevated understanding of celibacy. This is the kind of “yes, and” mentality that conservatives have sometimes struggled to adopt. When we reflect upon our culture’s idolization of marriage and the corresponding stigmatization or invisibility of lifelong celibates, it is tempting to address the problem by deromanticizing marriage. As Matthew Schmitz wrote:

Christians must counter the Court’s marriage idealism with their own marriage realism. Marriage exists only between a man and a woman, yes, but it is also not the be-all and end-all of existence. This latter belief, which has done so much to contribute to marriage’s decline, started in the churches before making its way to the courts. Let it be stopped in the churches as well. As more and more Americans live more and more of their lives outside of marriage, Christians must recover the forms of radical solidarity that gave St. Paul confidence when he said that it was good not to marry.

But elevating celibacy as a meaningful option within the church is commensurate with our current understanding of marriage as a fulfilling, transcendent way of life. We simply have to see celibacy as an equally ‘romantic’ alternative that reminds the world that marriage is a need that is passing away, and to dignify the ‘romance’ of ordinary, mundane living. In short, we need what Chesterton offered in his vision of the world now more than ever. From Manalive comes this bit, which I confess I love as much as anything I’ve ever read from him:

“Imprudent marriages!” roared Michael. “And pray where in earth or heaven are there any prudent marriages? Might as well talk about prudent suicides. You and I have dawdled round each other long enough, and are we any safer than Smith and Mary Gray, who met last night? You never know a husband till you marry him. Unhappy! of course you’ll be unhappy. Who the devil are you that you shouldn’t be unhappy, like the mother that bore you? Disappointed! of course we’ll be disappointed. I, for one, don’t expect till I die to be so good a man as I am at this minute– a tower with all the trumpets shouting.”

“You see all this,” said Rosamund, with a grand sincerity in her solid face, “and do you really want to marry me?”

“My darling, what else is there to do?” reasoned the Irishman. “What other occupation is there for an active man on this earth, except to marry you? What’s the alternative to marriage, barring sleep? It’s not liberty, Rosamund. Unless you marry God, as our nuns do in Ireland, you must marry Man–that is Me. The only third thing is to marry yourself– yourself, yourself, yourself–the only companion that is never satisfied– and never satisfactory.”

Now may be the best opportunity social conservatives ever have to make such a vision known again in culture. But the path to gaining a hearing begins, it seems to me, by affirming what nearly all Americans already believe. Because the current vision is so very nearly right. And yet so unquestionably wrong.   

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But the opening to present that vision is not the main one I am interested in. Near the end of his opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote, “In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death.” This is not simply unobjectionable: it’s true and beautiful, and provides the key to conservatives moving the argument for marriage forward in their own communities and in the broader public.  James Obergefell wanted a death certificate that listed him as married to his partner. As Kennedy put it, the absence of one meant “they must remain strangers even in death, a state-imposed separation Obergefell deems ‘hurtful for the rest of time.’” The impulse is not simply understandable: it’s just the kind of commitment that those committed to traditional marriage want to nurture and protect.

B&W RingsBut a death certificate is a shadowy sort of permanent union compared to the living, breathing icon of just a husband and a wife and no third party. The idea that the kind of ‘transcendence’ on offer in gay unions is identical to that available within different-sex unions is clearly false. Children carry the stamp, the visage, the bearing of their parents. The New York Times’s recent story on two sets of twins who were mixed up makes it clear that biology is and will be resistant to our manipulations: we may try to erase the importance of creation, but still, it manages to cry out that it has an order and significance that we simply cannot construct for ourselves. To attain a similar kind of transcendence that different-sex unions can have, same-sex unions need the state to secure their marriage after death, or broken homes from which they can adopt children, or the ‘progress’ of synthetic biology to reconfigure the procreative process.

Treating a death certificate on file with the county register as equivalent to the possibility of procreation, as Anthony Kennedy does, reduces ‘marriage’ to a means of getting tax benefits. Now, this reduction has happened for a long time, and conservatives are as much to blame as anyone for it. But any number of arrangements for those benefits might follow, as well they should: any two individuals looking to keep more of their cash from Uncle Sam should sign up to be married, and quickly.  But as I said before the Court ruled, if eros is not constrained then it will ultimately fade away. Kennedy’s ruling provides a roadmap for the final extinguishing of it.

Except among our churches, that is. Christians have an opportunity not simply to be the bearers of ‘better sex,’ which evangelical Christians have weirdly touted for years as a kind of apologetic message. Our witness can be much deeper, much truer, and more lasting than that: this is our moment to preserve and carry forward a form of erotic love that requires only the union of two individuals to transcend our own deaths. The one lesson that marriage proponents should take from the pro-life movement is that we must consistently, faithfully, and coherently demonstrate the unique beauty of the opportunity at the heart of traditional marriage. New human life is not simply a person, but a source of wonder and awe: we cannot look away from newborns because they bear in their persons all the tragic frailty and the nearly unlimited possibilities of our existence. And so also traditional marriage, where the permanence that transcends death depends upon so many factors outside our control and makes us immensely vulnerable to loss.

Yes, to make such an awe and beauty tangible to the world Christians need to attend to our own internal practices. We must renounce our own reliance upon and complicity in the “fertility industry,” reform our divorce practices, introduce a way of nullifying marriages that does not depend upon the state, expunge any “joke” that makes lifelong singleness seem ‘funny,’ hire single pastors to show our own community that they have insights into marriage, revisit our uncritical adoption of contraception, denounce any hint of treating single people as somehow unable to remain chaste before marriage, and a hundred other reforms I’ve argued for through the years that I’m not remembering right now. The work here is long and slow, and is only beginning.

But we can match the beauty inherent in our (reformed) practices with the beauty of our rhetoric. Pursuing internal reforms is possible while providing reasons for them to the rest of the world, reasons which would require continuing to explain why we still insist that two people of the same sex cannot marry, no matter how much they love each other.  As Ryan Anderson has taught me, if conservative Christians want others to respect our moral positions and not consider us bigots, it is incumbent upon us to make those reasons public. Whether those reasons are ‘secular’ or not is irrelevant to the question at hand:  if we wish to be responsible democratic citizens, we should bring forward our manner of thinking about such questions to anyone willing to listen. The Bible is not a gnostic text: it may require conversion to be obeyed, but not to be understood. Explaining our point of view demonstrates respect for our audience by seeking to make our positions intelligible to them.

But Obergefell also allows marriage advocates to let go of the pretense that marriage can be sustained through defense. If people have found conservative arguments for marriage wanting, that may be because only a small cadre of people have invested their time, energy, and reputations in making them consistently and repeatedly. Ryan Anderson, Maggie Gallagher, and Robert George, and the relatively tiny cadre of people laboring in these fields  deserve social conservatives’ gratitude and respect for the work they have done. But the intuitions that make such arguments plausible have not been in place for a while. Now conservative activists and thinkers have the luxury of rethinking our approach from the ground up and considering not simply how we can preserve marriage as it currently exists in the law, but how we can recapture the hearts of the very people who have found our reasons wanting. Being free from pressing and immediate legal concerns, we can devote ourselves to the renewal of marriage in America over the next 150 years…or 500 years.



The Distortions of Progressive Christians: How Religious Liberty is in Danger

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You are asking me to walk in the way of a well-known betrayer, one who sold something of infinite worth for 30 pieces of silver. That is something I will not do.” So said Baronelle Stutzman, a seventy-year old florist who has been sued by the State of Washington and by Rob Ingersoll in both her personal capacity and in her business for declining to provide flowers for Ingersoll’s wedding, a decision she reached after prayer and careful consideration. Ingersoll is gay. But he had also been a customer for some nine years, during which Stutzman had formed a close relationship with him, so that she asked him for details about his wedding and they left on good terms. She has employed individuals who identify as gay. Her case has been petitioned to the Washington State Supreme Court.

Baronelle Stutzman is a florist. And a dissenter.

Baronelle Stutzman is a florist. And a dissenter.

Kelvin Cochran was removed as Atlanta’s fire chief after self-publishing a book on male sexuality and handing it out to members of his longstanding bible study. The city of Atlanta had no such policy against such a practice, and after investigating Cochran could find no evidence of him discriminating against gay or lesbian individuals.* Blaine Adamson of Hands on Originals refused to print shirts for the Lexington Pride Festival which featured a rainbow flag on them, precisely because he did not want to participate in an expressive activity that he held deep moral objections to. He was compelled to defend himself against a complaint to the local “Human Rights Commission.” He won his case; it is currently not clear whether it will be appealed. He was defended by a lesbian print shop from New Jersey.

These are instances of government entities being deployed to compel private individuals to undertake activities which they find morally objectionable. Yet they are also indicative of a social environment in which those who hold traditional positions on marriage and act on them outside of directly religious contexts or their own home must reflect carefully on the potential troubles they might incur by doing so. Brendan Eich was ousted from Mozilla for just this reason. Just as the descriptions of infants as ‘fetal tissue’ has a real social cost, so the descriptions of traditional Christian accounts of sexual ethics as ‘bigoted’ establishes an environment that cannot but lead to the stigmatization of those who are willing to affirm them in public. Almost every conservative Christian I know, of any age, has begun having this conversation in one form or the other.

 

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None of the figures presented above are martyrs. That is the first, and perhaps the most important, distinction that needs to be made. The legal and social struggle between gay rights and Christian sexual ethics is real, but whatever challenges ‘losing’ the culture means for conservative Christians, martyrdom is currently not one of them, nor is there any reason to think it will be at any point in the future. The removal of property, of access to business in the way some Christians deem fit, of the opportunity to work in one’s preferred way—these are all constraints that could in fact happen. But while such limitations on our freedom may be unjust, they are not the same as the complete elimination of that freedom. And while the losses of opportunity and of income incurred by these Christians are real losses, they are qualitatively different than the loss of life and of imprisonment.

Yet the above individuals are dissidents in a struggle that is not even for religious liberty per se, but against the steadily expanding regulatory state which is exercising coercive power to compel ordinary citizens to engage in activities that they find morally objectionable. “Human Rights Commissions,” the IRS, Child Protective Services—these are all real and substantive ways that the sphere of opportunity and of authority for parents, individuals, and business owners is shrinking.

The effect of these expansions is not simply that there is more coercive power from the government being exercised on people’s lives, but that we have fewer non-governmental means of resolving our disputes—and that the government itself will increasingly be not the resolver of fundamental conflicts between citizens, but a source of and party to conflicts. When Mark Oppenheimer suggested that we should eliminate tax exemptions, his most intriguing line was that “countries that truly care about poverty don’t rely on churches to run soup kitchens.” Asking the government to fill in everywhere non-profits currently exist would certainly ‘solve’ the coming legal conflict over whether the government ought allow institutions which affirm traditional sexual ethics to not pay taxes. But by further reducing the size of civil society in that way, the government itself will almost certainly find itself acting in ways that citizens have religious objections to. The sense of disaffection and alienation that this might induce should trouble us all.

Dissidents, then, rather than martyrs.

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And coercion and constraint, rather than persecution.

Many conservative Christians have taken to describing the current environment as one in which they are being persecuted for their faith. Some Progressive Christians, like Rachel Held Evans, have argued strenuously against such claims, pointing out that conservative evangelicals still wield an enormous amount of influence. Donald Miller said something similar last year, albeit in a much more slapdash way. And while I think Miller and Evans distort our current moment in serious ways, they have a point that conservative Christians need to hear.

Social conservatives have been early adopters of ‘microagressions’, turning every development in culture as a sign and symbol of our society’s inevitable decline. The movement that has marked evangelicalism wasted enormous political and rhetorical capital on prayer in schools, the godlessness of Hollywood, and the ‘war on Christmas’, to pick a few issues from the grab bag. Alan Noble’s essay at The Atlantic last year has the best account of the phenomenon.

In short, what James Davison Hunter has written about ressentiment being the basis of culture war politics is right. And now I will self-indulgently quote…myself:

And here is the unfortunate effect: overreacting against various non-offenses and impotently shouting about real shifts in the world that [social conservatives] had no real power to prevent ruined the rhetoric of ruination and decline for the rest of us. Having played the same song so often, evangelical writers—like me—invariably have a credibility gap with anyone who isn’t already convinced. Young conservative evangelicals have been placed into a relatively tricky conundrum: the misuse of narratives of decline have left us without a potentially helpful tool to overcome and resist the naivety of our peers about the social transformations afoot. But carrying on as usual gives such rallying cries the atmosphere of a winnowing, so that anyone who demures is de facto on the outside. And therein lies a path where the declinist narrative becomes its own self-fulfilling prophecy: embattled and thriving, until it’s only we happy few who exist to die.

I am going to tout this website’s record in this respect. Before Noble, Evans, or Miller were talking about the problem, we published Chris Krycho saying nearly the exact same thing. As Chris said then:

“First, we must take into account that we American evangelicals are actually not much persecuted here, especially compared to our many brothers and sisters across the world and across history. Neither occasional hostility by coworkers, nor derision by the media, or even the slow collapse of American civil religion constitute persecution.”

But it is important to underscore just how damaging overreactions, distortions, and overblown rhetoric have been to the social conservative world. Adopting a decline narrative establishes a context where everything is further proof of the thesis, and makes social conservatives susceptible to sharing stories which reinforce their fears, regardless of their accuracy. As, you know, recently happened. Such disastrous moments destroy the credibility of social conservatives in public, and generate a reactionary skepticism about the other claims that social conservatives make. Hyperbole has a useful social role in persuasion—but only sometimes, and when the dominant public perception of a movement is that it is trading on irrational fears, that is the time to be precise.

Those critiquing the ‘evangelical persecution complex’ are right: the struggle over the shape of religious liberty simply does not entail that Christians are being persecuted for their faith, nor should Christians use such language. Deploying the government to constrain opportunities and limit meaningful life choices is a real infringement of our liberty: but ‘persecution’ is too powerful and loaded of a term to describe what is happening. Infringements on liberty (and even unjust ones) happen all the time, for lots of reasons, but an unjustified coercion and limiting by the state or society that leads to dhimmitude is not directly equivalent to the kind of systematic extirpation of religious believers as such. If it is ‘persecution,’ it is a form that is fittingly ‘soft’ for our bureaucratic state.

But then we need a different descriptor, one which communicates the real stakes without engendering hyperbolic responses or equating what Christians in America are experiencing with the sorrow and suffering of Christians around the world, both of which ‘persecution’ has done. ‘Unjustified, administrative coercion that constrains freedom’ may not sell t-shirts or raise funds, but it is more fitting to our time.

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But highlighting the abuses and the hyperbole do not mean Evans and Miller are right in their presentation of the substance of our current moment. At all.

If anything, they are following in the mode of evangelical engagement that their forefathers have practiced, by selectively quoting some of the more extreme elements of their opponents in order to differentiate themselves from them and present an overly sanguine account of the world. Jonathan Merritt did something similar recently on statements about gay marriage: by conflating a number of extreme claims with some very sensible ones and treating them all as equivalent, he managed to present conservatives as a whole as attempting to whitewash their own past. But there’s an ocean between Brad Wilcox and the AFA, and if you read their sentences carefully you’ll see they are simply not the same, even though putting them in that context means they look that way. But when they adopt this rhetorical method, young evangelicals are doing what traditional evangelicals taught them to do–perpetuate the culture war for their own benefit.

Again, it is easy for progressive Christians to continue to knock down the bogeyman that pastors are going to have to ordain gay unions because conservative Christians have sometimes set it up. And when central social-conservative institutions act in ways that are unquestionably wrong, the rest of the socially conservative world rarely critiques them publicly because ‘teams’ have to present a unified front. Such recalcitrance undermines the integrity and witness of these institutions, and fuels the reaction of the next generation.

But despite the accuracy of their critique of social conservatives, neither Miller nor Evans accurately capture the social or legal dynamics work in our contemporary struggle. Consider their context: both Evans and Miller are in Tennessee. I have little doubt it is far easier to be a conservative Christian there than it is to be an openly gay person. That is almost unquestionably true in small towns in many parts of the country.

But cultures aren’t determined by what happens in small towns, and the conservative argument about the emerging social pressures is one that depends upon the proposition that cultures are transformed from the top-down, rather than through small towns. Pick an ‘elite’ institution—the academy, the law, the media, Hollywood, finance, Silicon Valley—and advancement increasingly depends upon conformity to a particular set of social views and norms.* Traditional evangelical anti-elitism fed the narrative of hostility and ‘persecution’: but young evangelicalism’s slavish coveting of ‘elite’ status has, I suspect, helped many of us want to explain away the real pressures to change our accounts of the world required to advance in those circles. But at a minimum, Evans’ sweeping description ignores the many different facets of our society, and that power and influence simply is not distributed equally in every place.

But Evans also distorts the social context of this dispute in other ways. For instance, she points out that 48% of gay and lesbian Americans identify as Christians. (But do they support ending “religion based bigotry,” as one religious organization puts it?) I have no doubt that the vast majority of LGBT people simply want to live in peace with their neighbors. But the vast majority of conservative evangelicals are not culture-warriors, either, and never have been. Yet that has never stopped progressive Christians from making sweeping claims about the “religious right” and identifying ordinary believers with the claims of the religious right leadership. I think their practice is somewhat understandable: social movements have leaders, and what those leaders say matters. Only it is simply not clear that the LGBT activist community is interested in the kind of ‘live and let live’ world that Evans depicts, much as I wish they would be. Andrew Sullivan made this clear before he quit blogging. Obscuring that dynamic enables Evans to critique social conservatives, but only at the expense of consistency and accuracy.

Legally, going after the most extreme versions of the claims of social conservatives allows Evans to avoid actually providing answers to whether and how she thinks the religious claims of conservative Christians can co-exist with the existing regime of anti-discrimination laws. It is one thing to assert that extending “civil rights” to gays and lesbian individuals will make no difference to religious conservatives. It is another thing to provide reasons for thinking so, and to present the problem with any degree of accuracy. Which conservative leaders are claiming that we should be free from ‘disagreement’ on this issue, as Evans suggests? That actually gets the conservative worry exactly backward: most religious people are concerned that gay activists will not allow room for disagreement from social conservatives without constraining the spheres of their freedom.

Leave aside even what I wrote above about ‘coercion’ for a second: Evans’ rhetorical strategy of approaching this issue through sweeping generalizations conveniently allows her to avoid the serious questions that, for instance, Ross Douthat has posed. Here’s a list that I modified and expanded:

  1. Should religious colleges that explicitly ask students and/or teachers to refrain from sex outside of marriage lose their tax-exempt status, as Bob Jones did for prohibiting interracial dating? More pertinently, what legal or constitutional rationale can you provide for your answer? If sexual orientation is an “identity” the way race is, and if sexual orientation deserves to be a ‘protected class’ in the way race is, on what basis—other than your desire to be nice—do you think the government could or should allow tax exemption in one case but not the other? Should colleges lose their ability to participate in federal financial aid?
  2. Was Vanderbilt right for withdrawing recognition from Graduate Christian Fellowship for not permitting leaders who practiced same-sex sexual relationships?  Should higher-ed follow in their footsteps?
  3. (Quoting Ross), “In the light of contemporary debates about religious parenting and gay or transgender teenagers, should Wisconsin v. Yoder be revisited? What about Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary?”
  4. Does Evans think that tax exemptions should exist for Christian organizations at all, or are they merely a sign of our “privileged” status in American society? Are Christian organizations unduly privileged by their tax-exempt status over, say, Islamic, Jewish, or any other religious communities? If ‘yes’, should every religious community be similarly constrained financially by the loss of tax exemptions in order to especially eliminate Christianity’s ‘privilege’? Does the government have a right to every dime of everyone’s money, such that exempting certain institutions from being taxed is a special benefit or subsidy to them?
  5. Given that Evans has stated that religiously conservative views are responsible for suicides, on what basis should any protections be given to those institutions or individuals that promulgate or advocate them? Is a parent telling a nine-year old child who identifies as gay that same-sex sexual relationships are wrong a form of child abuse, or not? Is there any account of traditional sexual ethics that is not emotionally or materially harmful to people? If not, on what basis should the state allow ‘harms’ to be promulgated in the name of religion? What degree of protection, if any, should parents have over the education and moral formation of their children? Should Child Protective Services have the authority to intervene in cases where children or outside observers report ‘emotional trauma’ against parents who say same-sex sexual relationships are morally wrong? Should such parents be permitted to adopt, or to participate in the foster care system? Why or why not?
  6. Should Christian doctors lose their state licenses if they decline to preserve fertility services for gay and lesbian couples because of their moral objections? Should Christian counselors lose their licenses if they refer out cases to colleagues who are affirming?
  7. On what basis should we believe that Anthony Kennedy’s single paragraph on religious liberty in Obergefell will have any binding influence on the real challenges above?

These are the kinds of serious legal and social challenges to real and substantive religious liberty that our country currently faces. Extreme fear-mongering about pastors participating in gay unions have obscured these challenges, which has allowed people like Evans to skirt the real issues by focusing on the abuses. But by beating up conservative straw men, Evans and company get to overlook the existing legal and social framework that everyone now grants will lead to serious conflicts between traditional views on sexual morality and our prevailing view. These questions are not going away. And it is simply naive on the part of young evangelicals to think that being nice will help answer them.

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Recently, South Carolina lowered the Confederate flag from State House grounds for what we can all hope was the final time. The events that led to its demise were shocking and horrific—and the lowering of the flag a just and therapeutic act for the people of South Carolina, and the country. The groundswell against the flag was momentous: in just twenty three days, South Carolina managed to do what would have otherwise probably taken decades. The cost to do so was simply too tragically high, and somehow people still managed to disagree.

The one point of consensus, however, was that the flag meant something. It is not simply an inert image: on one story, it stands for racism and white supremacy by attempting to keep alive and affirm the distorted memory of institutions built on slavery. On another story, it stands for a heritage and tradition of dissent. Whatever we make of these, no one doubted that the symbol doesn’t matter—and that the act of waving such a flag was an act that expressed some kind of meaning that our society should take seriously.

Which is why the one thing we cannot say about the religious liberty challenges that are currently upon us is that they do not matter—at least not on pain of consistency. The rainbow flag, which Hands on Originals were cited for not printing on t-shirts, is not an inert symbol. It has a content and a meaning, and to those who have substantive disagreements with the morality of that movement, being compelled to print it is more akin to being compelled to print paraphernalia for the League of the South. Yes, there is significant dispute about the moral status of homosexuality: but for the Christian, trivializing the symbols as though they simply ‘do not matter’ is not an option. And for those with deep objections to same-sex sexual acts, providing the materials to celebrate them (even if those materials are not expressive directly) may be an indirect participation in them.

Similarly for weddings. There, acts and ceremonies bring the symbols of celebration to life. The direct, creative contribution of florists, bakers, and others to such ceremonies is not simply inert or neutral. We may think it morally permissible to do so as Christians; we may think it not. The one thing we are forbidden from thinking is that it is not expressive of something. And for those with deep moral convictions against such participation, the question is simple: should the force of law be deployed to coerce them to participate, any more than force of law should be deployed to compel a gay or lesbian photographer, cake maker, florist, or any other vendor to provide material for the wedding of a renowned social conservative activist or the materials for social conservative’s organizations celebrations?

These are the questions at hand. And progressive Christians, like Evans, have been able to effectively obscure and conflate relevant distinctions in order to further the narrative of ‘persecution’ beyond even where social conservatives take it, which helps the progressive cause by delegitimizing any and all religious concerns about the shape and boundaries of government coercion. Consider Evans’ description of religious freedom restoration acts as ensuring “the protection of businesses that refuse service to gay and lesbian people” (a phrase she repeats in her latest post).  And her suggestion that the perception of “American Christians is that baking a cake for a gay couple is too much to ask.” Evans herself is complicit in fostering that perception, precisely by obscuring the relevant distinctions that are necessary for seeing the actual objections these Christians have.

In short, her claim is a canard: every case that has come to the fore has involved the unwillingness on the part of business owners to provide material, substantive, or expressive support to ceremonies or events that endorse moral views which they seriously disagree with. In nearly every case, the business owners have a history not only of serving gay and lesbian individuals, but employing them as well—without discrimination. Not only would the RFRA’s provide absolutely no legal grounds for a business putting up a sign saying they would not serve gay people–none of the people who have become props for progressives have ever, in any way, come anywhere near advocating such a practice, much less engaging in it. To use that as a potential scenario creates an impression about the religious liberty cases at work that comes near bearing false witness.

At the least: such distortions are their own sort of ‘fear-mongering,’ a practice that seems to exist in an (entirely unnoticed) symbiotic relationship to the distortions that the religious right has deployed so effectively in the past. Such fear mongering cannot abide the kinds of careful distinctions that the most sophisticated conservatives have been making with respect to religious liberty and the government’s unmerited coercion of individual consciences. In that way, it trades on the same kind of lazy political rhetoric that evangelicals have been comfortable with for far too long—even if it deploys it in a way that is now opposed to traditional evangelical views.

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Evans is right that Christians should serve their gay and lesbian neighbors. In the religious liberty cases at hand, however, there is ample evidence that is precisely what these Christians did—only to draw the line at serving them in an expressive capacity that they morally objected to. Their reward for this from Evans is repeated obfuscation about the stakes of their cases and their reasons for undertaking them.

Which makes one wonder under what circumstances Evans would stand with her evangelical brothers and sisters against the coercive power of the state. After all, the ‘persecution narrative’ does not entail that Baronelle Stutzman is herself engaging in the kind of illegitimate victim politics that we should all spurn: she is a dissenter against an aggressively expansive government, one which Evans seems to have allied herself with at the expense of the religious believers she purportedly claims to align with. Evans “sees [Obergefell] as a victory for religious freedom in the sense that people whose religion supports and encourages same-sex unions will no longer be prohibited from practicing that important religious value simply because some of their neighbors hold a different view.”  Nevermind that they were never prevented from being married in a religious format to begin with. Identifying the expansion of ‘religious freedom’ with the ability to participate in a civil, political ceremony is a curious understanding of the concept indeed.

Christ died at the hands of the state, and died for the sinners who put him to death. But his death was not the end of his agency, but its manifestation: he was killed by another, but willingly accepted it. He was a martyr, yes, whose body was ravaged at the hands of a government whose reach exceeded its grasp. But he was also a dissenter, who accepted and even welcomed the consequences of his refusal to live on the terms handed to him by Caesar. The life of Christ is the fountainhead and grounds of religious liberty for all people: Christ demonstrates the power of martyrdom without endorsing the idea that Christians ought climb up on the cross themselves, as some of the early Christians were tempted to do. He spent three years of his life calling others to repentance, exercising every opportunity and power the State granted him to call the State to repentance, before silently inverting the judgment of Pilate in his trial and crucifixion. In this, he demonstrates his fundamental freedom and power and the limits of the State, reminding Pilate that there are some realms which the State cannot—and ought not—reach.  St. Paul would later follow in his example, and exhort us to follow his as he follow’s Christ (cf. Acts 22, 25, and 1 Corinthians 11:1, among other places.)

In the same way, Christians ought exercise every means possible to shape the laws of the land to preserve the freedom of all people before yielding themselves to the judgment of the court and subverting it in their response. That may involve acknowledging and repudiating the unjust laws of our forebearers, like the criminalization of sodomy. But it would also mean articulating the limits of the coercive power of the state and standing with all people whose intimate practices are compelled in ways that their consciences do not allow. There is no reason why serving our gay and lesbian neighbors is incommensurate with the freedom of Christian business owners and individuals to not participate in any way in ceremonies or events that they have moral reservations about—at least not unless the actual reasons Christians are providing for their objections are distorted by those like Evans.

For there is one thing which we never see our Savior doing in his “service” to his neighbor: participating in and endorsing a ceremony or ritual which was actually morally impermissible according to his own ethical standards. He kept himself “unstained by the world” in this respect, which is a very different standard than Evans’ cake-baking asks of conservative Christians. It is akin to the kind of compromise one might feel in attending a meeting of the League of the South: if one strongly felt like attending entailed approval, then one clearly ought not. Slapdash encouragements to “love one’s neighbor” by simply getting over it and baking the cake forgo the work of moral deliberation and analysis from that person’s point of view, and presuppose accounts of ceremonies and symbols that our recent Confederate flag controversy shows cannot be defended.

And carrying the cloak two miles when the law mandates one has no bearing in the least on whether Christians may dispute with the State about the shape the law should actually take. If the Washington State Supreme Court rules takes Baronelle Stutzman’s case and (God forbid) decides against her, and the State of Washington then imposes a fine, then she, with the help of all God’s children, should pay double it to those who have attempted to destroy her business and her reputation.

But there is nothing in Scripture which demands she must yield her agency pre-emptively and allow the law to make the judgment prematurely. Such a refusal of her agency, in the context where such agency is possible, would have the effect of further constraining the freedom of all citizens by yielding to the state a power to which it is not entitled. By playing the dissenter, Baronelle Stutzman and others are unmasking the powers that be, demonstrating their pettiness, their expansiveness, and their relentlessness in coercing all citizens into conforming with their point of view. The message that Christ has triumphed over the State is one to which they bear witness in their free dissent from it: whether the state will go on permitting such dissent without penalty is an open question.

———————

The evangelical witness has been severely and seriously compromised for the past thirty years by its overstatements, its hyperbolizing, its fear mongering, and its resentment-based politics. Having cried wolf for so long, it now struggles to persuade the very people who should be most firmly in its corner: her children. But those children have adopted her methods and rejected her substance, rather than seeing the truth of her current concerns despite the difficulties of her method. Rather than providing real and genuine leadership out of the moral majoritarianism of the religious right, they are keeping us within it. Progressive Christian distortions about the state of the world are the natural and inevitable rotten fruit of an evangelical environment that has poorly formed its young. The religious right birthed the young writers that she deserves.

We live in serious times. These superficially benign disputes, which might seem so trivial and outlandish to so many, bear within them principles and precedents that will have a serious and substantive effect on our freedom and character as citizens for long into the future. Evans suggests that this question is a “complex issue and [she] can see both sides.” That may be true. But it is made more complex by her repeated misrepresentations of it, distortions that serve to delegitimize conservative views not simply for her young, progressive evangelical audience, but for the world more broadly. Based on her depiction of it, she has not seen the conservative “side” at all.

This, then, is the real danger to religious liberty: it is not gay individuals or even activists who will erode our liberty. Rather, it is a host of ordinary people like Evans who, having been raised in an environment dominated by the religious right, are not willing or able—I make no claim as to which—to sift through the chaff to find the kernel of wheat, to make their way through the hyperbolic rhetoric to find the truth within. Such individuals will dismiss questions about the implications of the principles they accept and advocate as ‘fear mongering,’ or retreat into some kind of ad hoc position that they are ‘hard questions.’ They are, but these are far too serious of times for those who wish to be leaders to not answer hard questions. Logic is cruel, and those who endorse arguments that entail opposition is dehumanizing must account for the public and political consequences of that view.  Otherwise, by a thousand paper cuts, the sphere of freedom for our society will slowly bleed. Whatever ‘privilege’ Christians have in our societies, it is simply inconsistent for Evans to simultaneously exhort Christians to take up their crosses and bake the cake already while providing support and cover for the coercive power of the State which would compel them against their consciences to do so.

And yet.  Ours may be the first generation in the history of the world to make inconsistency and ambiguity virtues: that is our great struggle and our great opportunity. Those progressive Christians who have endorsed this next step in the sexual revolution are not very clear-eyed about what they have affirmed should, in a reasonable world, lead to. But “reason and love keep little company together nowdays,” said the Prophet from the 17th century, and if progressive Christians eventually wish to embrace an incoherent position and join in defending conservative Christians from the long, coercive arm of the state….I will be the first to welcome them with open arms.

 

——————————

*The ethics policy for Atlanta clearly focuses on employment, for understandable reasons. Indeed, it exempts “single speaking engagements.”  A book, I can attest, is far closer in form to a speaking engagement than a job. See this brief explainer for more.

*Rod Dreher has been cataloguing examples and anonymous emails for a year now.

Update: I had meant to mention licensing, as that is a huge forthcoming issue for many Christians in a variety of issues, and I totally blanked on it until I was reminded by a friend. So I added a question on it and adjusted the numbers accordingly.

Update 2: I edited the section on Vanderbilt for clarity and accuracy.


A Resignation Letter

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Let me get this out of the way, so no one else has to say it:  “Farewell, Matthew Lee Anderson.” Effective immediately, I am stepping down as Lead Writer of Mere Orthodoxy and handing full control of the site over to Jake Meador. He will assume responsibility for all aspects of the site. If he makes me “Emeritus Writer,” well, I won’t turn him down. I am also indefinitely departing from Twitter, though I will be carrying on with Mere Fidelity.  Whenever we get off our summer holiday, that is (which should be next week).

Eleven years ago, a friend and advisor told me that I should begin a ‘blog,’ a new medium that was democratizing discourse and opening up career paths for people who knew nothing about the traditional means of rising the ranks in publishing. I gathered a few close friends, took my inspiration from C.S. Lewis and G.K. Chesterton, and Mere Orthodoxy was born. It’s impossible for me to sum up everything this site has meant to my life since that day: we have never been famous or had a large audience. But our small size was one of our greatest strengths, especially in those early years. I was so young, and a barely adequate writer and thinker then, but somehow a small and extremely intelligent community formed and we argued and argued and argued together. Those years were crucial for my formation as a writer and as a person. And now that I am a decade older and still a barely adequate but much more verbose writer, I still don’t have the skills to say how much this ‘place’ means to me. Deciding to step down was the single most difficult decision I have made in a long time.

There is one central pressing practical reason for this decision: I have a doctoral dissertation to write, and it demands and deserves my full and undecided attention. As one person kindly reminded me, I’m no good to the world until that dissertation is done. (I’m not even sure that was hyperbole.) The academy is currently gripped by a credentialism that I sometimes think is more tied to the old vice of curiositas than the Christian pursuit of understanding. But to it I go all the same, embracing the discipline and attentiveness that it demands, with hopes and prayers that the formation I have given myself the past decade has not ruined me for its rhythms and life.

I am not giving up on writing for the vaunted ‘ordinary reader’ or ‘lay audience,’ though. I have come to understand that I have never really known how to write for such ‘ordinary readers’ in the first place, to which critics and fans alike I suspect would add their “Amen, yea verily, it is About Time.” And then they’d add that expressions like “yea, verily” are proof of the thesis under consideration. I mean, who says that?  And where was I again?

Right. Signing off.  This is a path too difficult for me.

The renewal of the ‘evangelical mind’ was well underway by the time I finished at the Torrey Honors Institute and began this little site: I had encountered there an evangelical community that was confident, historically aware, institutionally located, and unafraid to argue with each other about the questions that matter most. But it was a vital evangelical community precisely because it was so interested in the world beyond it, interests that I assimilated and learned. I became gripped by the possibility of articulating a ‘mere Christianity’ in public that had the energy, life, and joy that Lewis and Chesterton embodied. This little corner was intended to contribute to that effort, to the renewal not simply of evangelicalism, but of the traditional Christian witness in the elusive ‘public square’ of the emerging new media.

The scope of my writing has narrowed considerably since then, which is perhaps the most important non-practical reason for me to stop writing here. I was motivated by a strong sense of urgency when I began writing—the kind of urgency about the immediacy of action and decision that the conservative evangelical world fosters, and thrives upon. It is an urgency made for the internet, which depends upon closing the gap between action and response to almost nothing.  But that means that those who are online tend to have their passions and interests pulled along by what is currently happening at any given moment, rather than allowing one’s judgments to be formed through a process of slow, patient deliberation. I said something about this in my piece on reading, which I wrote several years ago.  But a few months back I reread this from Oliver O’Donovan, which confirmed my intuition that I needed to cease writing here for a season:

There is a folly of opinion, which finds satisfaction, as the proverb says, not in understanding but in expressing one’s mind (Prov. 18:2). Unlike the inconsiderate folly, this has exposed itself to the dialectic of social interrogation. But driven by a dread of having nothing to contribute to the social exchange, it allows society’s exchanges to direct it, rather than the realities that they should be communicating.  ‘Where we are now’ becomes the sole measure of truth—always ‘we,’ never ‘I,’ for the voice is that of the immanent collective, not of a formed judgment.

Here is the ‘simple’ of the Proverbs, who ‘believes everything’ (14:15), and here is the ‘scoffer,’ who ‘does not like to be reproved’ (15:12), the suggestible and the counter-suggestible, one echoing the current views and the other reacting against them, both wholly creatures of them, forming no judgment and offering no dialogical resistance. Opinion gains no coherence, and so has no prospect of growth. It is neither accumulative nor critical but reactive, a series of discontinued beginnings.

A self too weak to interrogate or argue with the successive new reports of reality that reach it makes no contribution to communications by reporting its own experience or questioning others’ reports. The mind is lively enough—images of the world and its doings and constantly formed and re-formed—but it is no more than a screen onto which public reflections are projected….The passions aroused by the news have a purely representative character, like those aroused by tragedy on the stage. Sharpening our arrows of opinion and firing them off at actors they will never reach, pronouncing judgments that involve us in no actual responsibility, we go through the motions of playing a part in the great communicative drama and so work off surplus active impulses before turning to the tasks that actually lie before us. We may, perhaps, feel more resolute about those tasks as a result of the exercise, but this is not the result of anything we have learned.

I cannot think of a more profound or accurate diagnosis not simply of the tenor of our age, but of the character of the internet and its various communities. I have tried, as much as possible, to resist the fragmentation and inevitable narrowing that interacting online leads to. And even before I had reread O’Donovan’s quote, I had become more skeptical of the de-institutionalized effect of writing at a distance.

But the narrowing has happened all the same, and there is no one’s fault but my own. In recent years, I have written less frequently than ever here, and it has been primarily controversies and events that have drawn me out of the woodwork. I own the weakness, even if I do have two substantive books to my name that provide a relatively robust outline of how I see the world.  I can think of only one mitigating factor that O’Donovan does not address: such a narrowing is perhaps much more likely when no one is being paid for their time or opinions. There is, as I said before, a love of writing and of words that ought move us to write (though not necessarily publish) regardless of who is reading. But when economic pressures turn such writing into a luxury, it is far easier to only weigh in when the passions are sufficiently aroused to do so. The difficulty is especially poignant within evangelicalism, where ‘passion’ is our stock and trade and one of the few motivators we have.

It is more difficult to step away now, though, because the opportunity to have a robust and cheerful conservative Christian outlook be heard is so much greater now than it was when I started out. The recent gay marriage decision provides Christians our best opportunity in the past 50 years to begin articulating the unique power and beauty of the orthodox view of marriage, and unwind the corrosions of it that have built up the past fifty years (and more). And because of the disputes about religious liberty, Christians are going to have to make the case over and over again for the fundamental importance of their practices and religion. Disillusionment, exhaustion, and alienation are not simply a phenomenon among young evangelicals, though they certainly are present there as well. There is a word of hope that matters now more than it ever has, a word which is one for all people, which those who bear the mantle of the “Gospel” can make more clear than ever through our communication and our lives.

But none of that can happen if we ourselves do not have a culture, and if we do not resist the allure of allowing the banalities required by the culture war to overwhelm the goodness of the civilization we are seeking to preserve. Institutionally, the path to prominence in evangelicalism has always depended upon maintaining relevance. It may be easy for conservative, traditional evangelicals to mock the magazine that bears the name and its corresponding interest in contemporary music and media, but we have our own forms of relevance-chasing, which follow the news and controversy cycles. For now, I am so embedded in this pattern that it is clear the only means I can resist it is by withdrawing from it. The path to building a new culture of words, a new cycle of communication, about even our society’s most controversial questions may depend upon more radical action than five or ten thousand word missives, though I still protest that those are still a good start. It may depend upon seasons of absence and silence, seasons which are not withdrawals but opportunities to listen and work for words that have more substance, more depth, more meaning than digital publications will allow. (Whether this form comes in personal correspondence or unpublished essays does not matter so much to me.)

All that is simply a hypothesis. I will find out its truth in the testing of it.

I do know, at the least, that any future words from me should only come under the authority of an editor who can tell me ‘no.’  It is a deep and perhaps irresolvable tension in my life that I sought to contribute to the renewal of the evangelical mind without participating in either of the central institutions which have dominated its intellectual life: the pulpit and the university. The status that partaking in such institutions grants within the evangelical world has one major negative: it takes our focus off the direct quality of the arguments and the work being presented. My educational training was characterized by what I might describe as a respectful deference to authority that was manifested in loving cross-examination: anyone was free to be questioned on what they said, and the vindication of the authority was in the reasons they gave for their position.

But for that, the deference to pastors and professors is the right one to have, for the credentialing process in those communities is helpful for sifting out at least some who should not be teachers. The immediacy and self-authority intrinsic in blogging exacerbates the unaccountability of writers, and itself contributes to the very anti-intellectualism of the evangelical world that I attempted to resist through the medium. It is not surprising that the emotionally emphatic character of evangelical writing, with its first-person narrative style and its bold font, has emerged among those who write online. We were the generation that wrote on Xanga, after all. But worrying about whether the negative effects of the form have overtaken any potential positive goods is not something I can do properly while participating in the medium. Sometimes it is not those who have experienced a thing that understand it best, but those who have not.

Still, there is lots of work left to be done.  And for Mere-O’s part, Jake is the man to do it.  It is my hope that he will re-broaden the vision of the site, and be willing to test your patience by posting on issues that seem obscure, uninteresting, and ostensibly irrelevant—in order to demonstrate that it is often in the obscure, forgotten corners of our world that transformation begins and our hope is found. I commend him to your careful attention, as I have since I first started publishing him, as well as the rest of the writers here.

For my part, I leave with nothing but gratitude for you, the longtime readers of this site and our new audiences. I have not words to say how I feel about the kindness you have shown me throughout the years. That so many of you have disagreed with me so vociferously is among my great joys: it is in spirited opposition that true friendship sometimes consists in, and if I haven’t always been an exemplar of charity, I have always been humbled to be a recipient of it. I leave a debtor, owing more than I could possibly repay.

And now I practice what I have always struggled to learn: knowing when to stop.

For the first time and, I hope, the only time at Mere-O, the comments are closed.


The Undead Religious Right: Why I Cannot Support Ted Cruz

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It is a well-known story: The Religious Right first galvanized around Ronald Reagan in 1980. Their ascent was over by 1988, when Pat Robertson’s failed campaign divided its constituency and the Moral Majority was dissolved. But the obituary was premature. Robertson’s campaign rose from the grave as the Christian Coalition, which handed out over 30 million voter guides to help usher in a Republican Congress and Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with America,” securing the Religious Right’s influence on the American political landscape for at least the next decade. George W. Bush (in)famously made evangelicals central to his campaign in 2000 and 2004; by the time his tenure was complete, the “Religious Right” had morphed into “social conservatism” and stories of its demise began reappearing, thanks to the ascendance of Barack Obama and a hopeful media obsession with the moderatish, rapidly maturing “young evangelicals.” In both 2008 and 2012, social conservatives were too divided to do much more than give Huckabee and Santorum the appearance of being serious contenders without any of the substance. In the years since, the stream of stories about the end of the religious right has became a flood, thanks in part the resolution of the gay rights marriage dispute in Obergefell.

And yet here we find ourselves one more time, with social conservatives playing a starring role in the Republican nomination. By uniting behind Ted Cruz instead of traditional stalwarts Rick Santorum or Mike Huckabee, social conservative leaders have helped push him into the top three in the race. Cruz’s strategy is straight out of 1980: He has made the Religious Right the base of his campaign, fostering social conservatives’ waning hopes that they might once again have a representative in the White House. Such pandering is what wearing Reagan’s mantle apparently requires.

By all appearances, then, the Religious Right is as alive as it has ever have been. But this time, the grievances that animate them have flowered into an overt anti-politics, a willingness to trade the responsibilities of governance for the therapeutic cleansing of disruptive chaos. Trump and Cruz are dominating evangelicals—and Cruz has provided evangelicals what Trump has popularized, except in a (slightly) more respectable form. The life of the Religious Right is that of the undead: Theirs is not the politics of hope grounded in a vision of a common good for all people, but a nihilistic cynicism animated by resentment and anxiety. And therein lies a tale.

Falstaff and Trumpism

The spectacle of Donald John Trump, Sr. would be entertaining if it were a play—as it kind of was, once. Sir John Falstaff—yes, the rotund, uncouth drunkard who is Trump’s nearest literary analogue—gripped the world when Shakespeare first introduced him to the stage and commands our attention even now. Like Trump, Falstaff is a boundlessly charismatic, amusing-yet-damnable force of nature. Henry can’t help but love him, even if he must eventually banish him. Falstaff is the “true and perfect image of life indeed”—or perhaps in our own tongue, ‘high-energy’—and, like Trump, is infamously willing to say whatever his own advancement requires. He is the embodiment and manifestation of an anti-political enthusiasm, a repudiation of governance for the sake of self-interested pleasures and concerns.

But Falstaff is also the most religious character on stage in Henry IV Part One, the play that made him a legend. Shakespeare had originally named the character John Oldcastle, a proto-Protestant dissident who was friends with Henry V. Falstaff is his own man, of course. And Part Two takes pains to distance Falstaff from Oldcastle. But the enthusiastic, devil-may-care spirit that both he and Trump embody has real sympathies with a religious temperament that is skeptical of social forms and emphasizes a grace free of moral reform—both of which suffuse the evangelical world.

The atmosphere that pervades Trumpism, and not policy, is the basis for his surprising shared sympathy with the evangelical world. While the evangelical leadership has gone other directions, the laity has its own attitudes and impulses—and those have more in common with Trump than most evangelical leaders would like to admit.

Consider Hurricane Trump’s rhetoric and aesthetic, which has a simplistic genius: Whatever making America great again means, it is simultaneously aspirational and nostalgic, both laudatory and critical. It’s easy to see why blue collar evangelicals in the heartland who are sharply infected with an anti-China, pro-populist sentiment like such a promise. But the rhetoric of ‘greatness’ has a broader cultural appeal. Video gamers were promised by Playstation that “Greatness Awaits,” and Nike told athletes you should “Find Your Greatness.” Even American Airlines these days is “Going for Great,” proving definitively that the concept can mean anything and hence means nothing. Trump’s sales pitch perfectly fills the greatness-deficit in American public life, and plays upon characteristically evangelical ambitions. Saving the world is what we do, which makes Trump’s promise of having a unique role in history nearly irresistible. In its own way, the promise of making America great again evokes Reagan’s own aspirational “shining city on a hill,” an aspiration that evangelicalism’s pietistic patriotism strongly endorses.

The sympathies appear even more pronounced when considering evangelicalism’s tensions with the prosperity gospel. Trump’s promise of greatness has all the credibility and cash value of the multi-level marketing schemes he has invested in. But such operations offer users a life of financial independence, freedom to be your own boss, the ability to do what you have always wanted to do. They promise for a person what Trump has offered the country, with the same level of clarity and specifics about how that could possibly come to pass. But if Trump’s brand sells to struggling middle-class people who are beholden to the man and yet await their reward, well, so does Paula White’s prosperity gospel. The only pre-requisite for making the appeal work is that one has already been successful: gold thrones for the evangelical preachers, and golden hair for our President-Elect.

But the glitzy promise of multi-level marketing is also inherently evangelistic—more evangelistic, even, than most evangelicals. The “Come to Jesus moment” often comes by way of conversion stories that mimic evangelical salvation tales: “Well, I once was working a dead-end job on the fast-track to nowhere, but now thanks to the magic of Life Saving Product I have an independent income stream and am my own boss! And so can you!” [Stage cues:  Just As I Am sounds sweetly in the background.]  “I once was lost, but now am free.”  Trump is no caricature of this sort of testimonial: he’s so much better and more entertaining at it that he’s broken the curve. The inherent appeal of being a ‘winner’ is not far from the hope of being set free from all one’s earthly troubles. Trump flouts the Bible these days like Big Dan Teague, in part because the kind of commercialized religiosity they represent is not far from the center of the evangelical ethos. “It’s all about the money, boys!” Or in this case, the votes.

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And then there is ‘authenticity’, which has governed evangelical political sympathies more than anything else for the past 30 years. Trump may also be a traitor to his own class, as Ross Douthat suggested; but his appeal to evangelicals is not that he’s an Insider who will tell Elite Secrets, but that he’ll say precisely what he thinks—if he thinks. Mike Huckabee went from longshot to serious in 2008 on the strength of evangelicals’ admiration of his ‘authenticity.’ Romney couldn’t fake his realism well enough for evangelical tastes. But Trump’s transparency is—you guessed it—yoooooge. He may be the most authentically real candidate in the history of politics, at least if you ask him. And evangelicals, as much as anyone, have no problem with the presentation of a self that has been inflated to unusual proportions. Evangelicals love a good show, especially when there’s a sales pitch attached. Dallas megachurch pastor Ed Young, Jr. once sold a book on sex by teaching from his bed for twenty-four hours. Trump’s self-aggrandizing seems rather limp by comparison.  

The Nihilistic Roots of Evangelical Power

How did we get here? For the past thirty years, evangelicals have sowed an anti-political wind, and now in 2016 they are reaping the Trump whirlwind. Having stoked the affections of alienation and disenfranchisement, evangelical leaders have this cycle scrambled to prevent the laity from voting on them. But those political passions have deep roots, which is why popular evangelical support for Trump has not (yet) diminished. In 2010, James Davison Hunter’s To Change the World argued that the Religious Right’s political approach has been shaped by a Nietzschean will to power, which aims to  enforce its will through “legal and political means or to threaten to do so,” rather than persuading others or negotiating compromises. This interdependence between the evangelical world and the government has a long history in American life: From Prohibition to the Comstock Laws, evangelicals have been particularly keen to pursue legal remedies for moral problems. Paradoxically, then, while evangelical Protestants have made much in recent years about maintaining a sphere of life beyond the reach of the state (the family, the church, and so on), they themselves have been an instrumental part of the politicization of everything.

On marriage, the recent source of so much consternation within the evangelical world, the problem of how the church and state interact is particularly acute. As University of Chicago legal theorist Mary Anne Case has observed, evangelical Protestants are uniquely dependent upon the State for their marital practices. As they do not have their own formal divorce or annulment proceedings and courts, evangelicals have outsourced such statuses to the states. Such intimate integration of the church and state, Case argues, has a historical lineage: The Puritans themselves viewed marriage as a political contract, rather than a sacrament, to the extent that in some cases preachers were not present so as to not confuse the church and the state.

This narrow identification between the religious community and the political order, however, has generated a strong sense of grievances at the shifts in political opinion, grievances that the Roman Catholic community and Black Protestant churches do not feel as acutely given their long history as outsiders. As Case writes, for evangelicals, marriage law “could be put in service of sectarian ends by groups that substituted capture of the state institution for development of their own clearly religious alternatives.” When those institutions were lost (as the public schools were in the 1960s), an acute but understandable sense of oppression gripped the evangelical political life. Hunter’s analysis concurs, identifying ressentiment as the corollary of the political will to power. For evangelicals,“injury—real or perceived—leads the aggrieved to accuse, blame, vilify, and then seek revenge on whom they see as responsible.”

Such an anti-politics of resentment, alienation, and disenfranchisement is at the heart of Trump’s appeal, even if the issues that he has been most vocal on are not traditional social conservative concerns. But ressentiment is not rational to begin with; it is not rooted in a deliberative, robust account of the common good, even if it uses such rhetoric to justify itself. The energy that generates ressentiment is more primal, more visceral—and hence, like Falstaff, less bound by particular moral outlooks than it might seem. The strange willingness of social conservatives to sometimes overlook the wildly disparate moral characters from their own outlooks of those who seek their votes—as evangelicals almost did in 2012 in their flirtations with Newt Gingrich—represents a willingness to sacrifice their principles on the altars of political power. This is the political ethos the Religious Right has fostered within their constituency for thirty years—and now, at the hands of Trump, it has finally born its nihilistic fruit.

Cruz, Trumpism and the Vanity of Evangelical Politics

Donald Trump may not be palatable to the establishment Religious Right—but Ted Cruz is, and as a candidate whose sole accomplishment seems to be ‘disruption’, he promises evangelicals Trumpism with a veneer of respectability. The galvanizing support by the traditional evangelical leadership class for Cruz was as predictable as the Cruz-Trump love affair. Cruz has followed the Reagan-Huckabee playbook of wooing evangelicals impeccably, while holding the decisive advantages over Huckabee and Santorum of not being either of them. In Cruz, conservative evangelicals have the embodied promise of a younger, chaos-light candidate who is firmly and securely one of their own—that is, one who shamelessly subordinates the religious life to the pursuit of political power.

Compare Cruz’s courtship of conservative evangelicals with Marco Rubio’s. Rubio endorsed Mike Huckabee in 2008 (disclosure: as did I), so he has roots in the social conservative world. Rubio’s stance on abortion is impeccable for social conservatives, and his personal life seems to exude the family-first conservatism that social conservatives have (ostensibly) made their distinctive witness. Rubio even packs more theological freight into a five-minute explanation of salvation than many evangelical preachers. As a religious conservative, Rubio seems almost too perfect. Consider the astonishing fact that on a November Sunday in Iowa, Rubio went to church—that is, he went to church to go to church, rather than to shill for votes. His decision to forgo campaigning that day “raised questions” among those who have apparently forgotten the 10 Commandmentswhich evangelicals infamously have sought to keep in public places, even if they have not taken them all to heart.   

Ted Cruz went to church in Iowa, too, one week after Rubio. And there he made it obvious (if anyone could doubt it) that he is willing to pander to evangelicals in ways that clearly make Rubio squeamish. Cruz reduced the evangelical megachurch he visited to a glorified campaign rally, complete with Cruz 2016 slides on the screens behind him. What began with Reagan’s delicate “I endorse you” to an extra-ecclesial gathering has culminated in the shameless, overt subordination of the inner life of the church for political gain.

Indeed, no religious arena has been immune to Cruz’s political ambitions. He announced his campaign at Liberty University, which bills itself as the world’s largest Christian university, and indelicately placed his own political hopes in the hands of the conservative evangelical community. “Imagine,” he bluntly put it, “millions of people of faith all across America coming out to the polls and voting our values,” before turning his family into a political prop to demonstrate his social conservative bona fides. On the day of an important Iowa social conservative event, the Presidential Family Forum, Cruz not-so-subtly announced the formation of a “Prayer Team.” Direct contact with the Almighty about all matters Cruz comes with strings, though: Team Cruz will require your name and address, please. “The prayers of [middle-class, registered Republicans] availeth [many votes].” So the Bible says somewhere, I think. Most perniciously, Cruz managed to turn an event about the persecution of Christians in the Middle East into a news story about himself, proving in the most abhorrent of ways that absolutely nothing is sacred when everything is political.

Cruz’s unsavory use of the religious life for his own advancement, however, is the playbook that the Religious Right has written for itself, creating a vicious cycle that identifies the evangelical world with such shameless politicking. Attempt to carve out a path respects the church’s independence, avoid subordinating the Christian life to political ambitions, and many conservative evangelicals will simply tune out. Pandering is the litmus test for politically conservative religious ‘authenticity.’ Evangelical pastors and laypeople who are more careful in their theological politics are understandably invisible to the media in political seasons—which rewards the Religious Right with the attention they crave, and is instrumental to their ongoing power.

Ignore the fact that such an empty political cycle lacks the robust theological sensitivity that Scripture requires of the people of God. Overlook, if you will, the idea that Cruz’s naked flattery toward evangelicals and Trump should make anyone who has read Proverbs cautious. Remember, instead, the jilted feeling evangelicals have had from political leaders who promised evangelicals the moon and did not deliver: that alone should require from evangelicals a healthy skepticism about Cruz’s promises. And then consider that Cruz’s overt religiosity—which itself should make evangelicals wary—appears to some people who knew Cruz in the past to be a learned art. Fool me once, and all that. But nostalgia is a force both forgetful and powerful and the vanity of the Religious Right is apparently insatiable.

The Politics of Hope and Despair

By signing on to the Disruptive Wing of the Republican party, conservative evangelicals seem to have finally traded in the hope of governing for the politics of disruption and despair. Since George W. Bush left the White House, conservative evangelicals have luxuriated in their perpetual alienation from the halls of power. Maintaining just enough influence without actually governing has been a structural feature of the movement. It has allowed evangelical leaders to perpetuate the illusion of having political clout without being able to generate enough votes to win the White House or having enough political savvy to be taken seriously by whomever does.

Supporting Trump and Cruz because they promise to introduce the chaos our political class deserves may give vent to the dissident, chaotic spirit of John Oldcastle. But electing Falstaff or the politician most eager to imitate him would be an apocalyptic, anti-political judgment that our political order is beyond repair. That is hardly the ‘good news’ that the name ‘evangelical’ is meant to signify—but then, evangelicals are some of the only American’s remaining who use ‘apocalyptic’ non-metaphorically.

Voting for Ted Cruz further subordinates the faith to the aim of political gain in a way that should make preachers of the Gospel blanch—which is why, as a conservative evangelical Republican, I will abstain in the general election if Cruz is the nominee. No politician who so overtly, so profligately subordinates the life of the Church to his own political gain should receive the support of those who claim the Gospel as their banner. The only small consolation the Religious Right might have is that the exhausted, cynical anti-politics that Cruz has so effectively tapped into may at last finally die with a bang this cycle, and not with a whimper.

Matthew Lee Anderson is a D.Phil. Candidate in Christian Theology at Oxford University. He wrote this because he needed to get it out and on with his life. 

Feature image credit: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ted_Cruz#/media/File:Ted_Cruz_by_Gage_Skidmore_4.jpg


Against Donald Trump: Why Evangelicals Must Not Support Trump

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The rise of Donald Trump among some evangelicals is an understandable, even if unsettling phenomenon. The alienation and despair that he has both fostered and exploited is a pervasive feature of some corners of American life. But no one is more susceptible to such hopelessness about our political class than working-class, rural, white evangelicals, who have been tutored more by the grievance and resentment theater of both conservative and evangelical talk radio than by the good news of the Gospel. As Ben Domenech has astutely explained, having lost every culture war such evangelicals are now fighting on the only terrain they have left: political correctness. And Donald Trump is their gift to the world.

I have relatively deep roots in the conservative evangelical world. In 2007, Justin Taylor and Joe Carter let me join with them in endorsing Mike Huckabee. (I have since grown to regret this.) Unlike many of my more moderate peers, I have publicly defended traditional marriage. I have spoken at the Values Voter Summit. When progressive Christian Rachel Held Evans wanted to find a Christian to explain why they are drawn to political conservatism, she kindly invited me. I have written a cover story and a number of other pieces for Christianity Today. I am unswervingly pro-life and will unflinchingly describe the abortion regime as an American genocide. I think Values and Capitalism is among the best programs in the conservative world.

I have also never written about immigration, but my own views are somewhere between Rubio and Cruz. (This must be said, as it has become a litmus test for evangelical conservatives in this campaign.) I am skeptical of the relaxed immigration policies that many countries in Europe have practiced, but also recognize that America isn’t Europe and that we may be able to sustain and assimilate higher percentages of immigrants than countries with tiny land-masses. Ross Douthat’s ten theses on immigration seem enormously sensible to me. Like many Americans, I think blanket amnesty is a bad idea—and I see no way to deport 12 million people. I have friends and neighbors who are both members of the white underclass and are undocumented immigrants, and see regularly firsthand the challenges both sets face in trying to sustain their way of life.

Born of the tribe of Dobson and inducted into the party of Reagan on the eighth day, I have supported every Republican presidential candidate in my lifetime. And never before have I been more ready to dissolve that union.

If Donald Trump is the Republican nominee, I will not hesitate in abstaining or voting for a third party in November. And neither should you.

——

In January, I compared Donald Trump to Sir John Falstaff, whose debauched and degenerate jollity has long intoxicated audiences with the strange brew of repulsion and mirth. Falstaff is larger than life itself: He somehow stands outside morality, even as he stands outside the political order. But Henry, having deliberately shrouded his character in the stench of vice through his close friendship with Falstaff, knows that the friendship cannot endure in the same way when he assumes the throne: “I will banish thee,” he promises Falstaff in the midst of their revelry. They both know it must be true: The legitimacy of Henry’s rule would be imperiled by his close friendship with the lecher.

Trump is a not simply a charlatan, a huckster, a con-man, though he is all of that. He is also shameless. The more outlandish he is, the more he is rewarded with the only currency he cares about: attention. He has none of the checks or balances that make the rest of us mortals weak and irrelevant. He is T.S. Eliot’s Hollow Man’ come to life: He blows wherever the loves of money, fame, and his indulgent fantasies of being a ‘winner’ will take him. As Joe Carter said recently, his penchants for insults betrays an incredibly insecure mentality, the sort that breeds a harsh authoritarianism at the first whiff of power. Nothing else will matter except maintaining the delusion that Trump is a Winner, Baby: the common good be damned.

Such shamelessness is his greatest asset: It is also one of our political order’s most deadly foes. As Eliot Cohen recently argued, Trump’s debased approach to political life signals a “larger moral and cultural collapse.” While ‘political correctness’ may slowly suffocate meaningful debate and dissent, the festering of an environment where outlandish and disgusting ‘rhetoric’ are rewarded with a party’s nomination will only embolden imitators. (Twitter is full of them, and they are terrible.) And we will be the worse for it: The shame that prompts our politicians to try to wiggle out of being called a ‘liar’ is what, in some instances, will actually prevent them from lying.

The lack of trust between the people and our government is a pernicious social disease that has been growing for a long time. But Trump is not so much a cure for our malaise as a more potent dose of the same venom. A political environment in which the truth is openly mocked, spit upon, and dragged through the streets before the cheering crowds places itself in serious jeopardy, as it reduces political relationships to who wields the instruments of power. If Trump, God and heaven forbid it, were actually to win the office, he would have his reward while the rest of us face la guillotine.

While evangelicals have gravitated to Trump precisely because of his repudiation of the ‘political correctness’ of our day, the brutal irony is that he is its final triumph, its consummation and perfection, its heroic champion…even down to his followers’ technique of shaming and silencing dissenters on Twitter. The reduction of politics to power and the assertion that argument is a cover for bigotry finds its completion in the devil-may-care spectacle that is the Trump campaign. He has persuaded even those who claim for themselves the name of the Gospel that nothing matters besides being told the warm and comforting truth that We Can Be Winners, that the truth is dispensable provided our needs are satisfactorily met. The irrelevancy of truth for the sake of power-relations in Trump’s campaign has transposed ‘political correctness’ into a new, contrarian key: Trump has not left it behind so much as co-opted it for his ends–at least until its purpose is served.

And those who support Trump will be most likely to lose out if he eventually wins. So it has often been for those who have bought into his lies. From Trump’s casinos to Trump University, like the prosperity preachers he emulates Trump has preyed upon the very people he claims to love and support. And why would a President Trump be any different? We have been given no reason why the Newly Converted Conservative Trump will be any better for America than the liberal Hillary Clinton. And no reason can be given because none exists outside of Trump’s most solemn word, a word that his history suggests is as valuable as the degrees from his University. For those drawn to Trump’s policies, on what reasonable basis would you expect him to not sell you out? Because the fearsome power of the Republican Establishment will hold him to account?  The same Republican establishment that is now bending to kiss the ring?

T.S. Eliot was not wrong about much, but he was about this: The world may end, but it will not be with a whimper, except from the conservative Republicans who have decided Trump is their only hope for the relevance and influence they crave.

——

There is no conservative argument for Trump. Conservatives once held that virtue and character are essential requirements for a just society, and that a stable marriage and family is among the best way to nurture those virtues. Those virtues, we contended, were essential for ensuring that the market not only operated efficiently, but stayed within its appropriate boundaries. The conservative movement once believed that religion was central to our social fabric, that not everyone had to be religious but that it needed to be afforded due respect and even reverence. Turning religion into a political prop would only cheapen it, and eventually corrode it. The political virtues that conservatives once cared about—temperance and restraint—are now treated (by ‘conservatives’) as the stuff of compromisers and weaklings: “Damn your concern for principles and prudence: We shall have our riots in the streets!”

My depiction of ‘conservatism’ is, admittedly, both nostalgic and not policy-specific. But it gestures at a set of intuitions which have helped me maintain my ties to a party that I have frequently found myself in disagreement with. I have always been happy to be an idealist: Chesterton taught me that it is the only path toward reform. Still, if the Republican party has become so detached from the conservatism that I depicted that it is willing to allow Trump to bear its mantle, it deserves the violent death that it currently faces.

It would be easy to look upon Trump and see him as an outlier in American life. But the Trumpian disregard for the truth and virtue is a cancer that has beset us all: Trump is a candidate for our time, a fitting judgment upon us who magnifies our sins and our vices. He may be a caricature; but he is a parody of us, a morality tale whose meaning we should heed.

But there is a difference between acknowledging the degraded political character of our age and joining with the Visigoths while they tear down the Roman monuments. That the Babylonians were God’s instrument for judgment does not mean the Israelites should have cleaned their swords. If the gods have released the Kraken upon us, shall we join him for tea and crumpets?

The Republican Party Establishment—may they rest in peace—has been leaning toward doing just that. Having failed to even try to stop him, they will now tell us that we are obligated to support him in November. At the moment when Falstaff must be banished, Chris Christie pledged his fealty—and was rewarded most handsomely for it. Hugh Hewitt has begun banging the unity drum. I have long admired him, though he has oft been tempted to prioritize the party over principle.

More will unquestionably come, with cries of “The Court, The Court, The Court!” So the wholesale repudiation of conservative principles by the party pledged to defend them will proceed, washed down by the smooth pragmatic consequentialism that has placed its principles on the altar of urgency. That the party of Lincoln would demand that we support Donald Trump suggests there is no one who might rise the ranks to whom such individuals would say ‘no.’ One might think that such unprincipled weakness is partly what has undermined our country’s respect for the party and given us….Donald Trump. The party leadership has not learned its lesson, but they will have their reward in full: a weekend stay at Mar-a-Lago, which should keep them warm and cozy in their infamy.

I do not despair at the prospects of President Trump: If that is the judgment upon us, then I will meet it with as much good cheer and confidence as I can muster. What tempts me to despair is the number of otherwise sensible people who will capitulate to the shameless huckster to preserve the shreds of their power. Yes, the Supreme Court is important. But if the Republic is in such dire shape that we have to vote for a chronic liar who has knows how to distance himself just enough from the racist underbelly of American life to hold it together, then we should just honestly acknowledge that she is already mortally wounded. This election is about “saving the country,” Hewitt cries, as though all it will take is three Supreme Court justices and a much stronger navy. If the country is imperiled, it is so because of the rot within–the rot that Trump’s overtly race-baiting politics has brought to the surface, and which the Vichy Republicans are currently planning to make terms with.

Besides, Trump’s promises to appoint conservative justices are worth what, exactly? More or less than the Trump University degree? That the next President may appoint three Supreme Court justices is not an argument for voting for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton. Given Trump’s penchant for telling people what they want to hear for the sake of his own advancement, we need some argument independent of his own words that he will suddenly become trustworthy when he is in office. The entire history of his character bears witness against it.  

But I am not convinced it has come to that, because I think there are enough decent, clear-headed men and women left in this country that Donald Trump will never be President. Would that there were more of them within the Party’s leadership.

Trump is the candidate Republicans deserve. But I will not be complicit in their folly. With Erick Erickson, I will never vote for Donald J. Trump. He has neither the character nor the principles to commend him to the office.  That this even has to be said is indictment of the world enough. It is an age of high folly when banally obvious truths have to be uttered by ordinary men and women.

The right response now to Donald Trump by any conservative is Erickson’s and Ben Sasse’s: We shall fight on Super Tuesday, we shall fight on the plains of Ohio, we shall fight in Florida, we shall fight with the cheer of knowing we are in the right, we shall fight on the floor of the convention, we shall never join with him. The Republican party may die, but conservatism and its principles will go on and be renewed without it. #NeverTrump. Not now, not ever.

But to that I would add that I may never support a candidate who endorses him, either. Offering support to Trump is such a gross error in judgment that I will be highly skeptical of any politician who lends their aid to place him in the White House. The party simply isn’t worth it. It never was, and as long as it continues to embrace the myth that the Party Matters Above All, it never will be. The only meaningful way to defeat Trumpism permanently is to offer a better politics, a politics rooted in integrity and character and concern for our neighbor, a politics that takes seriously the concerns of Trump’s followers without capitulating to their leader. Such a politics can win the respect of a majority of the country only if it breaks with Trump himself, and ignores the browbeating about the Court that the Vichy Republicans (like Hewitt) will offer until November 11th.

For evangelicals, the decision should be easy. Sadly, for many who are already supporting Trump, it is not. We have Bible verses clearly indicting Trump’s behavior, and in the strongest possible terms. I mean, look at the list from Proverbs about what the Lord hates: “haughty eyes, a lying tongue… a false witness that pours out lies…” Accepting Trump because he announces that we can be warm and filled completely divorces our political commitments from our interest in the Gospel. This is the time to recognize what you have wrought, and repent: The hour draws nigh, but it is not too late. Shamelessness is not courage. Defeating political correctness through wickedness is not a victory for the truth. The enemy of our enemy is not always our friend. If we feed the beast, he will someday grow strong enough to turn on us. And that day will come: Trump’s history of being blown by every wind and wave of sentiment virtually guarantees it.

For those evangelicals who are seized by despair at our political order and interested in burning it to the ground, consider instead voting for someone with the firmness of principles and character that will guarantee that when he arrives, he will not lose sight of his mission. C.S. Lewis once said he would rather play cards with an atheist who never cheated over a Christian who didn’t care. In the same way, disaffected evangelicals should prefer someone with a moral center over the hollow core of a B-grade celebrity. In other words, lend your support to Bernie Sanders: You’ll have as much of a chance of overturning our political order, having your interests represented, and passing pro-life policies as you will with Donald Trump. And he at least has the advantage of being a decent human being.

There is no world in which I would vote for Bernie Sanders. But I would consider it before I would ever consider voting for Donald Trump. And Republicans who expect us to fall in line come November should know that among evangelicals who have voted with them in the past, I am not alone.

Feature image via: https://www.flickr.com/photos/gageskidmore/8567825104


Evangelicalism After Trump: The Moral Bankruptcy of the GOP

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I am putting together a series of posts about evangelicalism after Trump with a particular focus on our political future after the nomination of Donald Trump by the Republican party. This first post in the series is from Mere O founder Matthew Lee Anderson. I’ll be putting something up later today. I also hope to get contributions from a few other contributors as well. Anyway, here’s Matt:

Last night’s results mean that Donald Trump will almost certainly win the Republican nomination for the Presidency. In light of these events, I have been asked by a few people to update my previous body of commentary on our current political environment.

And perhaps there is some need to do so.

I will not vote for Donald Trump. I have not, and will not, waver or hesitate in my resolve on this matter. It is a conclusion that is as obvious to me as my own existence: I cannot doubt it, for to do so would be to fundamentally oppose all that I have thought and stood for since I first wrote a public word some 13 odd years ago.

Voting is, and always has been, a moral act. It is an endorsement that we offer to a person—a qualified endorsement, to be sure, bounded by the contingencies of our time and the options before us. But as an endorsement of the relative fitness of this person for the office, it must be earned, and where no options exist to earn it there is no principle that requires our participation through this means. Responsible citizenship requires judgment, and sometimes judgment means abstention. Unless events intervene, that is almost certainly the path I will follow.

My previous essay on the matter of Trump explains my reasons for opposing him, and to it I have nothing more to add. I will simply say that the contrast with another unfit person for office does not help his case in the slightest.

The central principle of my decision is that Donald Trump is palpably unfit for the office of the President, and unworthy of the vote of anyone who dares think that the name of Christ still must have some salience for our public and political life. Since I posted my original essay on the matter, events have done nothing to dissuade me of this stance: if anything, they have further confirmed it.

But this is a harsh principle, and I cannot free myself from the burden of taking seriously its potentially far-reaching consequences. I have in mind two specific potential implications, both of which I raised in my original essay on Trump.

The first is whether I will ever vote for another Vichy Republican who stoops to endorse Trump for the sake of “the Party” or on some hope of maintaining influence within it in the years to come. My current answer to this is that I will not: The captivity of the character of our politicians to their parties is a principle that has no boundaries. If Trump can be rationalized for conservatives, anyone can be. What is needed in such an hour are leaders willing to lose their own political lives that we might have saved the country: the absence of such leaders is, perhaps, the most damning aspect of this tragedy.

The second is whether I will consider voting for Hillary Clinton in such a circumstance, a possibility that I had never in my life considered but which now must be addressed. Whether the nomination of Trump represents a proportionately grave reason to justify a prudential affirmation of Clinton is a question that I strongly suspect I will answer in the negative, but am obligated to consider all the same.

The most definitive and concrete question that I face is whether I will continue to identify as a Republican. And here, I can only say that barring some public act of repudiation by the Party for their complicity in bringing Donald Trump to public life, doing so has become impossible. To be the party’s nominee for the highest office in the land means more than being put forward as a plausible option to the public. The nominee is the party’s central standard-bearer, its de facto leader and representative in all other matters. The party that nominates Trump, and the politicians and pundits who demand that the rank-and-file remain “for the sake of the party” cannot be trusted with responsibilities as serious as governing the country. And any party that cannot so be trusted does not deserve our support.

Practically, this means that I will no longer presumptively vote for the Republican candidate in down-ticket races, as I have sometimes done. Vetting every candidate individually is an enormous task. Alleviating the burden of each citizen doing so is one reason why party affiliation exists: party affiliation has, in the absence of other reasons, functioned as a reason to vote for a candidate. Given the irresponsibility of the party at the national level, this can be true no longer: giving up party affiliation means not voting for candidates that I have not vetted, and when voting for them, doing so as individuals whose policies I support rather than as participants in a party that is alien to me.

It may be suggested that this is too ‘idealistic’, that it does not properly account for the intrinsic importance of party machinery for the sake of enacting policies. That may be true. My rejoinder is that I take parties so seriously that I meet their gross and heinous failures with the only (very limited!) censure I can offer. I do not and have never feared political irrelevance. To repudiate the party is not to embrace either quietism or inaction—as the length of this essay should clearly demonstrate. There are more ways of political action than are dreamt of in our society’s stunted imaginations, and it is incumbent upon those like me to recover them.

Whether the apotheosis of Trump is a betrayal of the Republican party, or a clarification of its inner core, does not matter. That the party has left any semblance of conservative principles outside its gates is clear enough, and damning. Such principles are not only of an economic or legislative type, but encompass the indispensability of virtue and the health of soft social institutions for our common good. It is only within such a hollow core that Trump could possibly arise: The absence may be one that we are all complicit in, but that does not entail that we should vote to perpetuate it.

But what will ‘the evangelicals’ do, those institutions and individuals who have made party politics the vehicle of their moral vision? Here is, perhaps, the only silver lining I can find to this sad affair. The rise of Trump is the death blow to any pretenses, any illusions about where the convictions of those conservative Christians involved in politics at our highest levels lie. We face the prospect of a great untethering of the evangelical witness from the Republican party, a prospect that every Christian—including, and especially, those like me who have claimed the Republican name—should meet with joy and gladness.

The restoration of the evangelical witness in American political life must begin with the expunging of the failed forms of influence-seeking that have gripped us, and with a reinvigoration of the proper theological basis of our activity. The reality that “the party” will now turn its attention—is already turning its attention—to demanding fealty for Donald Trump from those whom he has openly and flagrantly mocked is a trumpet blast loud enough to awake even the Religious Right from the deathly slumbers of its partisan captivity, a captivity it has embraced to its own demise.

There is no clearer choice, no more obvious decision than that between King Jesus and the petty, frail would-be Caesar who Republicans now have foisted upon us. If voting for Donald Trump is required for ‘influence within the party,’ now or in the future, then there is no moral limit, no ground of our principles that conservative Christians will not be asked to give up for the same reason. There can be no compromise: there will be no fault for refusing. If the party allows a wicked man to become its nominee, there is no prudential reason in the universe that can enjoin the consciences of those whose special, assumed vocation to bear witness to Christ’s claim in our public life to vote for him.

Will the Religious Right, once more, offer its soul for the temporal, earthly pottage of political influence? I wish I had more confidence that they would not: But its former standard-bearers have been among the quickest to yield themselves up to Trump’s influence. Mike Huckabee, Sarah Palin, Ben Carson—their easy and glad capitulation should cause serious and sober reflection within the halls of the Religious Right’s central organizations. The failure of their judgment is as damning a critique I know of the theological and political formation on offer in the world of the Religious Right. Whether others will see it as so remains, alas, to be seen.

My rejection of Trump can doubtlessly be interpreted, and thereby dismissed, as ‘virtue signaling,’ a rejection of the lower white class who originally made him a force. No protest I make can dislodge the critique besides weaponizing my own life and friendships as evidence against it: That is what makes the charge peculiarly forceful and attractive to a people unable to reason together.

But beyond noting the thick irony of conservatives rushing to class-consciousness and other sub-rational explanations of political discourse, I will only say that the hidden premise that repudiating Trump entails scorning his voters is not only unargued for, but false. The premise of my rejection is that Trump is a cynical liar. That his supporters are grossly wrong about him, I clearly think. But that they have reasons for the hope, optimism, and support they have invested in him, I also know well.

This is the political wasteland that we evangelicals have helped make. Renewal begins by acknowledging such a fact and reforming the inner lives of our churches and institutions accordingly. No such renewal can begin as long as we lack the nerve to stand on our principles, to insistently and repeatedly point to the intrinsic importance of virtue within our leadership for the advancement of the common good.

Such a stance may seem tedious: it may even appear as a form of resignation, a blithe washing of our hands of the serious matters before us. But the witness of the Gospel exceeds the tyrannical urgency of political action in a democratic society: it expands the horizon of our hope beyond the election in November, and beyond its consequences over the next four and four hundred years. The occasional way of negation, the word of judgment on our political order that abstention signifies must be set within such a deeper, more pervasive affirmation of the goods to which we are headed. It must be a word of gladness: In this abstention we yield up the political order into the hands of the God from whom we had illegitimately, irresponsibly attempted to wrest and control it. If this be resignation, it is so only on the grounds of our accompanying announcement in joy of the goods and glories that our political order cannot reach or touch.

Featured image via: https://www.flickr.com/photos/gageskidmore/5440393641


The New Evangelical Scandal Republished

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Note from Jake Meador: In early 2009 after the election of Barack Obama, Matthew Lee Anderson published his “New Evangelical Scandal” essay in Houston Baptist University’s journal The City. The essay is no longer available online, so we are making it available by republishing it here at Mere O. I for one think it is still relevant.

In the 2008 Presidential campaign, the dominant story once again focused on how the evangelical voting bloc would align itself. In late 2007, amidst stories that the influence of the so-called “values voters” was waning, evangelicals launched Mike Huckabee’s previously struggling campaign into the national limelight. Though Huckabee’s inability to move beyond his evangelical base ensured his influence would not last, his politics and campaign drove a wedge not only between the evangelical public and the evangelical elite, but between the evangelical public and the Republican intelligentsia, most of whom offered nothing but loathing for the Arkansas governor.

As Huckabee’s campaign faded, Barack Obama’s ascension kept evangelicals and religion in the public eye. In 2004, John Kerry ignored the so-called “faith based community” until it was too late—so Obama started his courtship early. In 2006, he had shared a stage with Sam Brownback at Rick Warren’s influential Saddleback Church for a Global Summit on Aids and the Church. In 2008, he returned to Saddleback along with Republican nominee John McCain to discuss with Warren the issues evangelicals care about.

While Obama was expected to perform wonderfully on stage, McCain was not to be outdone. The aging Senator delivered what was unanimously considered a stellar performance on Saddleback’s stage, and then acknowledged evangelicals even further by selecting one of their own, Sarah Palin, as his running mate. Palin’s status was solidified during her speech at the Republican National Convention, where she established herself as a formidable political force in spite of attacks from many in the establishment media.

For the most part, evangelicals were overjoyed by the selection of Palin, a mother of five who clearly lived out her pro-life principles. But prior to her selection, many of Obama’s supporters fueled increased speculation that evangelical voters—especially the younger generation—are no longer captive to the “religious right” or the Republican Party. It is a story that seems to write itself every election cycle—as author Hannah Rosin wrote in 2000, the focus of the religious right was, in her words, “maturing”:

Like many who start out as political gadflies, Christian activists are blurring into the mainstream. Where once pollsters found solid agreement among those who identify themselves as religious right, they now find disagreement, even on fundamental questions such as prayer in schools. Where once they found a single-issue focus, they now find distractions; religious conservatives define their top priorities for candidates as anything from their morality to their education policy to their tax plan. They still care about abortion, but many care about other issues more.

This trend, if real, wasn’t reflected to a great degree at the ballot box in November. According to the 2008 exit polls, even a dynamic figure like Obama was unable to break evangelical voters to the left. A total of 26% of evangelicals voted for Obama, compared to 23% for Kerry—a statistically insignificant change. But upon closer examination, Rosin’s description might finally be coming true.

While evangelical turnout in 2000 was down slightly, evangelicals supported George W. Bush in 2004 in overwhelming fashion. Democrats learned their lesson—in 2006, they began appealing directly to people of faith and adopting values-heavy language, winning back some evangelical votes. They did not stop there. While dissatisfaction with Republican complacency and corruption had made their job in 2006 easier, Democrats began building an infrastructure to ensure that they would retain those votes in 2008.

The 2008 Democratic National Convention began with an interfaith forum and included faith caucuses, a new development from the 2004 convention. Cameron Strang, CEO and publisher of trendy post-evangelical magazine Relevant, accepted the opportunity to open the convention with prayer before reversing his decision. He was replaced by emergent church icon Donald Miller, whose Blue Like Jazz is popular on Christian college campuses. Strang wrote on his blog:

If my praying on opening night at the DNC would be perceived as showing favoritism or incorrectly labeling me as endorsing one candidate over the other—rather than being the bridge-building gesture which I intended it to be—then I needed to rethink the decision. So I brought that concern up to the DNC, and they graciously understood. They still desired to have someone participate who represented this new generation of Christian voters (which is awesome, by the way), and I thought, who better than Blue Like Jazz author Don Miller? I respect him immensely, and he’s a much better representative of our audience than I am. So, I gave him a ring and he was more than up for it. Likewise, the committee was thrilled to invite him to give the benediction in my place—a move I think will ultimately be much better for the DNC. Don Miller’s famous; I’m not.

In a move that encapsulates the “new generation of Christian voters,” Strang subsequently changed his voting registration from Republican to Independent.

Whether Democratic efforts to win over evangelicals are successful in the long term remains to be seen. But their devotion of resources and attention to evangelicals and other faith-based communities suggests they see an opportunity to make inroads that did not exist previously. Their focus is on the younger, hipper evangelical: the twenty and thirty-somethings who are just as likely to have been educated at Harvard as Wheaton, and who are ostensibly more thoughtful and compassionate than their parents, and are disenchanted with the purported Babylonian captivity of the evangelical right.

Even though the sociology has not yet caught up, the narrative of a new breed of evangelicalism has taken hold among the media and political elites. The narrative is doubtlessly popular in part due to wishful thinking by Democrats and their media-savvy friends; yet as a young evangelical myself, it is impossible to discount entirely. Even if the outline of our theology is broadly the same as our parents, as it is for an increasing number of conservative evangelicals, our ethos is different. And the differences are not strictly political—the political trends among young evangelicals that have received so much attention are grounded in different concerns and emphases that undergird younger evangelicals’ approach to culture and spirituality as well. This new ethos is largely a reaction to the abuses, failures, and excesses of our parents’ generation and contains significant clues as to the future of evangelicalism in America.

At the close of the twentieth century, evangelicals began to wade into the political arena. Though their first dalliance was with Jimmy Carter, their disappointment with his failures to address their needs and concerns—and to give them a voice in his administration—disillusioned them and made them vulnerable to the advances of Ronald Reagan. Unlike Carter, Reagan appointed evangelicals to prominent positions within his administration. Though it would occasionally waver, the evangelical/Republican alliance was solidified at that point.

For younger evangelicals, this political alliance signaled an abdication of Biblical principles about poverty, race, and other issues of social justice, and constituted a subordination of the hope of the Gospel to the promise of politics. Evangelicals, the story goes, had gained political influence in exchange for their souls.

This myth of evangelical conservative political captivity pervades younger evangelical sermons, conventions, and conversation. Regardless of its veracity, it has become an accepted truth. While some younger evangelicals have run in the opposite direction and placed their hope in the Democratic political platform, most have instead eschewed the partisanship of our parents in favor of self-labeled independence and open-mindedness.

This rejection of partisanship is often motivated by emphasizing the apolitical nature of God and His Gospel. Jim Wallis’s Sojourners, the standard bearer for leftist evangelical political reflection, has popularized the slogan, “God is neither a Democrat nor a Republican.” The idea was formalized in the “insistently moderate” Evangelical Manifesto, which Joe Carter accurately criticized in the pages of this journal (see THE CITY: SUMMER 2008) as giving the impression that “one of the purposes of the document is to be a repudiation of the Religious Right.” While I venture most young evangelicals have never heard of the document, they would be very familiar with its message. Unfortunately, such sloganeering prevents careful consideration of the role political parties play in the American political process and the potential benefits of partisanship. Some questions, it seems, are non-starters.

Yet while young evangelicals are increasingly unlikely to associate themselves with the Republican Party—or with any party at all—on many key issues they are at least as conservative as their parents. For instance, while a majority of younger evangelicals are resolutely pro-life, they justify their disassociation with Republicans on the (mistaken) grounds that the Republican Party has not benefited the pro-life cause at all. This ignorance extends especially to the effect the President has on pro-life issues (one thinks of the Mexico City provision and President-elect Obama’s promise to repeal it as his first official act), and a misplaced optimism about Democrats’ moderation on the issue. As Michael Gerson has put it, “In my experience the new evangelicalism is not trading moral conservatism for social justice. It is adding social justice to moral conservatism.”

While younger evangelicals are pro-life, they are not pro-life in the same way as their parents. Rather than pursuing political solutions, younger evangelicals are more intent on engaging in a cultural ground war to change hearts and minds, which in practice ends up diminishing the political importance of abortion. Even the limited success of Democratic overtures toward younger evangelicals ought to concern Republican and cultural conservative leaders, and prompt healthy self-reflection about how well pro-life Republicans have educated their own on their successes and how they have been gained. While non-partisanship is the new political virtue, it is increasingly being used to justify political apathy on moral values not currently in fashion.

The rejection of partisanship by younger evangelicals is part of a broader deterioration and rejection of the institutions that shaped the identities of our parents. While younger evangelicals may claim to be above the partisan fray politically, they are increasingly segregated into self-selected niche communities from which they derive—or better, create—their respective identities. Despite its claims to reject modernity, this communitization suggests the triumph of western liberalism over the evangelical mind.

Consider the case of patriotism among younger evangelicals. For most young evangelicals, it is far easier to gain applause by pointing out America’s flaws than by trumpeting national virtues, especially when those flaws have to do with American consumption and economics. Rob Bell’s “Nooma” videos are instructive on this point: In “Rich,” Bell, a prominent leader of the emerging church, targets Americans for being rich relative to the rest of the world. While much of his teaching is instructive and Biblical, Bell ignores the generosity of both Americans and American evangelical Christians, and the interesting questions around what constitutes “rich and poor.” While such critiques are sometimes heralded as courageous, they are typically nothing of the kind. It is easier for young evangelicals to criticize than to praise, especially when the target is America and her values.

At the core of this revised patriotism is the attempt to rescue the Gospel from its American captivity, the chief symbol of which is the presence of the American flag in many evangelical churches. As the argument goes, the presence of patriotic symbols in the house of God inevitably marginalizes the church by subordinating it to the political order. Many young evangelicals fall into the trap of placing an “or” where there previously had been an “and,” assuming that we can remain loyal only to God or Caesar, but never both.

From whence the devaluation of patriotism? Sadly, much of this view is reinforced at historically Christian universities, which have become hotbeds of a baptized version of Sixties liberalism that is not as much anti-American as it is anti-national. Unlike our parents’ generation, many younger evangelicals have had extensive experience outside the country (and much of that in third-world countries). Evangelicals have always been globally minded—the missionary movement of the 19th century is evidence enough of that—but the increase in short-term missions and the influx of study-abroad opportunities provide young evangelicals extensive opportunities to see the United States from the outside, creating conflicting opinions about America’s position in the world. While the missionaries of our parents’ generation permanently relocated and adopted the habits, customs, and culture of their new homes, younger evangelicals experience just enough to become disillusioned with the excesses of American culture for a while, only to slowly return to enjoying those excesses while maintaining their newfound cynicism.

Yet it is not just the sense of national identity that has deteriorated among young evangelicals. The social effects of divorce have been well documented, and evangelicals have hardly been immune. The prevalence of divorce in the evangelical community has left large swaths of young evangelicals to deal with the debilitating effects of shuttling between two households for holidays. For other evangelicals, the deteriorating social structure has endowed them with a cynicism around marriage that has contributed to a rising marrying age. While young evangelicals are still flocking to the altar, they are taking their time to do it—and exploring their options along the way.

In addition to their political, national, and familial affiliations, young evangelicals have slowly moved away from identifying with their own theological systems and heritage (the trend of evangelical converts to Anglicanism that Robert Webber first noted has not abated—if anything, it has expanded toward Rome and Constantinople). Such conversions belie, I think, evangelicalism’s failure to articulate its own theological distinctives and advantages and its rich intellectual and spiritual heritage. Few young evangelicals who convert have read—much less heard of—the writings of John Wesley, Andrew Murray, A.W. Tozer or other giants of the evangelical past (one wonders whether the new evangelical leaders like Rick Warren, Bill Hybels, Rob Bell and others have read them). And even fewer evangelicals are inclined to give the tradition in which they were raised the benefit of the doubt, to see the errors and problems and remain regardless.

All this bodes badly for the future of evangelicalism. In the face of declining partisanship, patriotism, and eroding family ties, young evangelicals have increasingly turned away from their roots in search of a sense of grounding and stability. They have the intelligence to notice the flaws, but often lack the charity and the patience to work to fix them.

As our communal ties have deteriorated, our consciousness of the role social institutions and communities play in our own spiritual and social formation has increased. On evangelical college campuses, it is fashionable to criticize the narcissistic individualism of modernity while trumpeting the virtues of community and the importance of social structures for change. Politically, young evangelicals are just as quick to criticize the social structures that keep individuals in poverty as they are the individual decisions that lead to young women getting abortions.

All this, ironically, signals the triumph of western individualism on the evangelical (and post-evangelical) mind. The renewed focus on community and on institutional structures is still grounded in the decisionism that has always marked evangelicalism. The fact that we are born as Americans—or as evangelicals—is unimportant. What is important is that we choose to be patriotic, that we choose to be Republican, that we choose to be evangelicals (or emergent, or Catholic, or Presbyterian)—and that we make that choice independent from and irrespective of any tradition that may have shaped us.

The young evangelical fashions himself into his own preferred identity, and then finds others who have done likewise. More often than not, this results in a rejection of the traditions—political or otherwise—in which younger evangelicals were raised.

In other words, as the traditional identity shaping institutions have eroded or become passé, young evangelicals have turned to carving out their own identities. The introduction and acceptance of tattooing in the evangelical community is indicative of this sort of identity creating behavior. Living in the bodies we have been given is not enough—we must remind ourselves that we have control to make ourselves how we want to be. This self-styling is as common among conservatives as it is among liberals.

No book is more exemplary of this need to create our own identity than Donald Miller’s Blue Like Jazz. Written in 2003, Miller’s book is styled after Anne Lamott’s Travelling Mercies. For many young evangelicals, it functions as a modern-day Confessions, with two important exceptions: there is no attempt to discover the unity behind the decenteredness and fragmentation, and there is no interlocutor. It is difficult to see how his rambling and disjointed narrative and his distaste for social institutions and religion are not simply Fifties beatnik ideology baptized. The fact that it has resonated with so many young evangelicals reveals that most of us are struggling to pick up the pieces of an ever-expanding world and form a unique identity for ourselves, which is precisely what Donald Miller attempts to do. He simply has been more successful than most.

Fewer words find more frequent use among young evangelicals than “authentic.” Barack Obama and Mike Huckabee resonated with young evangelicals for the same reason: they appeared authentic in their positions and their mindsets. Sarah Palin’s immediate success hinged upon her knack for being a different sort of politician, a more authentic one—that is, one who reminded us of her humanity. The ability to appear authentic matters to young evangelicals just as much as a politician’s policies or decisions. As one friend put it to my wife, “I agree with more of John McCain’s policies than Barack Obama’s, but John McCain just doesn’t make me feel good.”

Such sentiments are common. And while authenticity has a political dimension, it is also a social virtue. Young evangelicals frequently decry the inauthenticity of the mega-church and individualistic evangelical tradition, where people put on a happy face and “played church.” Experiencing “real life together” is the pursuit of the new evangelical small group, where “real life” is always “messy.” Authenticity in social settings is frequently an excuse for sharing sins and problems within a group of people who doubtlessly share the same sins and problems.

It may seem an odd comparison, but few cultural phenomena have captured the new authenticity like Peter Jackson’s Lord of the Rings trilogy. Jackson’s revision of Faramir—changing him from a heroic and pure character to a conflicted, modernized man—represents something much deeper than an additional plot twist designed to generate additional suspense. A Faramir who has the purity of heart to not be tempted by the Ring—like J.R.R. Tolkien’s—is inconceivable for members of the Millennial Generation, evangelical or otherwise. For young evangelicals, authenticity is synonymous with struggle.

This represents a substantial shift in how young evangelicals understand themselves, and in how they behave. The language of character formation, virtue, right and wrong has been supplanted by pseudo-psychological language about authenticity and feelings. With respect to decision making and evaluation, the rightness or wrongness of an action or an attitude is downplayed if the action itself is “authentic.” When it comes to political decisions, policy, character, and experience take a back seat to whether the politician strikes us as a “real person.”

The emphasis on authenticity is tied to the rejection of a doctrinaire and dogmatic Christianity that outsiders perceived to be hypocritical and artificial, and it results in an intellectual approach that is reticent to draw lines or provide definitive answers. The new evangelicals tend to frame their intellectual engagement with the world and with Christianity in terms of a journey or a path—conclusions do not matter nearly as much as questions and conversation. Being right is less important than asking authentic questions. In this way, Rick Warren’s Civil Forum with Barack Obama and John McCain perfectly encapsulated the new trend in evangelicalism.

The new questions don’t stop at political issues, though. For previous generations of evangelicals, questioning one’s faith was anathema. Now, it is a rite of passage, necessary for maturation and perfectly acceptable with God. It is, after all, part of the journey toward an authentic faith.

The refusal of younger evangelicals to be held captive to a political party does not mean that we are immune to the underlying issues that lead to the purported Babylonian captivity of the evangelical church. Younger evangelicals’ claims to be above the fray may be true politically—but in the place of political power they have begun to seek cultural influence.

The new movement to become culture creators is driven largely by the rejection of the evangelical artistic sub-culture. For young evangelicals, Thomas Kinkade, DC Talk, and the Left Behind books and movies are embarrassing lightning rods for criticisms that Christians have abandoned the arts. In this way, Francis Schaeffer circa-1970 has won—young evangelicals are quick to defend artistic engagement as a valid expression of our humanity and Christian faith.

Thankfully, the new movement has promise. Evangelicals would do well to raise the level of their artistic and cultural productions. But young evangelicals’ language about engaging the arts suggests that their new pursuit has little to do with excellence for its own sake—rather, artistic engagement is frequently subsumed under the hope and promise of cultural influence. The popularity of worldview oriented training programs indicates a deepening dissatisfaction for the fragmentation and privatization of Christianity, and a new drive toward excellence in all realms of life. The arts and the classics are to be engaged for the sake of promoting the Christian worldview, and for building Christianity’s reputation to the world.

Fundamentally, young evangelicals want an evangelicalism that is respectable—and more often than not, that means distancing themselves from it when it isn’t. Criticisms of kitsch art and of misplaced political loyalties are rarely courageous. Rather, they often win those who offer them praise and admiration from similarly embarrassed young evangelicals and traditionally scornful elite outsiders.

Beneath each of these shifts in the young evangelical ethos is a tacit, yet devout, commitment to a kind of libertarianism—even while holding more paternal instincts on political issues like poverty and race. The libertarianism of my peers is less political and more cultural. It is grounded in the notion that we have—and hence, we ought to have—control over ourselves, and responsibility for ourselves, regardless of circumstance. This conflicts, of course, with many of the communitarian ideas these same young evangelicals support in regards to governmental assistance in society—but few would accuse my generation of being intellectually consistent or coherent.

For most young evangelicals, the flash points where our libertarianism comes out are traditional sources of conflict with parents: tattoos, alcohol, music, movies, language and sexuality. In each area, younger evangelicals have rejected the perceived prudishness symbolized by our parents (yes, ironically, the children of the sixties and seventies) in favor of engaging the culture around us. Often this reflects a new internalization—one might characterize it as a gnosticization—of the Gospel. Social rules, such as those which once governed alcohol consumption among evangelicals, language, and sexual behavior, are now a sign of a Puritanical legalism that has forgotten that Jesus really cares about the heart and our intentions, not our behaviors and, as such, are to be discarded.

This principle of self-control and self-realization undergirds young evangelicals’ consumption of media. The new mantra of cultural engagement provides young evangelicals an effective cover to consume the same media as their peers. They are deeply convinced that such media has no effect on their lives—remaining confident they are carefully protected from the bad effects of consumerism by their flawless decision-making abilities.

This is one of the deep ironies of the young evangelical ethos. While vehemently rejecting the consumerism of 20th century evangelicalism, young evangelicals have adopted a new consumerist mindset under the guise of engagement with culture—a mindset that earns them access into the social standing they desire. The consumerism that has infected the core of evangelicalism has not been eradicated in the younger generations—it has simply been subsumed under a new teaching. Young evangelicals aspire to be urbane, sophisticated, and not appear judgmental or harsh—they want to be cool. And being cool means tossing aside the social mores that many of them grew up in, and transforming themselves into faith-soaked libertines.

Here young evangelicals’ approach to marriage and sexuality is instructive. The social institutions governing mating processes among young Christians continue to erode. While isolated pockets of evangelicals have attempted to buttress them against the impending tide of libertarianism, in reality couples decides for themselves how they want to approach marriage and sexuality. The slow but inevitable relaxing of codes of conduct at evangelical institutions is indicative of this trend—and it is a welcome trend to students who have to deal with being “weird” for attending a school with arcane rules. The new consumerism and the new libertarianism go hand in hand.

Eschatology has historically been one of the chief hallmarks of evangelical theological reflection. It is one of a handful of doctrines evangelicals have made famous. From the Thief in the Night movies and Hal Lindsey’s Late, Great Planet Earth in the 1970s to the Left Behind series of the 1990s, eschatology has dominated the evangelical imagination. It has been so prevalent, in fact, that leftist commentators have sometimes blamed dispensational theology and its focus on national Israel and the end-times for American foreign policy.

Such analyses frequently give evangelical political savvy far too much credit. For younger evangelicals, however, eschatology is barely worth considering—unless, of course, we are mocking Left Behind among our peers. Worship music is one of the best indications of the declining focus on eschatology. While there are lots of other reasons to criticize evangelical praise choruses, one neglected point of criticism is that they tend to ignore the future triumph of Jesus. Any casual trip through prominent evangelical hymns reveals an extraordinary emphasis on the next life: There is a Fountain, It is Well, How Great thou Art, Blessed Assurance, and Amazing Grace all see fit to acknowledge the work that is yet to be done. I can find no comparable thread in the new evangelical worship songs.

The disappearance of eschatology from a young evangelical framework has much to do with a renewed focus by younger evangelicals on their view of the Kingdom of God. On the liberal side of the spectrum, Brian McLaren has been at the forefront of focusing on the Kingdom of God’s effects here and now. While McClaren has focused on the social and political dimensions of the Kingdom, Dallas Willard has approached the Kingdom from a more individualistic, relational framework. McClaren has gained the most traction among younger evangelicals, among whom it is increasingly common to speak of “building the Kingdom of God.”

Yet focusing on building the Kingdom here and now to the exclusion of a robust eschatology ignores the inevitable failure of the Church to influence the world for Jesus that eschatology presupposes, creating idealistic (and ultimately, humanistic) notions of Christianity and its potential for progress in the world. It is disingenuous of young evangelicals to criticize the political triumphalism of the religious right while ignoring the cultural triumphalism that this presupposes, and which undergirds our own cultural ethos.

The de-emphasization of eschatology by young evangelicals has several political and cultural consequences. For one, it focuses young evangelicals more on the current state of the earth and the necessity of protecting and preserving our environment. “Creation care,” as Richard Cizek has put it, is significantly less important if the end times will be as Thief in the Night depicts them. A devalued eschatology lends itself to cultural engagement rather than the cultural escapism that has historically marked evangelicalism. And perhaps most importantly, a weakened eschatology signals a weakened commitment to answers. Young evangelicals’ rejection of the “moralism” of their parents’ generation is frequently accompanied by a diminution of the categories “right” and “wrong”—they are about questioning, not necessarily answering, pointing out that life is not “black and white, but often gray.” For those who are inclined to focus on the blurriness of life, the stark juxtaposition between good and evil that eschatology depends upon is inconvenient at best and impossible at worst.

Yet I get the sense that for many of my young evangelical peers, the doctrine of eschatology is less important not because of careful reflection upon the Scriptures, but because of the political and cultural scorn the doctrine has earned. For most young evangelicals, eschatology is cringe inducing not because traditional formulations are wrong, but because they are weird. That all Christians would disappear in a flash will hardly earn Christians cultural acceptability—and cultural acceptance, today, is their paramount desire.

What does the new evangelical ethos portend for the future of evangelicalism? A less doctrinaire, culturally engaged, and politically independent evangelicalism will doubtlessly be more palatable in a culture that esteems tolerance, respect, and being nice. On a political level, I suspect that as evangelicals become more independent in their rhetoric, they will continue to vote with Republicans. Pro-life issues continue to be sticking points for many young evangelicals who might otherwise vote for a Democrat, and while the Democratic Party has begun to make overtures to pro-life voters, such moves have been to this point more rhetorical than substantial.

Yes, there are long-term changes afoot among younger evangelicals, who like their generational peers have shifted to the left. But these changes will take decades to mature—just as it took the Religious Right more than a decade to gain the national influence it sought. Whether evangelicals are overwhelmingly Republican in twenty years depends largely upon the direction party leaders choose. If politicians like Mike Huckabee are run out of the party because of moderate-sounding fiscal policies, there is a strong likelihood that young evangelicals will continue to disassociate themselves with Republicans.

This cuts to the heart of the young evangelical ethos. Young evangelicals frequently care more about being ostracized than they do being correct. The embarrassing image of the anti-intellectual, culturally ignorant and doctrinaire right-wing evangelical is easy to run away from, and it is common to hear it criticized in younger evangelical circles and churches. As young evangelicals go off to college and after graduation take jobs in the big cities, they discover that the suburban conservatism in which they were raised is simply not trendy, and that accommodating more centrist or leftist positions is significantly easier than dispelling stereotypes.

That young evangelicals care deeply about social acceptance is true on levels deeper than politics or culture. From alcohol to media to language, young evangelicals are consistent in defending their right to behave just like the culture around them. Those evangelicals who live truly counter-cultural lives, like those who pursue abstinence, do so with privatized, stylized reasons instead of moral reasons. Youth pastors sell chastity as the new way of being cool, rather than a sober and serious rejection of a devastating lifestyle. This is because, like the broader culture, young evangelicals do not have lives as much as they have lifestyles—consciously chosen preferences, beliefs, and dislikes that allow them to associate with others who share their preferences, whether conservative or liberal, traditional or contemporary.

The irony, of course, is that the newfound political independence of young evangelicals will give them increasing amounts of true political power. In the 2008 primaries, evangelical leaders realized that the perception that they would rally behind the Republican candidate, regardless of whom it was, had diminished their influence within the Republican Party. Their response to this situation—to stay out of the fray until it was too late—only confirmed their enduring political naiveté. By avoiding the appearance of aligning with any one political party, young evangelicals would be a coveted demographic.

And yet, I suspect that we will see the rise of a new religious right—or left—when my generation discovers that while voting as an independent may be politically feasible, independent politics in Washington D.C. cut against the gears that run the political machine. In other words, non-partisan politics—as opposed to bi-partisan politics—is hardly a way to get things done. While young evangelicals have lamented the lack of progress on pro-life issues, few have considered whether their own rejection of partisanship would further the pro-life cause in the least. In addition, while it is currently fashionable for young evangelicals to value culture over politics, I would suggest that as young evangelicals grow older the pendulum will swing toward politics again. An anemic eschatology places the burden of God’s work on the here and now, but cultural renewal is a multi-generational process that responds to decay with rebirth, neither of which fit comfortably with the leftist notion of painless hope, change, and progress. In twenty years, when presented with an opportunity to gain short-term influence within the political machinery as our parents were, I suspect my generation will seize it. I suspect they would rather be courted for their votes than have their voices ignored.

Theologically and ecclesiastically, it is fair to say that the exodus from evangelicalism by many of its intellectual leaders will continue. One could reasonably argue that the distinctives of evangelicalism are such that it is exactly where intellectuals ought to be, and that they have an obligation to remain evangelical. Yet until evangelical leaders educate their laity on the importance of the authority and inerrancy of Scripture, the role and depths of the evangelical tradition, the importance of the body to the spiritual life and disciplines, and the wonders and glories of the Triune God—and then reform their ecclesiastical life accordingly—it will be difficult to keep our best and brightest within the fold.

This is not to say that evangelicalism will cease to exist. Its great hope and promise—both in the past and now—is its vibrant energy, missionary impulse, and its deep commitment to the authority of Scripture. At the beginning of American evangelicalism, Wesleyan circuit riders brought the Gospel to the untamed lands of the West, while the revivalists worked to reform the Church from within in the East. At the core of these movements was a deep enthusiasm and desire for a real encounter with the living God.

In this regard, young evangelicals remain truly evangelical. The new evangelical ethos is marked by a desire to reform evangelicalism from within, to recover a sense of authenticity in our connections to God and each other. This is accompanied by a renewed desire to reach out beyond the confines of evangelicalism and meet people on their own terms. Think of it as version 2.0 of the seeker-sensitive movement: it’s trendier, better dressed, and more open to conversation.

Young evangelicalism, then, is not so different from previous iterations. It shares the same contours, the same pursuits, and even the same human propensity to self-deception as previous generations. But it is different in its expression, and in this it presents new opportunities and challenges for the Church in America.


The Evangelical Capitulation: Prayer Documents from their Meeting with Trump

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Today, over 1,000 members of the Religious Right met with Donald Trump. It was pitched as a ‘conversation’; it was very clearly a campaign rally for the Republican nominee. Over 1,000 members were invited: I was not among them.

One participant observed that Jesus was not mentioned at the event. But, we do know that attendees were asked to pray before and after the event itself. Which is, at least, something. 

Someone sent me the documents that attendees received. Specifically, they were given a prayer guide for the pre-and post-meeting and a more general guide for praying for Trump and other leaders modeled upon the Lord’s Prayer.

The documents provide a bit of insight into the mindset of the organizers of the conference. They are mostly benign, and intentionally aim to be neutral. They have a more therapeutic than political ring to them, which is perhaps surprising for this gathering.

But they are generally oriented toward overcoming any internal objections or hesitations or sense of ‘judgment’ about others and the candidate. “Acknowledge any personal feelings that would keep you from honoring Mr. Trump for his participation,” they exhort the attendees. “Take a moment to offer a blessing for Mr. Trump and his family.” They aim, in this sense, at peace in nearly every sense: an internal peace, and the unity of peace as evangelicals with their Republican standard bearer.

But those who have badly studied what (culture) wars they must fight will be ill-equipped to see the nature of the peace that we need. There’s an Anglican prayer that asks for the wisdom to know the peace we ought preserve, and the false peace we ought relinquish. No peace can be made with Trump without the sharp rebuke of the Gospel with its call to repentance; no “Yes” is evangelical unless it also clearly announces its “No.”

Was such a word offered by any of the attendees? Did they meet their candidate with the diffidence and unconcern that Jesus shows before Pilate? In the earnestness of their supplications, were they moved to renounce the ways of evil and unrighteousness that Trump has himself tacitly and, nay, openly endorsed?

There is a unity which we must seek, and a unity we cannot allow. The capitulation of the Religious Right is now complete. It is a tragically comic ending to a movement that has done far, far more harm than good.

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There is no Pro-Life Case for Donald Trump

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We are now in the 12th hour of the conservatism’s life in this election cycle, which means it is as good a time as any to revisit the question of how I plan to proceed through American political life over the next four months.

For those who don’t want to read further, it is hard to find a more succinct or accurate distillation of the development of my thought than that offered by Ben Sasse’s spokesman after the Senator met with Trump this week: “Mr. Sasse continues to believe that our country is in a bad place and, with these two candidates, this election remains a dumpster fire. Nothing has changed.” I heartily agree.

There are no conditions at this point under which I could possibly vote for either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton.

The Problems with Hillary

Let me address, very briefly, my disposition toward our former Secretary of State.

Perhaps I can distill my assessment of her fitness for office by confessing that the day James Comey announced there would be no indictment I was briefly tempted to join the Burn It Down movement and vote for Trump. Trey Gowdy’s exchange with Comey is as damning a piece of political theatre as I can remember in my lifetime.

I mean, it is not often in our political life that lifelong Democrat lawyers feel obliged to write 7500 word defenses of the criminality of their party’s nominee. Seriously, read through that link. Every word. And then tell me that the failure to indict is not a gross miscarriage of justice.

From my standpoint, Hillary’s systematic lying through this process *alone* would disqualify her from the office. But that her emails are almost certainly in the hands of America’s enemies would seriously compromise her ability to negotiate on matters of foreign policy. And I haven’t even mentioned her record as Secretary of State, or her position on abortion. With all due respect to my friends in the party, Democrats should be congratulated on nominating the one person that could cause otherwise sensible people to look favorably upon Donald Trump.

The Problems with the Donald

So, no, I won’t be voting for Hillary. Trump, then? No, not him either.

I have heard every argument defending voting for him over the past six months. I remain as convinced as I ever have been that there are no grounds on which it is permissible or morally licit for a conservative Christian to lend their support to Trump by voting for him.

In fact, I think it is obvious that no one should vote for the Contemporary Falstaff. However sophisticated the rationalizations for Trump become, they do not overcome the single, basic fact that he has done nothing in his personal life nor his professional career to demonstrate that he is fit for the highest office in the land. I take it as a given that nominating an unfit person to such an office would be a grave danger to American security and interests.

So there is no world where I will think that the political calculus and rationalizations add up to making voting for Trump permissible, save the world where Jesus appears in the flesh and tells me it is. And that is not this world, despite the earnestness with which many Trump supporters have assured me it is.

Of course, it is very hard to prove obvious truths to those who doubt them. But I have given it a sporting go over the past six months. Among the various reasons I have set forth I would include his manifest lack of integrity, his overt courtship of racists, his instability, his braggadocious sexual licentiousness, his authoritarian impulses, the fact he never seems to have read the Constitution, the fact that he would deliberately work with small contractors to steal from them, and so on. Let’s just say it’s a really long list, ermkay?

The Dumb and Dumber Case for Trump

And yet, here we are. The pro-life movement is signing up with The Donald. Why? The main reason, as best I can tell, is what I have dubbed the ‘Dumb and Dumber’ argument. Voting for Donald Trump on the chance that he will elect conservative justices to the Supreme Court is perhaps the most prominent way pro-lifers have justified their capitulation to Trump. As the argument goes, Trump’s interest in placating his conservative base, in winning a second term, in working with Congress, and so on justify the conclusion that there is a chance he will appoint better justices than Hillary Clinton. When set within this comparative context, conservatives are justified in voting for Trump.

There are a variety of reasons I think such claims are wrong. I have critiqued it at various points, and I will not rehearse those arguments in full here.

Instead, I’d note that the argument invariably reduces to a blind assertion of faith that such a chance exists. Any evidence or arguments that purport to show the odds of Trump appointing conservative justices are miniscule are met with a shrug. We know, it is said, what Hillary will do. Trump is at least a wild-card. (Hence my name for this line of reasoning.)

There are good reasons to think that the odds of getting conservative justices are, well, not very good: Trump won’t even say he’s interested in actually being President if he wins a first term, much less commit to a second. So it is highly unlikely that he’ll govern with that aim. The logic and rationale of his candidacy — Burn Everything Down — gives Trump a convenient excuse to not work at all with Republicans, and then to blame whatever failure he faces on their recalcitrance. That is how he ran as a candidate; we can presume that is how he would govern as a President.

In short: Donald Trump does not seem to care about whether the Republican Party is behind him. His self-described “movement” means he has all the leverage. Paul Ryan and other Republican leaders may be able to frustrate his aims (if R’s win the House and Senate, that is). But I suspect he would find enough Democrats willing to pass what will almost certainly be much more moderate, if not fully progressive, proposals than those he has offered to his base. He has shown such a disinterest in becoming the Republican nominee that prominent conservatives are openly endorsing the idea that he is, in fact, a Democratic plant. That sort of logic just reinforces that if he wins, he won’t need the Party: The Party will need him, and bow accordingly.

Never mind. Evidence for what Trump might or might not do does not matter at all to the Dumb and Dumber case. The only claim that matters is that however miniscule it is, we have better odds of getting conservative justices from Trump than we do from Hillary. It is an article of faith, impervious and impenetrable to rational assessment.

But it is wrong.

For one, the argument treats treats gaining conservative justices as so important that they trump to any other end or goal. The reasons for this judicial myopia are deep and important within the pro-life world. No pro-lifer can say that Supreme Court opinions simply do not matter, for reasons that are obvious. But ironically, shouting “The Judges!” as a political clincher deepens the very doctrine of judicial supremacy that Roe and other similarly bad rulings have exacerbated. Pro-lifers should play a role in deflating the Supreme Court’s singular power over American political life: The use of such power to enact social change has exacerbated tensions in American society, and undermined the conditions for long-term stability and peace.

But the claim also rests upon a highly contentious and narrowly selective account of the consequences of getting the justices we want.

What do I mean? Let us think for a moment about the effects of a Trump/pro-life alliance beyond the Courts. For one, supporting Trump means that every Republican candidate going forward need only offer the thinnest of overtures to pro-lifers to win their support, and that there will be nothing conservatives can do if such candidates do not deliver. If Trump were to be nominated and fail to appoint conservative justices, the logic of the “Dumb and Dumber” argument would mean that there could be no reprisals. The idea that there is a chance the Republican nominee elects better justices because he says he will do so is impervious to any kind of falsification, and as such, eliminates any kind of meaningful political reprisal against the party that fails in its pro-life duties.

To put the point differently, it is reasonable in our political system for minority factions to offer their support only in exchange for meaningful attention to their interests and concerns. By supporting Trump, pro-lifers make it astoundingly clear what kind of price the party has to pay to win their votes. The value of the pro-life vote has plummeted, given that Trump’s nominal outreach efforts seem to have worked. But the only way to raise that price and extract more meaningful concessions from Republicans in the future is by refusing to do business with them. If pro-lifers really believe that the Republican party is the only vehicle that they have in American political life to reach their ends — which is what the “Dumb and Dumber” argument rests upon — then they should absolutely refuse to support this candidate on the grounds that abstention is the only way of keeping the value of their vote up in every subsequent election.

On one level, I really get it: Having deep and abiding moral commitments to the cause of life might mean an irrational, utterly foolish willingness to continue to be abused in such manner by the only party who will at least invite you to their cocktail parties and fundraisers. But pro-lifers lose every ounce of their future leverage over the party by accepting Trump.

In normal conditions, I could easily see pro-lifers voting for non-optimal candidates on the basis of the likelihood of political pressures making them more pro-life than their instincts might otherwise lead them to be. This was, for what it’s worth, a huge part of my argument for supporting Mitt Romney in the general election last time around. There were many questions about the depths of his pro-life commitments: I defended him on the basis that, even if he himself had intuitions that I disagreed with, he clearly wanted to be a two-term President and needed pro-lifers desperately.

But Romney also was (and is) clearly an incredible family man. His early pro-choice policies were worse than his own personal life. And the importance of that cannot be understated: Romney gave pro-lifers the chance of justices and the rest of it in a package that fundamentally endorsed the cultural conditions which we think are essential for minimizing abortions, namely, stable families.

Trump’s life demonstrates his lack of commitment to the pro-life cause.

This case is clearly different. Trump is a walking-anecdote for the various cultural ideologies and trajectories that the pro-life movement opposes. Specifically, by voting for Trump, they endorse someone who in his personal life has not merely lived in, but reveled in the moral atmosphere and commitments that stand beneath our abortion culture.

If abortions happen because of the breakdown of marriage, then there is nothing ‘pro-life’ about electing someone who is at best a serial monogamist. If the abortion culture has anything to do with the wider degradation of our society’s sex and morals — as pro-lifers have argued it does for as long as I have been alive — then there is nothing pro-life in endorsing a candidate who has bragged about the number of his sexual partners. It matters that Trump is unwilling to answer whether he personally has funded abortions. It matters a great deal.

Let me be as explicit as possible about what pro-lifers supporting Trump means: It means lending their aid to someone who (with Bill Clinton) was friends with Jeffrey Epstein who was eventually convicted of pedophilia. And Trump knew of it and commended Epstein. I mean, look at this glowing endorsement: “I’ve known Jeff for fifteen years. Terrific guy. He’s a lot of fun to be with. It is even said that he likes beautiful women as much as I do, and many of them are on the younger side. No doubt about it — Jeffrey enjoys his social life.”

Think about that for a second: Conservative evangelicals and other pro-lifers have rushed to find any justification they can think of to vote for a fellow who almost certainly knew of pedophilia occurring, and, for all we do know of him, did nothing to prevent it. At the very least, he was not the one who went to the police about it. That pro-lifers have been reduced to this beguiles the mind, to put it gently.

And now Trump himself has been named in a second lawsuit alleging that he engaged in rape of a minor. This one claims to have a witness. That would be incredible for such a case, but would also not be unlikely given the nature of Jeffrey Epstein’s parties. I have no position on whether Trump is in fact guilty of such charges: I only know that if we vote for him because “there’s a chance” he’ll give the world conservative justices, then we should also include in our political calculation that “there’s a chance” such unspeakably wicked events happened. In this instance, pro-lifers do not have time to await the justice system to act: We face a vote, both next week at the Republican convention, and in November. We must instead assess whether the strength or weakness of the purported victim’s claims justifies the risk of throwing our support behind someone who has been accused of such horrendous acts.

I will confess at this point that it is hard for me to get beyond a raging anger at the fact that pro-lifers are throwing their support behind someone for whom such allegations cannot be treated as naked, political attempts to destroy an otherwise good person’s character. Think of it: if it turned out that such allegations are true, would anyone be that surprised given Donald Trump’s life and what we know of how sexual immorality works (namely, that it breeds more immorality, not less)?

Again: I am not saying anything about whether these allegations are true. In the court of law, there is a presumption of innocence. But in the assessment of a person’s character…past performance leads to future results. Pro-lifers who support Trump can dismiss these allegations as entirely baseless: But on what grounds? Certainly not because of Trump’s life history. Or they will have to consider such allegations in assessing Trump’s fitness for office, and tell a complicated story about suspending judgment while the judicial process does its thing. I am not the brightest of bulbs, but it sure seems that when explanations are complicated, things are not going well.

Once again: I am not assessing the guilt or innocence of Trump: I am suggesting that the fact that it cannot be instantly dismissed as an unreasonable possibility is itself damning for any political movement that pretends to care a single iota about sexual mores, as the pro-life movement must. Even if Trump is exonerated of these charges, or wins on legal technicalities, their plausibility says as much as anyone needs to know about what kind of baggage supporting Trump might bring upon the pro-life movement.

The pro-life movement must accept a degradation of itself as a movement in order to support Trump.

Having to treat these sorts of questions as real possibilities is the kind of cultural corrosion that the pro-life movement must accept in exchange for voting for Trump. The moral gap between Jeffrey Epstein and Donald Trump is smaller than one might think: If Trump does not explicitly approve of Epstein’s actions, he also clearly did not object to the point of turning Epstein over to the police. But it is hard to hear Trump’s comment about Epstein as anything other than an astonishingly cavalier acceptance of Epstein’s ‘preferences’. (No, Trump does not use that word. But that seems to be his position.) Accepting such a nominee’s character as a permissible side-effect of the chance of getting pro-life judges eliminates any interest in anything besides the law from the pro-life movement’s political reasoning. It indicates that pro-lifers are willing to accept personal and cultural decay of our leaders for the sake of conservative judges and legal opinions.

Such a stand bifurcates the pro-life movement into two, allowing technical, legal rationality to come apart from the broader cultural conditions pro-lifers are trying to establish to end abortion. Such a bifurcation represents a kind of legal triumphalism that views the law as the paradigmatic and final means of social change. I think the law changes things: you’ll hear no platitudes about “hearts and minds” from these quarters. But if such opinions are not minimally reflective of the broader moral fabric of a society, they will not have the effect intended.

Additionally, setting forth such laws without the cultural conditions necessary to support them might even engender a backlash, and undermine the fragile gains pro-lifers have already made. This is one of the lessons from Roe, which was not at all reflective of our broader cultural mores at the time. It created incredible social divisions and galvanized the pro-life movement. Disconnecting the legal from the cultural allows the pro-life movement to do the same, except in reverse. But if the recent history of morals legislation in this country is any indication, such a strategy does not work well over the long term. Judicial myopia leads to, in this case, cutting off the pro-life movements cultural nose on the slimmest of hopes of saving its political face.

Suggesting that the thin hope of conservative justices on the courts justifies accepting such cultural consequences also seems to rest on either naivety or hubris. It is hard to know which. Pro-lifers will not be able to distance themselves from Trump’s shenanigans, though they will try: if he is their candidate, they will be made to own everything he does if he is elected President. Political action has a symbolic character: it sets a narrative, and that narrative matters as much for the long-term future of a particular movement as do the judicial opinions that result from it. In this case, it is a ludicrously easy story to tell: Pro-lifers are willing to accept misogyny, divorce, racism, and so so on for their political ends.

Pro-lifers will protest that voting for Donald Trump does not mean endorsing everything Trump does. And they would be right. Yet I say it’s either ‘naivity’ or ‘hubris,’ because the pro-life movement hasn’t exactly been stellar at framing its own identity. The cultural and media headwinds they face go a long ways toward explaining the struggle. But in this case, they add to those the fact that their critics will have a serious and legitimate point. Voting for Trump means treating everything else he does as acceptable *on the condition* that he also promises — merely promises, mind you — conservative justices. The pro-life movement can justify supporting Trump only by viewing his character, his known sexual vices, his unrepentant history of supporting abortion, etc. as acceptable side-effects that, in this case, are the cost of their hope for conservative justices.

Note that I say ‘the hope’: Accepting such side-effects if we know that Trump will appoint conservative justices is one matter. I still think it’s obviously bad to do so. But if conservatives don’t even know whether the good they are aiming at will come to pass, but are gaming their acceptance on the brute grounds that ‘there’s a chance’ it will, their position looks even worse.

What other consequences come with supporting Trump?

If we want to assess voting for Trump on the consequences for the pro-life movement, we cannot simply ignore the symbolic, social, and cultural effects. Such consequences are doubtlessly ‘softer’ than the sharp-edged, definitive nature of Supreme Court opinions. But if we want such opinions to save lives, they need a society that will welcome and support them. I am not proposing that pro-lifers simply wait to pursue legal strategies until that society exists. I am instead proposing that, in their prioritization of such legal efforts, they not endorse candidates who have flagrantly and grossly acted in ways *contrary* to that society and the morals it needs to flourish. If justices really worth *any* cost to the pro-life movement, now is the moment we will find out.

Let us reflect for a moment, in this light, upon what I take to be among the hardest questions our society: What sort of injustices are we are willing to allow in the short term for the sake of long-term social stability, peace, and well-being? In attempting to defund Planned Parenthood, pro-lifers ask others to shoulder a serious and grave social cost for the sake of eliminating a gross and systemic injustice. And I think it is permissible for them to do so.

But a similar argument can be run against the pro-life defense of Trump: The democratic character of American political life might simply require that they accept ongoing injustices for the sake of longer-term goods. Paying for conservative justices means being saddled with and further mainstreaming Trump’s moral corrosiveness. (What happens if he pulls a version of the ‘Claire Underwood’ and admits while President that he paid for an abortion, and that he doesn’t regret doing so?) Repudiating such cultural degradation by not supporting its political representative might mean more abortions in the near term: But even if Roe were to be repealed in the next President’s term, where will people turn for political guidance if pro-lifers have deemed Trump’s decadence as acceptable? Dividing the political and cultural logics of the pro-life movement by treating Trump’s character as an acceptable side-effect undermines the integrity of the movement and will eviscerate its ability to speak with power on cultural matters for long into the future.

As I see it, the choice pro-lifers face is whether they are willing to sacrifice their political lives in order to save their cultural and moral soul. I wish I had more confidence that they would choose wisely.


This is a gratuitous link to a sketch that came to mind at this point in the essay: Make of that intrusion what you will. Enjoy it. Laugh! It is funny! Good times.


Hope for Chaos at the Convention.

But we are here at the twelfth hour! Must we not vote for one of them? No. Absolutely, unequivocally, unhesitatingly no. First, we should hope and pray for total, unmitigated chaos at the Republican Party’s convention.

The odds of Trump being elected are incredibly high. But, well, am I saying there’s a chance? I am, I am indeed. Angering Trump’s supporters, many of whom do not care about pro-life positions, will happen if the party nominates someone else. But given that Trump simply is not fit for the office, alienating such voters seems like the unhappy cost of doing the right thing. For a major political party to nominate someone who at least half of its constituents do not trust with the nuclear codes would be a palpable failure.

So, we should hope for a rules committee that releases all the delegates, for floor protests if they do not, for delegates voting with their consciences even if it breaks every rule and gets them kicked out of the party. We should hope for decent men and women who have served the party to examine their consciences and determine whether they really, genuinely believe this man can be trusted with the highest office in the land.

We should even hope for Ted Cruz going off script and announcing in the strongest possible terms that no one should ever vote for Donald Trump. I’m no fan of Senator Cruz. But I would write him in for President in a heartbeat if he did that.We should hope for a Republican party that, at the last hour, saves itself the humiliation of nominating the only person in the country who might not be able to beat Hillary Clinton.

Do I have any confidence that Republicans will do the right thing? No! None whatsoever! Not a shred! I have as much confidence in that as I do that Trump will nominate a conservative justice. I mean, we shouldn’t overlook the fact that we are talking about a party that mocked Obama for being dependent upon a teleprompter, and that now praises their candidate because he manages to follow one. It’s a cruel and hilarious irony, really. They have become a parody of their past criticisms.

In recent years, Republicans have been more than willing to engage in political entertainment at the cost of acting responsibly for the common good. Which means Trump really is a creature of their own dysfunctions. So, no, I don’t have any confidence that the party will remember their courage and nominate a President we can trust with the nuclear codes. (We clearly can’t trust Hillary: She’d probably store them on a private server somewhere.)

I only have hope. Delusional hope. I cannot but help believe that there are yet ten righteous men and women within the city who could prevent the judgment that is upon us. I am prepared to be sorely disappointed. That is precisely what hope means: an unabiding commitment to the right when the situation is hopeless. (Thanks, Gilbert.)

And if the Republican Party nominates Trump?More mischief.But first, lest you be teetering on edge of despair, I present as an interlude David Brown, the chief of Dallas’s police department. Seriously, watch that. Do you have hope for our country again? I certainly do. Watch that and tell me again that Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton are the best we can do. There’s a theory of democracy in there, a deep understanding of the limits of police work, a palpable sense of courage. If he did not have other important work to do, I would write his name in for President in a heartbeat. I still might.

Okay. Is there any path besides the write-in candidate?

No, probably not, but let’s consider one anyway. We should hope that within 24 hours of Trump’s Teleprompter-Reading Masterpiece, Mitt Romney finally listens to his children and announces a third-party bid. Or if not Mitt Romney, someone else with some name recognition who might steal a state or two. I don’t know who this group of ‪#‎nevertrumpers‬ has found to put on the ballots, but if they have a pulse and can plausibly claim to be pro-life, I’ll almost certainly vote for them.

(As to Gary Johnson…If the Libertarian Party had wanted to be anything other than useless in this cycle, they should have nominated a pro-life candidate. It was the most obvious thing they could have done to be a genuine threat to overturning the two-party apple cart. I would have sung their praises and signed up in a heartbeat. As it is, they are something of a joke, and given that our society’s treatment of babies in the womb doesn’t exactly put me in a laughing mood, I’ll pass, thank you very much.)

Don’t get me wrong: I might still vote for a candidate who doesn’t have a chance of winning the nomination. If it’s not the Better for America candidate, I’ll consider the Constitution Party. Or if not them, I’ll write in Ben Sasse or David Brown. Or my mom. She keeps unruly highschoolers in line, which is more than Donald Trump has ever done.

But, really, we should hope for Romney. And then we should hope that Bernie Sanders sticks a fork in the Democratic Party’s eye and takes up the Green Party’s invitation to run as their candidate. Why? Because it seems plausible that if Romney and Sanders played their cards strategically, they could between the two of them pick off just enough states to keep both Donald and Hillary below the 270 electoral college threshold.

Yes, that’s right. This possibility has not been spoken of nearly enough in this cycle, not for my liking.I haven’t crunched all the numbers to figure out exactly which states Romney, or Romney and Sanders together, would need to win to keep Hillary and Trump below 270, because no one is paying me to write this essay. But someone needs to put together this kind of map, and quickly. It would be an easy way to fame, and it would contribute to the narrative that ‘Trump or Clinton’ is not our inevitable future.

At that point, the House of Representatives would choose the nominee. My understanding is that tradition indicates they would choose from the top three candidates. Suppose Romney is in the mix: Is there anyone in the House who would rather have Donald Trump be President than Mitt Romney? I bet there might be a small contingent of Democrats who would support Romney over Hillary for the sake of the rule of law. Even if Democrats win the House.

See, I can have nice thoughts about Democrats sometimes. I am large; I contain multitudes.

Those are my hopes for the next month, at least.

You don’t have to vote for either of these candidates.

And if none of that comes to pass? I will happily write in the person I think most fit for the office (probably Romney, Sasse, or David Brown) and revel in my moral purity for the next four years. Oh, will I revel. I will be positively insufferable, I assure you. It is a dangerous thing, standing on principle. It goes to one’s head, which is why it is occasionally worth doing. It clears the air, and reminds one of which way is up.

And you can join me, too. You don’t have to vote for either of our two candidates. There is no political calculus that adds up to supporting either one. It is almost certainly false that America deserves better: She deserves the major party candidates she has. But that does not mean clear-headed people should accept them. The grace of living in a democracy is that the only judgment we receive from our leaders is the one we bring down upon our own heads. But there is no rule or line of reasoning that requires Christians to vote for the Barbarians because everyone on our block is.

Trump could also simply resign the nomination, too, if he wins it. And Christians should pray for that to happen. The argument for doing so has its own twisted logic: He could be the single most powerful person in American politics for the next twenty years without ever having to face the gut-wrenching decision of whether to send American lives into battle. By being President, he risks his brand and his fortune: Whether Americans die because of his action or inaction will have a considerably more profound effect on his legacy than if his casinos go bankrupt. Maybe Trump will follow his native Falstaff all the way, and imperil the lives of real human beings. But maybe he’ll look at the risk as a businessman, and think that it does not add up.

If that happens, well, we will have our chaos. We like to think his base would be incredibly angry. But basically everyone has been wrong so far about what would hurt him with his constituency, so who knows whether they would care if he voluntarily stepped down? They seem to treating the whole business as a highly entertaining but ultimately inconsequential show. That would be a fine twist for ratings and the inevitable launch of the Trump Political Media Network.

I do not know what the next four months of America’s political life holds. However, I am rooting for turmoil and intrigue. Were one of our contemporary novelists writing this story, they would throw in a sharp set of twists that no one could see coming. That is precisely what I am eagerly hoping for. And if it is November 11th and Hillary and Trump are still our own major candidates, then I want to see men and women of principle everywhere make their opposition to our two major candidates known far and wide by throwing their vote away on candidates who deserve our support, even if they’ll never win.

The only rule of this election is that almost no one saw it coming: I get why we are all now expecting things to follow their normal course of events, but the predictive powers of our Opinion Leaders don’t exactly inspire confidence these days. I am cheerfully prepared to drink the cup of chaos to the last possible drop. It is going to be a terribly exciting road ahead, whatever happens. Here’s hoping America survives.

Feature image via https://www.flickr.com/photos/donkeyhotey/24394211100


Mere Fidelity: Understanding the Meritocracy

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This week, Derek, Alastair and Andrew consider Helen Andrews’s essay on our meritocracy. Andrews is one of the liveliest and most compelling young writers of our day, and her essay is a fascinating analysis of how our aristocracy has shifted. You can see the excerpt Andrew posted from it here. 

If you enjoyed the show, leave us a review at iTunes.  If you didn’t enjoy the show, let us know and we’ll work to make it better.  Or we’ll ignore you.  And if you want to subscribe by RSS, you can do that here.

If you’re interested in supporting the show (you know, with money), you can check out our Patreon here.

Finally, as always, follow DerekAlastair, and Andrew for more tweet-sized brilliance.  And thanks to Timothy Motte for his sound editing work.


To Sow or to Reap: Four Theses on Social Conservatism (#1)

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Note from Jake: This series was first published four years ago by Matthew Lee Anderson in the months leading up to the 2012 election. I had tentative plans to do a similar series this year, particularly after Michelle Obama’s opening-night speech at the DNC highlighted the enormous gap between the Democrats’ ability to give a positive vision of American and the GOP’s ability to do the same. But as I reviewed these posts by Matt, I decided that what he is saying here still basically applies. Indeed, if anything these posts should be read even more closely today in the aftermath of the Trump nomination. So over the next four days, we’ll be republishing Matt’s series of four theses on social conservatism. 

At the recent Values Voter Summit, I was fortunate to join a few friends on a panel discussing the gap between social conservatism’s current incarnation and the generation of young people who have grown up at its edges and are increasingly dissatisfied by it.*

I won’t rehash what I said there. But I do want to add a few theses that social conservatives might consider, ideas that are doubtlessly controversial and which I am not working through in my own mind and so not necessarily committed to. I’m inquiring here, not asserting. Which means this week, I’m going to write four posts about all this and leave Friday for (more) discussion.

Strap in: This could get interesting.

Is it time for traditionalists to plant or harvest?

There is a time to sow and a time to reap. My first thesis is that social conservatives are entering a time for sowing new cultural seeds rather than reaping their cultural fruits. As folks have recently pointed out, you can’t fight a culture war if you haven’t got a culture. And by and large, social conservatives haven’t got much in that department to pass along to the children. What they do have has been cobbled together by imitating mainstream America and borrowing from Nashville. The net effect is that social conservatives are trying, desperately, to reap legal fruit despite neglecting the difficult work of sowing and nurturing cultural seeds.

Now, it is possible that this sort of dichotomy is a false one. A cultural movement need not necessarily choose between sowing and reaping, between the work of engendering a culture and working for the laws that the culture produces. And as a dear friend suggested, having children can radically reorient us toward short-term bandaids, if only because parents are by disposition intensely protective.

However, if there is such a thing as cultural flourishing and decline, then we need to carefully discriminate where we are in those seasons and allocate our time and resources accordingly. To do otherwise would be rather imprudent, no? That means redirecting attention, efforts, and (yes) funding away from the particularly urgent political concerns toward seemingly frivolous long term cultural efforts. By way of hypothesis, I suspect it is easy for Christians to raise money for either political causes at home or missions and social-justice causes overseas. But a library, conservatory, or an art studio—institutions that will form the backbone of any permanent culture?

The Unconservative Rhetoric of Conservatism

At its worst, social conservatism’s fundraising rhetoric depends upon deeply unconservative premises: “Unless we act right now because this election is the most important of our lifetime, then we’ll all end up ruined.” It is true that in history there are decisive moments, moments where inaction means ruin. Shouting appeasement on the eve of World War 2, rather than building up the arsenal, turns out to be an almost completely destructive miscalculation of the moment. But by and large, the short-term urgency to motivate action has more in common with the hastiness of a revolutionary atmosphere than the glacial plodding of those committed to seeing the first things take root in their society.

But therein lies an important question, doesn’t it?  Who is to say which cultural season we are in, whether it is springtime in America or whether we have entered into winter? And here I must confess, along with everyone else, that like all matters of discernment the matter is less certain than we might like. My intuition is that we are somewhere in the winter and need to be preparing the fields for springtime. But I do know that by opening that question and deliberating about it, seriously and honestly, social conservatives might even find new and better approaches to their own political activity.

It may be the case that some people read this and think that I am suggesting something like “withdrawal” from the culture wars, that I am advocating a position of defeat and appeasement for those who are hostile to Christianity. Not in the least. If anyone wishes to question my commitment to, say, Christian moral teaching on abortion and homosexuality, feel free. I’m always in need of a good laugh.

But we ought to seriously consider the terms in which the critique is offered and think hard about whether we really want to endorse them. Yes, warfare goes both directions. But it goes. both. directions. Which means that a war is over when one side quits fighting. The side that quits fighting only “loses” if they, you know, actually lose. For someone to pick up their ball and go home when they are ahead is unheard of, but whose to say that hostilities should end only when one side triumphs? What if one side made “victory” problematic for themselves and focused on other activities? The war (if it is one) would keep going unilaterally and the cost might be high. The other side would doubtlessly declare it a “win,” but then again, within our current media environment, even if social conservatives were to “win” they would still end up losing. And the only way to win a game where the rules are such that you necessarily lose is to play a different game. 

*Yes, the Religious Right is getting older. No, the “millennial Christians” haven’t demonstrated much interest in following them. Yes, this is all overly familiar territory to us around Mere-O.

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Mere Fidelity: Examining Populism

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This week, Matt returns to the show and foists his questions about our current populist movements upon his reluctant dialogue partners Andrew and Alastair. Hilarity ensues.

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End the Hostilities Against Elites: Four Theses on Social Conservatism (#2)

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Note from Jake: We are re-publishing Matt’s old series from the fall of 2012 on social conservatism:

Part 1

Thesis: For social conservatism to thrive, it needs to end its hostility toward elite institutions that are currently opposed to it.

Consider this bit by Rick Santorum from this year’s Values Voter Summit, which both stunned and saddened me:

Now, I’m a Rick Santorum fan. I like the fellow. Yes, he has a penchant for occasionally putting things badly (a problem rampant in social conservatism, and if I ever talk more one I’ll probably suffer from). But when I first heard him speak, I came away thinking that he was presidential material. Is he perfect? No way. But there aren’t many folks out there who can make a decent case for why family-friendly tax policies are good for America, and he’s one of them.

But still, if this is a snapshot of social conservatism, the movement is in far more trouble than we realize. Let me be really tough on Santorum for a second and count the ways in which this statement goes wrong:

First, the rampant populism fuels a sense of grievance against elites. It’s class warfare, only the classes are divided along prestige lines rather than economic ones. The “smart folks” in the university aren’t ever going to be with social conservatives and judging by much of the standard rhetoric about Hollywood, neither will they. I’m open to that being an honest assessment of the situation at the present: There are plenty of tweed-wearing academics who wouldn’t be caught dead at the Values Voter Summit. But class resentment—even if its against the “creatives” or the media or academics—will necessarily limit conservatism’s appeal and so unnecessarily throttle its cultural impact.

Second, this sort of statement emboldens conservatives in the wrong places. It’s one thing to highlight conservatism’s populist character and to emphasize the church and family as the wellspring of cultural renewal. I’m all for that project. But to cut away elites altogether creates the misguided confidence that as long as we get the numbers on our side, things are going well. We’ve seen this dynamic play out in the marriage debate, where conservatives have won vote after vote—and lost court case after court case. And while we might like talking about our slight margin on marriage and how important it is, we should not forget our Plato: Crowds tend to be unsteady, unreliable guides that tend toward despotism rather than liberty.

Third, it ironically points toward a lack of confidence in our ability to argue persuasively for our positions. If our cause is just and our understanding of human nature is true, then if we motor along doing our thing elites will eventually come around. And if they don’t, well, then I suspect conservatives will eventually become them. Intellectually troubled positions can’t borrow capital forever. Eventually, they’ll go bankrupt. And if social conservatives were actually confident in their positions, well, we wouldn’t foreclose the possibility of persuasion simply because our views are currently on the “outs” in those communities. We ought to roll out the welcome mat for those who recognize that liberalism has been tried and found wanting. Because if conservatives are actually right about this, then their ranks are going to swell.

One more frustration: What happens to those younger social conservatives who are talented enough to enter elite institutions? They certainly aren’t encouraged to go in that direction. (I was cautioned this weekend by a friend not to forget Jesus while studying at Oxford.  And that after telling him I’m doing a degree in theological ethics!). Instead, because the “media will never be on our side,” those who might be able to play at that level will be perpetually cordoned off to the secondary conservative institutions, that may or may not be as good. That may actually have some advantages, but it also becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: Hollywood will never be on conservatives’ side as long as social conservatives spend their time railing against it and keeping their young people as far as possible from it.

Thriving as a movement might not mean entering into these institutions as a way of “infiltrating” them or trying to make a difference in them for conservative principles. As James Poulos ably points out, that mentality may be part of the reason why conservatives are no good at pop culture. What’s more, to attempt to cover the gap through strategy is simply another sign of the movement’s lack of confidence. If our understanding of the world is actually the best on offer, then all we need to do is calmly and patiently point toward it with a cheerful and engaging smile.  To do otherwise would be simply vanity.

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